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ABSTRACT 
Confidence in the banking system is critical to the health of households, 
businesses and the overall economy.  Government intervention in the financial 
services sector and the strict regulation of the banking industry is rationalised by 
the need to minimise the occurrence of events that could undermine the 
reputation of banks and threaten confidence in the system. 
This aim of this research is to answer the question, ‘Are Scottish consumers 
confident in retail banking regulation?’  This research has taken a unique 
approach to answering this question by measuring the levels of confidence in 
each of the specific rationales identified in the literature for regulating the retail 
banking system.   
Analysis of the findings was undertaken in three distinct stages: individual 
demographics in relation to levels of confidence; the direction of confidence in 
relation to these demographics; and the combined demographic factors that have 
the greatest impact on the levels of confidence in each of the areas that regulation 
seeks to address.   
In designing the survey, a three-stage approach was also adopted; theorists, 
practitioners and end-users contributed to the development of a consumer 
survey.  The questions were derived from the theoretical framework and 
developed into the final consumer survey that would gather the demographic 
information and test the hypotheses. 
The main findings are that the youngest age group (18-29 years) have the highest 
levels of confidence in their retail banks.  Those with a higher income and those 
with higher educational attainment have the least confidence in the areas that 
regulation seeks to address.  This has implications for both industry and the 
regulators in terms of how they target these specific groups to increase their 
levels of trust and satisfaction.  A lack of trust threatens the stability of the financial 
system and the wider economy.  
Finally, this research has contributed to the continued debate into the use of 
parametric methods of data analysis when using Likert scales.  The finding is that 
the use of parametric tests for the analysis of Likert scale data is robust. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
A bank account is a basic necessity to participate in modern society.  It is a 
requirement for employment and housing.  With no bank account it would be almost 
impossible to borrow money.  Paying for goods and services, paying utility bills, or 
transferring money to friends and family are all facilitated through bank account 
services.  Plastic cards, internet banking, mobile payments are all services accessed 
through bank account provision.  Commercial banks provide retail banking services 
to household and business customers.  They play the vital role of channelling funds 
between savers and borrowers and operating the payments system.   
In the facilities described above, commercial banks are undertaking the crucial role 
of financial intermediation.  In this role they are providing the essential economic 
mechanism of transferring and allocating funds to their most productive use.  A bank 
provides loans to borrowers (deficit units) and accepts deposits from savers (surplus 
units).  Since households make up the largest proportion of surplus units (consumer 
spending is by far the single biggest part of aggregate demand), they are providing 
a high proportion of the finance that businesses and governments require through 
the deposits held in their bank accounts.   
Financial intermediation reconciles three disparate needs of deficit units and surplus 
units which cannot be met through direct lending.  The first is the difference in size 
of deposits to loans.  Depositors may be making relatively small, albeit frequent, 
deposits into their bank accounts, whilst borrowers may by looking to borrow a 
substantial sum perhaps to finance a home purchase, or to finance a large-scale 
commercial project.  Secondly, depositors may need the flexibility to be able to 
withdraw their funds at relatively short notice, a liquidity preference, but home 
finance loans and commercial loans for investment projects tend to require long-term 
borrowing.  Lastly, higher risk is associated with the probability of higher return, 
consequently banks will seek out contracts which offer the best returns, and 
conversely depositors may be risk-averse.  Additionally, borrowers who are more 
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inclined to take risk are less resistant to higher interest rates.  These unequal 
requirements are resolved through the transformation function that banks perform.   
To overcome the disparity in size of deposits to loans, banks lend the aggregated 
deposits.  To resolve the mismatch of demand deposits to long-term loans banks 
use maturity transformation.  Banks are able to lend for a longer timeframe than they 
borrow because they maintain a net balance which in normal operating conditions is 
not significantly affected by the daily inflows and outflows of deposits and 
withdrawals.  Lastly, since two contracts exist when banks accept deposits (between 
bank and depositor) and make loans (between bank and borrower) the risk is 
transformed.  The risk-averse depositor does not take on any of the loan risk, and 
the bank is able to diversify their risk by investing in a range of products, industries, 
geographical areas, and consumer profiles.    
Confidence in the system is essential since depositors would demand their deposits 
and possibly trigger a bank run if they feared that there was a risk of loss.  Without 
these deposits, banks would soon find their capital depleted and could not make 
loans.  Banks that face liquidity and capital shortages may face insolvency and could 
cause a shock to the overall system, triggering a financial crisis. 
Where banks have a shortage of funds to lend, or decide to cut back on lending 
(such as after Global Financial Crisis) businesses will struggle to raise the finance 
they need to invest and grow.  This in turn will lead to slower economic growth (see 
Figure 1.1 overleaf) and higher unemployment (see Figure 1.2 overleaf).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 3 
 
Figure 1.1: Comparison of Real GDP Growth from 2007-2017 in UK and USA  
 
(Adapted from Statista, 2019)  
 
Figure 1.2: Comparison of Unemployment Rate from 2007-2017 in UK and 
USA
 
(Adapted from Statista, 2018 and 2019) 
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Confidence in the banking system is consequently critical to the health of 
households, businesses and the overall economy.  Hence, government intervention 
in the financial services sector and the strict regulation of the banking industry is 
rationalised by the need to minimise the occurrence of events that could undermine 
the reputation of banks and threaten confidence in the system. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 left the United Kingdom’s financial services 
sector with a less than favourable reputation.  Bennett and Kottasz (2012, p.128) 
argued that “a substantial deterioration in the favourability of public attitudes towards 
the banking industry seems to have occurred following the crisis”.    
The aftermath of the collapse, the nationalisation of Northern Rock and rescuing of 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group by the taxpayer are likely to remain in the 
forefront of the media and general public’s minds for decades to come.   
In fact, the situation in the financial sector became so desperate that the United 
Kingdom’s government abandoned the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition 
Commission rules and allowed Lloyds TSB to take over Halifax Bank Of Scotland in 
order to avoid their collapse and try to regain financial stability on the grounds of 
“national interest” (Hall, 2009, p.445).  This controversial acquisition became the 
subject of a court case nearly a decade later when 6000 retail and institutional 
investors sued the bank for £600m.  Shareholders argued that they had been 
deliberately misled by the bank and its executives about Halifax Bank of Scotland’s 
financial situation.  Lloyd’s TSB executives argued that the waiving of the competition 
restrictions was an opportunity that was too good to be missed (George, 2018).  
Akinbami (2011, p.134) described it as “the most significant financial crisis to occur 
since the Great Crash of 1929”.  To put this comparison into perspective, in 2009 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 4.8% compared to a fall of 5.1% in 1931 (The 
Economist, 2010).  However, the UK economy was around 400 times larger in 2009 
compared to 1931 (Measuring Worth, 2018).  Gamble (2009, p.452) wrote of the 
“economic, financial, organisational, political and ideological” hurdles faced during 
recovery in the 1930s and the long depression that followed the crash.  This differed 
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from the predictable 10-year boom and bust cycles which characterised the 19th 
century UK economy; crisis came to mean not just financial struggles, but also the 
socio-political obstacles to recovery.  
In contrast, Richardson (1969) described the social and political struggles faced by 
the British public in the 1930s as mild compared to their counterparts in the United 
States of America or Germany, with unemployment rising by not much above 5%, 
wages increasing by an average of 3% annually, national income barely declining, 
and an “upswing” from 1932 onwards. In reality, in comparison to the rest of the 
world, the UK depression was minor. 
What has compounded public mistrust during this most recent crisis, are the 
scandals which some feel amount to, at least metaphorically, criminal acts.  For 
example: Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) mis-selling; London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) fixing; and interest rate swap mis-selling, to name just a few.  Gosling 
(2011, p.40) wrote of the PPI debacle, “In the history of financial crimes perpetrated 
against the public in this country…the mis-selling of PPI…is up there with the best 
of them”.  PPI was sold alongside retail credit as an insurance product that enabled 
consumers to ensure that their repayments would be met should they become 
unable to earn income due to accident, illness, death and certain other 
circumstances.     
1.2 Recent Scandals in the UK Retail Banking Sector       
There have been a number of scandals in the sector which have been attributed to 
a failure of regulation.  Many of these can be linked to the market failures of 
asymmetric information, when one party to a transaction has more material 
knowledge than another.  Additionally, the principal-agent problem, which exists due 
to bank executives acting on behalf of shareholders, can lead to problems of moral 
hazard and conflicts of interest.  Furthermore, the inequality in bargaining power has 
led to a rise in accusations of fraud and mis-selling.  Some examples of these 
scandals will now be discussed.   
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1.2.1 Mis-selling                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
One of the biggest retail banking mis-selling scandals of recent years, in terms of 
number of consumers affected, amount of compensation paid out and time taken to 
resolve, was exposed in September 2005 when the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) 
published a report which demonstrated the problems consumers faced with PPI.  In 
the report, CAB reviewed cost, exclusions, sales process, and claims.  CAB revealed 
unfair treatment of consumers in all of these areas.   For example, one-off premiums 
of up to 56% of the loan value were being added to the loan and interest charged on 
the premiums (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2005).  Additionally, CAB found that 
consumers were being pressurised into taking PPI without having the exclusions 
explained properly, or sufficient questioning carried out to establish suitability of the 
product.  Consumers who were experiencing financial difficulty were finding their 
debts increase through consolidation loans with PPI added to them.  Often these 
consumers would have to refinance as they struggled to meet the monthly loan 
repayments, and a new PPI policy would be sold with each new loan.  CAB (2005) 
also found that there were several obstacles when a consumer tried to make a claim.  
Firstly, for many consumers this was the earliest point in which policy exclusions 
came to light.  Next, the evidence that had to be provided in order to make a claim, 
either medical or unemployment related, was expensive and time consuming to 
obtain.  Then, the claims process was protracted, in some cases resulting in missed 
repayments which resulted in financial detriment to the consumer. 
CAB raised a super-complaint with the Office of Fair Trading and urged them, the 
Financial Services Authority and the Treasury Select Committee, to investigate 
further.  In October 2006 the Office of Fair Trading published its findings and in 
February 2007 recommended referral to the Competition Commission under section 
131 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (Competition Commission, 2009).   
 
The Competition Commission made several recommendations to resolve the 
adverse effect on competition and consumer detriment: 
i. A ban was to be placed on selling PPI at the point of sale of credit;  
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 7 
 
ii. A personal quote was to be provided; and 
iii. Information relating to costs, benefits, optional nature, alternative providers 
and protection products must be stipulated in the marketing material 
(Competition Commission, 2009).   
In April 2011 the British Banker’s Association decided to challenge the new rules 
imposed by the FSA, following the Competition Commission findings, in the High 
Court, a case which they lost and decided not to appeal (Wells, 2011).  Several years 
later, claims are still being made and in March 2019 the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA), the FSA successor, announced that the total paid since January 2011 was 
£34.2bn (FCA, 2019b).  However, a deadline for claims of August 2019 was imposed 
by the FCA in 2017. 
1.2.2 Ring Fencing 
There have also been a number of scandals outwith retail banking which have 
strengthened the case to ring fence them from investment banks.  The current 
regulatory structure is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4.   Ring fencing is the 
separation of retail banking from the riskier global operations and investment 
banking side of the business.  During the bank bail-outs, the taxpayer, via the Bank 
of England (BoE), was effectively bailing out not just the essential retail part of the 
business but the much riskier and profitable investment side.  In future the BoE would 
be able to act in its capacity of Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) and save the retail side 
(to protect consumers) and allow the investment side to fail (FCA, 2016c). There will 
be further discussion of ring fencing in Section 2.4.5.  This echoes the reforms in the 
United States following the Global Financial Crisis.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act and the Consumer Protection Act (DFA) was enacted in July 2010 to 
bring an end to implicit guarantees of bail-out for those institutions regarded ‘Too Big 
To Fail’ (TBTF).  Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014, p.156) argue that “for market 
discipline to be effective there must be the market belief that uninsured creditors and 
shareholders will bear the losses in the event of failure”. However, their research 
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finds that although market discipline has improved since the passing of the DFA, 
there are opportunities for further improvements. 
i. LIBOR-fixing Scandal  
Barclays was accused of fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), 
the rate at which international banks in the UK lend to each other, and was 
fined £59.5 million in June 2012 under section 206 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Walker, 2013).   Dillow (2012) stated that the biggest 
cost of the Barclay’s scandal was trust, as this in turn depresses long-run 
economic growth.  The reason for this, he explains, is asymmetric information, 
which is explored in more detail in Section 2.6.3.2.  The LIBOR scandal is a 
textbook example of what Llewellyn (Financial Services Authority, 1999) 
termed ‘grid lock’.  Grid lock is discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.4.  
ii. Money Laundering 
The United States Department of Justice (2012) released a statement 
reporting that HSBC UK and HSBC USA had admitted to Anti-Money 
Laundering and sanctions violations.  This included permitting drugs 
traffickers to “launder hundreds of millions of dollars through HSBC 
subsidiaries, and to facilitate hundreds of millions more in transactions with 
sanctioned countries”.  HSBC forfeited $1.256bn and agreed to enter into a 
five-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA).  This meant that if HSBC 
failed to comply with the agreement in any way they could be prosecuted. 
In October 2017 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, 2017) reported 
that the UK financial regulators and the Serious Fraud Office were to review 
allegations that HSBC and Standard Chartered were linked to a South African 
corruption scandal.  Despite this, HSBC’s Press Office (2017) reported that 
the DPA had expired and that as HSBC had “lived up to all of its commitments” 
it would be seeking the dismissal of all charges. 
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Simultaneously, Withers (2017) reported that Lord Hain, in the House of 
Lords, had advised that a whistle-blower was assisting the FCA in their 
investigations.  However, there has been no further information released from 
the regulator, in the House of Lords or in the national press. 
iii. Interest Rate Hedging Products 
The FCA (2016b) identified major failings in the selling of these complex 
products and ordered a total of nine banks to pay redress amounting to 
£2.2bn and over £500m in losses. 
iv. Foreign Exchange Rates 
In November 2014 the FCA announced they were fining five banks a total of 
£1.1 billion for manipulating the spot foreign exchange currency rates (FCA, 
2014b).   
In January 2018 HSBC entered a further Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
with the Ministry of Justice and was fined over $100 million for currency 
rigging (The United States Department of Justice, 2018). 
1.2.3 Bank Runs 
Perhaps the most critical of events occurred in 2007.  Prior to this it was believed 
that depositor insurance would always prevent a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983).  BBC News (2007) reported the panic started when they announced on the 
13 September 2007 that Northern Rock had asked for assistance from the Bank of 
England, in its Lender of Last Resort capacity.   
On 14 September 2007 the Bank of England agreed to provide emergency funding 
at a penalty rate to Northern Rock following assurances from the FSA that the bank 
was not insolvent.  However, the panic was perpetuated by media images of 
consumers queuing outside their branches and did not cease until an announcement 
from Alistair Darling, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 17 September 2007 
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confirming all deposits held by Northern Rock would be guaranteed (Edmonds, 
2008).  
On 1 October 2007 the Chancellor attempted to restore consumer confidence further 
by increasing the level of depositor protection obtainable under the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) from 100% of the first £2,000 plus 90% of 
the next £33,000, to 100% of £35,000, per institution, per consumer (Hall, 2009, 
p.429). 
There are different levels of compensation dependent on the claim category, as at 
August 2018, these are detailed in Table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1: Financial Services Compensation Scheme: Compensation Levels 
Claim Category Compensation Level Date Effective From 
Deposits  £85,000 per person per firm 
(100%) 
The above figure is calculated 
on the exchange rate 
equivalent of €100,000 in EU 
countries to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage 
From 30 January 2017 
Deposits £1M for temporary high 
balances (100%) 
From 3 July 2015 
Investments £50,000 per person per firm 
(100%) 
From 1 January 2010 
Home Finance £50,000 per person per firm 
(100%) 
From 1 January 2010 
Insurance Business No upper limit  
Long-term, compulsory, 
professional, and certain 
claims for injury, sickness or 
infirmity (100%) 
Other types of claims (90%) 
From 3 July 2015 
 
General insurance advice and 
arranging 
No upper limit (90%) 
Compulsory insurance (100%) 
 
From 14 January 2005 
(Source: Financial Services Compensation Scheme, 2018) 
 
Investments, Home Finance, Insurance Business and General insurance advice and 
arranging compensation limits are not in place to protect against bank runs, however, 
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they are essential to maintain a level of trust and protection against bad advice or 
mis-selling. 
1.3 Who was to Blame? 
Arguments as to where the blame lay for these scandals were plentiful.  ‘Greedy 
bankers’ was a popular theme in the national press, fuelled by coverage of 
extortionate bonus payments when the rest of the UK population struggled through 
the credit crunch. Black (2008, p.32) argued that although subprime lending was the 
‘trigger’ of the Global Financial Crisis, the cause was the abundance of credit 
available to all.  He goes on to say that if the regulators had stepped in it would have 
been tantamount to stopping the “party” and it is “the politicians and the public who 
should accept the blame for this. We all did it and benefited from it”.  
Somewhat ironically, the regulator in authority during the above scandals was set up 
after a series of bank failures in the 1990s.  Logan (2001, p.320) referred to the 
period as “the small banks’ crisis…when failure was last widespread and the system 
faced a potentially systemic threat”. 
1.4 The Financial Services Authority 
The FSA came into power as the sole regulator of the financial services sector in the 
UK in 2001 as a result of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000).  Gordon 
Brown, the then Chancellor, later publicly admitted setting up the FSA to monitor 
individual institutions was a “big mistake”.  During a key note speech at the Institute 
for New Economic Thinking he explained, “We set up the FSA believing that the 
problem would come from the failure of an individual institution”.  He then went on to 
say that the understanding of what “global” meant was “incomplete” and 
misunderstood by almost everyone involved in regulation (Brown, 2011). 
On 24 April 2012 Hector Sants made his last speech as CEO of the FSA.  In this 
speech he outlined what he felt were the reasons the FSA had failed.  Firstly, 
inadequate capital and liquidity standards of banks; secondly, many of those in key 
board positions, both executive and non-executive, lacked the technical skills to 
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manage the risks in their banks; thirdly, the culture of high rewards for short-term 
gain and lack of governance; and fourthly, the perception of high performing senior 
individuals being above the law.  Rather unapologetically, there is no mention of the 
billions of pounds of on-going mis-selling scandals that have caused harm to millions 
of customers and small businesses.  The banks were clearly, in his opinion, to blame 
for the financial crisis (Monaghan, 2012). 
1.5 The Financial Conduct Authority 
In 2013 the FSA was abolished and replaced with the FCA.  The FCA work alongside 
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) to create a “twin peaks regulatory 
structure in the UK” (Competition and Markets Authority, 2015, p.5). The role of the 
PRA is to ensure authorised firms are managed appropriately and sufficiently robust 
financially, whilst the FCA monitors authorised firms’ conduct, with particular focus 
on consumer protection and product intervention.  It is hoped that the reduction in 
span of control and defined areas of regulatory control will prevent further failure to 
maintain systemic stability and protect consumers. 
The FCAs regulatory objectives are:  
i. market confidence 
ii. financial stability  
iii. the protection of consumers 
iv. the reduction of financial crime 
In June 2018, the FCA published ‘The financial lives of consumers across the UK’.  
Their findings were that only 40% of UK adults are confident in the UK financial 
services industry, and only 31% feel that financial firms are honest and transparent.   
1.6 Consumer Confidence 
Prior to the aforementioned FCA research, Ernst and Young published its third 
Global Consumer Banking Survey, in 2014.  Over 32,000 participants from 43 
countries were surveyed, including 767 from the UK.  The Ernst and Young press 
release title ‘Two years of declining confidence in UK banking draws to a close’ 
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perhaps suggests a more positive impression than the data itself.  Although almost 
double the number of participants in 2013 stated that their confidence had increased 
since 2011 and 2012, this was only 11% of participants, with 52% saying their level 
of confidence had not changed and 37% saying their confidence had decreased; 
hence, still a long way to go in terms of meeting the FCA objective of maintaining 
consumer confidence in the UK financial system.  Interestingly, the UK consumer 
has double the level of distrust in their banks than their counterparts in the United 
States, Germany, France and Switzerland.   Ernst and Young found that the key 
driver of mistrust in the UK was the national press (67%), whilst the key driver of 
trust was how the individual consumer was treated by their bank (68%).  However, 
the survey found that trust does not prevent the price-sensitive UK consumer from 
switching, with 66% of consumers who had switched in the past 12 months citing 
rates and fees as the reason for doing so. 
It is clear that the events of the last decade, such as Payment Protection Insurance 
and interest-rate hedging product mis-selling scandals, LIBOR-fixing, money 
laundering and foreign exchange rate fixing have compounded distrust of the 
industry, the culmination of a bank run has elevated this distrust to suspicion of 
corruption, destroying confidence in the institutions and those in place to regulate 
them.  Trust and consumer confidence, and why they are so important in financial 
services will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4.3.  
The purpose of this research is to measure specifically the confidence of consumers 
in the areas which regulation seeks to address, fundamentally the prevention of 
events such as those mentioned above. 
1.7 Research Aim and Objectives 
Considering the above issues, and acknowledging the critical role that financial 
institutions contribute to the health and development of the economy, the aim of this 
thesis is to answer the question, ‘Are Scottish consumers confident in retail banking 
regulation?’  Based on the answer to this question, the implications of the levels of 
trust afforded by Scottish consumers on the banking sector, wider financial services 
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sector, and ultimately the economy, will be assessed.  The June 2018 FCA Report, 
‘The financial lives of consumers across the UK’ found the differences in levels of 
confidence between regions to be marginal.  Therefore, it could be argued that 
results from a Scottish study can be more widely applied to the UK. 
The specific research objectives are:  
i. Undertake a critical review of the existing theory of financial regulation 
literature, from the perspective of consumer confidence in retail banking, and 
identify the areas that retail banking regulation seeks to address; 
ii. Contextualise the theory and develop a set of key research questions through 
a three-stage survey design with theorists, practitioners and end-users; from 
theoretical model to empirical testing, to identify relevant theoretical and 
practical issues;  
iii. Create and conduct a Consumer Survey which measures levels of consumer 
confidence in the areas that retail banking regulation seeks to address; 
iv. Analyse and evaluate the data to determine the measure of overall levels of 
confidence, levels of confidence in each of the areas that regulation seeks to 
address, and differences in levels of confidence between demographic 
groups, such as age, income and education; 
v. Present the findings and contributions of this study to theory and practical 
implications for the regulator, banks, consumer groups and government, and 
make recommendations for future research. 
  
1.8 Research Methods 
The study will involve the following research methods: 
i. Secondary data collection through a review of the literature in terms of the 
theory of banking regulation and applicable economic theories;  
ii. Primary data collection will take a mixed method approach of a three-stage 
survey design and a survey of over 400 Scottish banking customers. 
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The survey will be empirically tested with three groups: the first with theorists, the 
second with practitioners, and the third with end-users. 
1.9 The Importance of the Research 
The research will provide an insight into the levels of consumer confidence in each 
of the rationales that regulation seeks to address.  As far as the researcher is aware 
this is the first study that has been conducted to obtain this data.  The research has 
identified the arguments for regulating the banking industry and, specifically, the 
reasons why retail consumers in particular must be protected.  Motivations for 
regulating the industry are mainly driven by the need to protect against market 
failures, such as externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and 
additionally non-economic, social rationales for regulation.  Maintaining the 
confidence levels of consumers is paramount to the safety and stability of the 
financial system and is a key objective of the UK regulator.  The researcher has 
therefore elected to measure the levels of confidence in each of the areas that 
regulation seeks to address to establish if regulation is ‘fit for purpose’ in this regard.  
Secondly, the researcher has used established demographics, such as age, gender, 
income level and education level to determine if there are differences in the levels of 
confidence between the groups.   
The methodology adopted in this research has sought to achieve a 360 degree view 
of the problem by including theorists and practitioners in the initial research stages 
to ensure the consumer survey questions were a true and accurate interpretation of 
each of the rationales for regulation.    
The importance and value of the potential findings and recommendations from this 
research are mainly twofold.  Firstly, this adds a new dimension to the academic 
literature on regulation and consumer protection in financial services.  The 
confidence levels of retail banking consumers has been broken down into each 
specific area that regulation seeks to address, and additionally compares the 
demographic characteristics of those consumers and how this affects their levels of 
confidence.   Secondly, this adds to practice by improving knowledge of consumers 
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within particular demographic profiles.  This has implications for both the regulator 
and commercial banks in the industry, which may treat consumers differently based 
on their profiles and specific needs. 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into six chapters.  The first chapter has introduced the 
background of mis-selling and institutional failures which brought about the reform 
of the UK financial sector regulator, and described the research aims, objectives and 
methods.  
The second chapter is a review of the literature in terms of the key theories and 
concepts.  Each theme will be explored by tracing the theory back to its roots to 
understand how it has developed over time to become accepted practice.  This 
chapter is split into two distinct sections.  The first section contextualises the 
research and the second section provides the theoretical framework.  
The third chapter provides an outline of the research methodology and methods 
employed by the researcher.  The relationship between the research question, the 
philosophical assumptions and the techniques used to conduct the research are 
demonstrated. Additionally, there is an overview of the preliminary research, 
including changes made to the Consumer Survey following examination of the 
feedback obtained during the three-stage empirical testing with theorists, 
practitioners and end-users.  Further, the data collected in the final study is 
described, including the characteristics and demographics of the sample population 
and the validity of the sampling approach is discussed. 
The fourth chapter presents the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.  The 
data from the Consumer Survey theoretical questions is analysed, focusing on 
specific characteristics of the participants. 
The fifth chapter presents a stepwise multiple regression analysis to identify the 
combination of demographic variables that would be used to predict the levels of 
confidence in the rationales for regulation. 
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The sixth, and final, chapter concludes the thesis and provides the development of 
the research topic, suggestions for future work, summary, and contribution. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The first chapter introduced the series of events, such as mis-selling and institutional 
failures, which brought about the reform of the UK financial sector.  In this chapter, 
an analytical overview of the key literature and development of regulation will be 
undertaken.  From this, the theories identified will inform the research method 
employed to answer the question, ‘Are Scottish consumers confident in retail 
banking regulation?’   
This question can only be answered by examining the trilateral relationship between 
the banks, the consumers and the regulator(s).  This chapter is therefore split into 
three distinct themes.  The first is the retail banks, why they exist and their structure 
and culture, and how this impacts consumer confidence; the second is the consumer 
and the role of consumer protection in banking; and the last is regulation and the 
structure and role of regulatory bodies in maintaining consumer confidence.  Each 
of these themes is split into sub-themes that explore the applicable economic 
theories. 
2.2 Retail Banks 
The definition of a retail bank will first be examined and how they have evolved over 
time in the UK market.  The structure and culture of these institutions will be explored 
and how these factors influence the treatment of consumers and impact consumer 
confidence in the effectiveness of regulation. 
2.2.1 What is a Retail Bank? 
The definition of a bank has changed considerably over the past few decades as 
there has been rapid change within the sector.  The most up-to-date definition 
provided in the FCA Handbook (2018a) is: 
a. A firm with a Part 4A permission, which includes accepting deposits 
and:  
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i. which is a credit institution; or  
ii. whose Part 4A permission includes a requirement that it comply 
with the rules in GENPRU and BIPRU relating to bank; but 
which is not a building society, a friendly society or a credit 
union;   
b. an EEA bank which is a full credit institution. 
Part 4A permission refers to the permission granted by the FCA, or PRA under Part 
4A of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000).  The Financial Services Act 
(2012) amended the 2000 Act and implemented the new regulatory framework by 
replacing the FSA with the FCA and PRA.    
2.2.2 The Evolution of the Retail Bank Market in the UK  
UK financial institutions underwent significant structural change during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Bowen, Hoggarth and Pain, 1999) as a result of deregulation and a 
changing market environment (Bank of England, 1991).  The move from a 
fragmented system, with a large number of providers with clear differentiation in the 
products and services provided, to a smaller number of large multinationals was 
facilitated by “the natural economic drivers of economies of scale and scope, 
interacting with demand-side drivers are financial deregulation” Davies, Richardson, 
Katinaite and Manning (2010, p.330).  “The bank branch network has been declining 
steadily for nearly 30 years. There were 20,583 branches in 1988 but only 8,837 in 
2012” (Edmonds, 2018).  Further consolidation of the sector followed the Global 
Financial Crisis. The growth in the size of firms has resulted in a move away from 
relationship banking to transactional banking (Llewellyn, 2014). 
2.2.3 Retail Bank Structure (Business Models) 
In the UK there is dominance in terms of the ownership structure of financial firms, 
that is, the Shareholder Value Model (SVM).  Llewellyn (2014) identified that this lack 
of diversity is the root cause of a multitude of problems faced by the industry over 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 20 
 
the past two decades.  In particular, this has led to a reduction in consumer choice 
and effective competition.  In 2002 the Competition Commission (later replaced by 
the Competition and Markets Authority) revealed findings of an inquiry into banking 
services provisions to small and medium-sized enterprises (which fall within the retail 
banking remit).  They concluded the market was operating as a complex monopoly 
which had an adverse effect on choice and information, and increased consumer 
detriment through exploitive practices such as excessive pricing (Competition 
Commission, 2002).  The Centre for Policy Studies retaliated with a report which 
claimed that it was the government’s deluge of regulations which had ‘obstructed 
innovation’ and ‘impeded competition’ (Lodge, 2002).   
Llewellyn (2014) posits that there are clear economic, systemic and welfare benefits 
to a more diversified financial system.  Mutual firms (which he calls the Stakeholder 
Value Model), such as Building Societies, focus on their members and as a result of 
addressing agency problems more efficiently may be more suited to providing 
financial products with longer-term contractual relationships such as mortgages and 
life assurance. 
The separation of ownership and control in the SVM also means that there is a lack 
of personal responsibility for decisions (Llewellyn, 2014).  Further, the business 
objectives of SVM focus on short-term rate of return on capital.  This gives rise to 
the creation of incentive structures and a culture that emphasises bonuses based on 
sales and maximising shareholder wealth (Llewellyn, 2014). 
2.2.4 Retail Bank Culture 
Spicer et al., (2014) undertook a significant study of the culture in UK retail banking.  
The motivation for the study was the lack of progress in culture change, compared 
to other areas such as capital ratios, remuneration, competition and ring fencing. 
They noted that the financial crisis had not been enough to incite cultural change 
and it was only after the LIBOR scandal that culture came more into focus.  The first 
of their main conclusions was that an aggressive sales culture, which was reinforced 
through reward, was to blame for widespread bad practices and bank failure.  During 
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their research, Spicer et al., (2014) found that in some cases the ‘dropped sales 
targets’ had simply be rebranded as ‘expectations’, ‘customer needs’ or ‘customer 
outcomes’.  In the worst cases a return of the ‘sales target whiteboard’ had been 
witnessed.   
Second, culture change is the responsibility of the banks themselves and not of the 
regulator.  The Banking Standards Review Council (BSRC) has been set up to 
support the process of cultural change.  However, to avoid what Stigler named 
‘regulatory capture’ and “maintain its public credibility and independence, its senior 
positions must not be solely filled by secondees from banks, nor can there be 
allowed to develop a revolving door between banks, audit firms and the BSRC” 
(p.11).  Spicer et al., (2014) add that senior leaders in the banks must take 
responsibility for embedding the new culture and changing behaviour as a priority.  
However, only by the BSRC assessing the front-line staff can they be sure that the 
message is not ’lost in the middle’.   
Third, the research indicated that more occurrences were likely to be uncovered.  
This is supported by the findings that in many cases banks were aware of problems 
for a number of years before they attempted to address them.  This is another 
example of Llewellyn’s ‘grid lock’ as the banks’ justification for not doing anything 
sooner was that everyone else was doing exactly the same.  Grid lock occurs when 
firms know how they should be behaving but adopt hazardous strategies as there 
are short-run advantages, which they may also believe their competitors are 
adopting (Llewellyn, 1998). 
Fourth, the banks are trying to change their cultures and become more ‘customer 
centric’, and all have programmes in place.  However, the research revealed that 
customer outcomes and metrics can be ‘gamed’ easily.  The examples given in the 
report are: 
i. closing ‘easy-win’ complaints quickly so they remain non-reportable and 
ii. a satisfied customer at point of sale, does not necessarily mean a satisfied 
customer later 
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The illustration used in the report is a loan customer who is happy to get the loan but 
later cannot afford the repayments when interest rates rise.  
Last, the old culture has become so engrained staff are wary and/or so overloaded 
by change that Spicer et al., (2014) predict it will take a whole generation to 
accomplish any significant change. 
In 2011, the CEOs and Chairmen of five of the UK's biggest banks signed up to a 
new ethical code of conduct aimed at improving the way they do business. They 
committed to treat customers and colleagues with respect and integrity and act fairly, 
paying close attention to risks (Goff, 2011).  The next section discusses ethics in 
organisations. 
2.2.5 Organisational Ethics 
Jones and George (2008, p.150) define organisational ethics as “the guiding 
practices and beliefs through which a particular company and its managers view 
their responsibility toward their stakeholders”.   
Although it must be acknowledged that there are hundreds of conflicting definitions 
of the stakeholder (Miles, 2012), it is generally accepted that a consumer can be 
defined as a stakeholder (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Cullum, 1997; Crane 
and Matten, 2007; Jones and George, 2008).  An early definition of stakeholders 
from Stanford (1963) as cited by Freeman (2010, p.31), “those groups without whose 
support the organisation would cease to exist”, is particularly fitting since banks 
would not exist without consumers.  For the purposes of this thesis, organisational 
ethics will be investigated in the context of the consumer and the protection of this 
stakeholder within financial services.   
Donaldson and Preston (1995) identified three distinct aspects of stakeholder 
management theory:  
i. Descriptive/empirical 
ii. Instrumental 
iii. Normative 
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Descriptive stakeholder theory is, as the name suggests, used to describe and 
explain different aspects of the firm and managerial behaviour, such as, how the firm 
operates, what the managers think about how they manage (Brenner and Molander, 
1977, as cited in Donaldson and Preston, 1995), how the firm is actually managed 
(Clarkson, 1991; Halal, 1990; Kreiner and Bhambri, 1991, as cited in Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995), and how the interests of the various stakeholders are considered by 
the board (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992, as cited in Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  In 
short, what does the firm do to manage the interests of their stakeholders? 
Instrumental stakeholder theory is used to determine whether taking stakeholders 
interests into account actually benefits the firm and positively contributes to the 
successful achievement of corporate objectives.  Briefly, the firm takes stakeholders 
interests into account because it is good for the bottom line.   
Normative stakeholder theory considers the moral and philosophical reasons why a 
firm should take their stakeholders interests into account.  In summary, the firm takes 
stakeholders interests into account because it is the right thing to do.  Donaldson 
and Preston, (1995), find that essentially there is value in using all three approaches, 
which are complementary, with normative theory being central to the theory. 
The stakeholder value model, or mutual model, discussed by Llewellyn (2014) 
implies that a firm will not pursue financial objectives above all others.  Christen, 
Rosenberg and Jayadeva (2004) previously developed what they describe as 
‘double bottom line’ institutions. That is, they pursue social objectives in addition to 
financial objectives.   They called these institutions ‘alternative financial institutions’ 
(AFIs) who serve the needs of consumers who have difficulties accessing 
microfinance financial institutions, particularly in developing or transitioning 
economies.  In the UK, Credit Unions are a type of financial cooperative who offer 
savings and loans provisions to those who may otherwise be excluded from the high 
street.  Credit Unions are not-for-profit and have been endorsed by Ethical 
Consumer magazine as providing truly ethical current accounts (ABCUL, 2012).   
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There are questions about who is accountable and responsible for a firm’s ethical, 
or otherwise, decisions.  Particularly since no executives were prosecuted for the 
behaviour that led to the 2007/08 crisis.  Overall, a strong ethical culture is 
considered essential to make the banks less vulnerable to misconduct (Vigeo-Eiris, 
2017). 
2.2.5.1 The Corporation as a Moral Agent  
French (1979, p.207) provided the foundations of a theory in which he proposed 
“corporations can be full-fledged moral persons and have whatever privileges, rights 
and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons”.  
French (1979, 1984) argued that corporations are both legal and moral persons and 
therefore are moral agents.  According to French, what makes the organisation a 
moral person is its ability to perform acts separate to any individuals associated with 
the organisation, and for these acts to have intentions which are also separate to the 
intentions of the individuals associated with the organisation.  Additionally, French 
(1995) adds to ‘intentionality’ the ability to make rational decisions and arguments, 
and the ability to respond to and change behaviour that is detrimental to others and 
their own interests.   
Green (1989) argued that companies do have ethical responsibility and are not 
protected by limited liability from the consequences of their actions.  Sheppard 
(1994) reiterated the concept that corporations are moral persons.  He proposed that 
corporate culture can be viewed as the organisation’s personality and that the board 
of directors, who provide the emotional capacity to be a moral person, are ultimately 
responsible for the corporate moral person. 
However, after some criticism (Donaldson, 1982; Werhane 1985), French (2005, 
p.577) later revisited his original work and conceded that organisations are not moral 
persons as they “fail to make it as intentional agents”.  He explains, if intentions are 
understood in terms of desires and beliefs, then organisational policy cannot be 
understood as intentions. 
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In more recent work, Hess (2013) argued that corporations are moral agents but not 
moral persons.  He defined a moral agent as having moral obligations and a moral 
person as being entitled to specific rights and protections.  His argument was based 
on whether corporations should be entitled to rights and protections from the 
perspective of four different paradigms: legal, political, cultural and business ethics.  
From a legal position Hess (2013) argued that corporations are recognised as 
persons for practical reasons only; such as entering contracts, rather than to afford 
them any rights and protections.  From a political standpoint he argues that whilst 
corporations can be termed rational agents (capable of entering into contracts), are 
entitled to certain political privileges, rights and duties, this does not make them a 
moral person with moral privileges, rights and duties.  Thirdly, what is culturally 
accepted as a person; the emotions and feelings experienced, and the 
‘vulnerabilities’ people are susceptible to, he argues, is what separates them from 
corporations.  The fourth and final paradigm relates to business ethics and is derived 
from French’s (1979) seminal theory on the moral person, which he himself later 
retracted, leading Hess (2013, p.330) to describe it as a “red herring”. 
Hess (2013) concludes by reasoning that corporations are moral agents in that they 
can and should be expected to act in accordance with their moral obligations, 
however, they are not moral persons entitled to rights and protections as they cannot 
experience physical and emotional pain and suffering as a result of their 
vulnerabilities, and therefore, there is no valid argument to grant them rights and 
protections. 
Since the financial crisis there have been reforms within the industry to increase the 
accountability of the board of financial institutions.  The Senior Managers and 
Certification Regime (SM&CR) introduced a statutory duty of responsibility in March 
2017. 
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2.2.5.2 Ethical Frameworks 
There are certain ethical frameworks that can be applied when making ethical 
business decisions.  Jones and George, (2008) present four ethical frameworks for 
use in a business context: 
i. utilitarian rule 
ii. moral rights rule 
iii. justice rule 
iv. practical rule  
An ethical decision made under the utilitarian rule should produce the “greatest good 
for the greatest number of people” (Jones and George, 2008, p.139).  The 
philosophy of utilitarianism is linked back to “British philosophers and economists 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and has been 
influential in modern economics in general” (Crane and Matten, 2007, p.94).  
Utilitarianism is based on the principle of utility; the value of actions.  This is a 
variable which is commonly used in economics and therefore complements its 
numerical approach.  As an ethical decision under the utilitarian approach weighs 
‘good’ against ‘bad’, Crane and Matten, (2007) relate it to “cost-benefit analysis”.  In 
a corporate situation, when management are faced with an ethical dilemma their 
decision should result in the greatest amount of good for their stakeholders.  A 
shortcoming of the utilitarian approach can be demonstrated when the common good 
and individual rights clash.  Jones and George, (2008) acknowledge that in capitalist 
societies, such as the UK, the rights of the shareholders will be favoured above the 
rights of other stakeholders in the case of cost-cutting exercises.  This is evidenced 
by the announcements off-shoring of 4,000 UK jobs by HSBC to Asia in 2003 (Cave, 
2003) and 9,000 job losses at Lloyds in 2014 as the business moves towards digital 
rather than face-to-face banking (Lawson, 2014).  Their ethical justification in these 
situations was had they not undertaken these cost-cutting exercises they would 
become uncompetitive and may face closure, resulting in greater harm to all 
stakeholders.  
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According to Jones and George (2008), moral rights rule is concerned with protecting 
the rights of the people who will be affected by the decision.  “The British philosopher 
John Locke (1632-1714)…conceptualised the notion of natural rights” (Crane and 
Matten, 2007, p.100).  When faced with a dilemma, managers need to consider the 
rights of each group of stakeholders and how these would be affected by different 
decision outcomes.  They should choose an outcome that protects the rights of all 
stakeholders.  This can present difficulties when a decision has positive effects for 
one group and has negative effects for another.  As with the utilitarian approach, one 
of its shortcomings is the clash between individual rights and the common good. 
Natural rights are often referred to as human rights today and a breach of these in 
the UK would be breaking the law.  HSBC came under fire in 2014 for financing 
companies such as Wilmar International and Sime Darby which have questionable 
human rights abuse records (Green Century Funds, 2014).  So, although not directly 
breaching human rights laws, it could be perceived that they are advocating these 
companies by financing and holding shares in them. It would not be surprising to find 
that consumers are confused as to how this could be, since HSBC promotes itself 
as a leading supporter in the campaign against climate change and states that 
“sustainability underpins our strategic priorities” (HSBC, 2017).  
The justice rule is concerned with ensuring that ethical decisions are made fairly and 
impartially; and therefore address the clash between individual rights and the 
common good.  In the situation of a bank, management would have to ensure that 
the costs and benefits are fairly distributed to all stakeholders relative to their input 
into the organisation.  Traditionally, their stakeholders can be identified as:  
i. Shareholders 
ii. Customers 
iii. Employees 
iv. Suppliers (Crane and Matten, 2007). 
When looking at how a bank distributes its increased profits from the types of cost-
cutting exercises mentioned above, it is clear that shareholders benefit through 
dividends received and employees through bonuses received.  What is not so clear 
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is how these cost savings are transferred to consumers as some would argue that 
customer service standards are falling (Which?, 2019) and costs of running a bank 
account are rising via service charge and penalties.  In reality, lower bank borrowing 
costs have not been passed on to consumers in the form of lower overdraft costs 
(Rovnick, 2016).  
Jones and George, (2008) suggest that a fourth rule has been introduced, the 
practical rule, in response to the conflict in stakeholder interests the three rules 
above present.  Three questions must be positively satisfied in order for a business 
decision to be deemed ethical.  Firstly, have today’s accepted business “standards” 
and “values” been met?  Secondly, do you feel comfortable that your decision, and 
how it has “affected” individuals and groups, will be “communicated” to the public 
and press?  Lastly, will friends, family and associates with which you have a 
“significant” connection “approve”?  For example, when bank managers decided to 
pressurise their sales teams into selling PPI to every customer who opened a 
personal loan or credit card (whether they needed the product or not) could they 
justify this decision to their families and would they approve?  This approach can be 
used to determine the practical effects and outcomes of any decisions, however, 
reliance on others perceptions may lead to poor judgement. 
The FCA Principles for Businesses (see Table 2.1 overleaf) are founded on ethics.  
Language used such as, “integrity” (Principle 1), “due care and due diligence” 
(Principle 2), “treat [customers] fairly” (Principle 6), “clear, fair and not misleading” 
(Principle 7), and “manage conflicts of interest fairly” (Principle 8) set the foundations 
of how financial organisations should be applying ethics in their day-to-day 
processes and procedures and dealings with consumers.   
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Table 2.1 FCA Principles for Business 
1. Integrity A firm must conduct its business with integrity  
2. Skill, care and due 
diligence 
A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence 
3. Management and 
control 
A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management 
systems 
4. Financial prudence A firm must maintain adequate financial resources 
5. Market Conduct A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct 
6. Customers’ 
interests 
A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and 
treat them fairly 
7. Communications 
with clients 
A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, 
and communicate with information to them in a way that is clear, 
fair and not misleading 
8. Conflicts of interest A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself 
and its customers and between a customer and another client 
9. Customers: 
relationships of 
trust 
A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its 
advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled 
to rely upon its judgement 
10. Clients’ assets A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients’ assets when 
it is responsible for them 
11. Relations with                      
regulators 
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative 
way, and must disclose to the appropriate regulator appropriately 
anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would 
reasonably expect notice  
(Source: Financial Conduct Authority, 2018)    
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In 2013, Black and Anderson produced a paper which examined how an ethical 
framework could be created for the financial services industry.  Firstly, the 
suggestion of more legislation was dismissed on the grounds that more rules replace 
and reduce ownership of responsible decision making and “devalues ethics as it then 
becomes a question about what is required, rather than what is just and the right 
thing to do” (Black and Anderson, 2013, p.3).  Jackman (2012) describes the 
reduction in the need for firms to think for themselves as “a kind of laundering of 
conscience; if it’s legal, it must be all right…and often focuses attention on minimum 
standards”.  He goes on to say there is a “need to create space for ethics – space in 
the sense of deliberate ‘gaps’ in regulation”.  The Black and Anderson (2013) paper 
acknowledges ethical duties have long since been part of the regulatory rules, dating 
back to 1988 (with the passing of The Bank of England Act, 1998), and suggested 
that the problem is more interpretation and application by financial firms and 
appropriate supervision by the regulator. 
Secondly, it was suggested remuneration structures and performance incentives 
which drive behaviour could include ethical targets.  Each firm’s performance against 
these objectives could be used to benchmark strong and weak ethical behaviour 
which could be used to gain competitive advantage.  Presently, firms and individuals 
who are found to be conducting bad ethical practice are subject to public rebuke, 
however, there is no such recognition for good behaviour. 
In 2013, O’Loughlin reported that HSBC was joining Barclays and the Cooperative 
Bank in removing sales targets from frontline staff and instead focusing on customer 
needs.  This followed an investigation by the FSA which demonstrated that of the 
incentive schemes in place at the 22 firms examined, most were likely to lead staff 
to mis-sell to meet targets and gain bonuses (O’Loughlin, 2013).  
Thirdly, it was suggested that an ethical group could be created which would self-
regulate the industry as a whole.  BBC News (2014) reported on the establishment 
of The Banking Standards Review Council (BSRC), an independent body set up to 
report on the behaviour and competence of member banks.  It is fully funded by the 
industry but membership is not mandatory, which led to criticism and headlines such 
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as “Ethics panel for banks on the brink” due to the lack of commitment from several 
investment banks and none from foreign banks at the time (Wallace, 2014).  
However, to date (2019), 34 UK, foreign, and investment banks, and building 
societies have joined the renamed Banking Standards Board (BSB) which was 
launched with a new board in May 2015 (BSB, 2015). 
Webley and Werner, (2008) found that although most large corporations had ethical 
codes of conduct there was a gap between the values and principles conveyed in 
the code and the attitudes and behaviour of the firm.  Their research revealed this 
gap was due to ineffective ethics programmes and deficient corporate culture.  
However, McKinney, Emerson and Neubert, (2010) found that firms which had a 
written code of ethics tended to exhibit more ethical responses to common business 
dilemmas.  The ‘Big 4’ banks all subscribe to a code under various titles.  HSBC’s is 
called ‘Our Values’; Barclays’ is called ‘Purpose and Values’; Lloyds are called 
‘Ethics and Values’; and RBS’ are called ‘Our Code’.  
Painter-Morland (2010) argued that through the process of formulating corporate 
ethical codes they (the codes) become institutionalised, losing moral responsiveness 
and undermining ethical responsiveness.  Essentially, imposing control mechanisms 
and rules was counter-intuitive to informing ethical behaviour.  Painter-Morland 
(2010) suggested ‘self-questioning’ which would “allow the moral conscience to be 
spurred into action” (2010, p.273).    Within RBS’ code is a ‘Yes check list’ (see 
Figure 2.1 overleaf).   This exercise encourages employees to actively engage in a 
process which enables them to make ethical decisions; this is a step ahead of their 
competitors and addresses the dilemma highlighted by Painter-Morland (2010).   
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Figure 2.1: RBS ‘Yes’ Checks 
(Source: RBS, This is Our Code, 2013) 
 
Fourthly, if agreement on ethical conduct could be reached, which Black and 
Anderson, (2003) concede would be difficult, a form of ‘scenario analysis and stress-
testing’ could be conducted; much in the same way that the banking system’s capital 
adequacy is currently tested.  The purpose of these exercises would be to identify 
weaknesses and develop strategies to deal with them, consequently raising the 
profile of ethics in banking and opening the channel of communication between the 
regulator and regulated concerning these matters. 
Lastly, Black and Anderson, (2013) suggest, with hesitation, the regulators presence 
within financial organisations may help to overcome ethical issues as and when they 
arise.  However, it is accepted that this strategy would conflict with the FCA approach 
of reducing contact with the regulated.  Additionally, they highlight the possible risk 
Ask yourself…  
1 Does what I am doing keep our customers and the bank safe and secure? Consider 
the impact of what you are doing. Rehearse a briefing with your boss.  
2 Would customers and colleagues say I am acting with integrity? Consider: would I 
do this to someone in my family or a friend? Would I do it to myself?  
3 Am I happy with how this would be perceived on the outside? Consider the impact 
of this in the outside world. Try writing the press release – does it sound good for 
customers?  
4 Is what I am doing meeting the standards of conduct required? Think. If you are 
unsure then seek a second opinion.  
5 In 5 years’ time would others see this as a good way to work? Will this have a 
positive impact? Imagine writing it on your CV.  
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of regulatory capture.  To date, there is no UK banking industry wide ethical code of 
practice.  In the next section, the consumer and the role of consumer protection in 
banking will be explored. 
2.3 Retail Bank Consumers 
In this second theme, the definition of retail bank consumer will be considered from 
the perspective of the industry regulator, and therefore the legal definition.  Next, the 
regulatory bodies and laws which are in place to protect the interests of the 
consumer will be introduced.  Lastly, the reasons why consumers demand regulation 
will be explored. 
2.3.1 Who is a Retail Bank Consumer? 
Although the terms consumer and customer are often used interchangeably, the 
economic definition is generally accepted as the former being defined as the 
individual who consumes a good or service and the latter as the individual who 
purchases a good or service.  Generally, in retail banking both are performed 
simultaneously making it hard to differentiate.  Cartwright (2004) regards consumers 
of financial services as both private bank customers and private investors and are 
not restricted to their economic definitions.  Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis 
the terms consumer and customer should be treated as ‘one and the same’.  
The FCA’s consumer mandate has been expanded under section 404E of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) and covers the following:  
 Persons using, contemplating using or those who have rights or interests in 
 services provided by an authorised person/regulated firm, either for 
 themselves or on another’s behalf.  The services include: acceptance of 
 deposits, consumer credit, investment activity, payment services, electronic 
 money and ancillary services (The National Archives, 2018).   
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2.3.2 Consumer Protection in Retail Banking 
What is consumer protection?  In the context of retail banking, it is the legislation 
that is in place to regulate banks and protect the interests of the consumer.  The 
Financial Services Act (2012) outlines the FCA’s statutory strategic and operational 
objectives.  The first of the operational objectives, and the only one considered for 
the purposes of this thesis, is the consumer protection objective: 
 
Figure 2.2: FCA Consumer Protection Objective 
 (Source: The National Archives, 2018)   
(1) The consumer protection objective is: securing an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers. 
(2) In considering what degree of protection for consumers may be appropriate, the FCA must 
have regard to— 
(a) the differing degrees of risk involved in different kinds of investment or other 
transaction; 
(b) the differing degrees of experience and expertise that different consumers may have; 
(c) the needs that consumers may have for the timely provision of information and 
advice that is accurate and fit for purpose; 
(d) the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions; 
(e) the general principle that those providing regulated financial services should be 
expected to provide consumers with a level of care that is appropriate having regard to 
the degree of risk involved in relation to the investment or other transaction and the 
capabilities of the consumers in question; 
(f) the differing expectations that consumers may have in relation to different kinds of 
investment or other transaction; 
(g) any information which the consumer financial education body has provided to the 
FCA in the exercise of the consumer financial education function; 
(h) any information which the scheme operator of the ombudsman scheme has provided 
to the FCA pursuant to section 232A. 
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In a 2012 FSA report introducing the FCA, Wheatley said of the FCA’s new 
approach, “We will step in earlier, and act faster, when we identify problems that risk 
harming consumers or the integrity of the market” (FSA, 2012a, p.8).  The new 
regulator intends to take a more proactive approach, however it is important to note 
that consumers are not protected against all risks or every eventuality, and are 
responsible for making their own decisions.  This is aligned with the views of 
Llewellyn (1998, p. 315) who stated that “the objectives of regulation should be 
limited to correcting identified market imperfections, failures and externalities”.  
Further discussion of the rationales for regulation is in Section 2.6.  
2.3.3 Consumer Protection Laws 
The Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015 consolidated eight different general consumer 
law legislations into one.  The Act covers unfair terms, the supply of goods and 
services, digital content, enforcement powers, and competition law. The FCA is an 
enforcer under the CRA and has the right to challenge any consumer credit provider.  
The FCA took over this responsibility from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) whose 
services terminated in 2014.  From a consumer perspective, complaints do not have 
to be pursued through a court of law; instead they can be referred to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) if an unsatisfactory response is received from their 
bank.   This is a free service for consumers, subsidised by the retail banks.  There 
is further discussion of FOS powers in Section 2.4.2. 
One of the roles of both the OFT and the Competition Commission was to scrutinise 
the Financial Services Authority rules and practices in the interests of competition 
and consumer protection (Wu and Lee, 2001).  Consumer rights responsibilities were 
passed to the FCA, and anti-competitive behaviour became the remit of the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in 2014.  It could be argued that by 
passing all consumer protection powers to the FCA it has diluted the rights of the 
consumer, particularly since it was the OFT who campaigned so vigorously for 
consumers in the PPI mis-selling scandal, insisting the then regulator, FSA, 
investigate.  Conversely, Green and Perry (2016) argue that the new regime is much 
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stricter and highlight the significant steps the FCA has taken to ensure the fair 
treatment of consumers by payday lenders and debt management companies. 
2.3.4 Consumer Demand for Regulation 
There are several reasons why consumers demand regulation of the banking 
industry.  Llewellyn and the FSA (1999) identified that it stems from consumers’ need 
to feel assured.  He argues that if consumers do not feel confident enough to 
purchase suitable financial products it has the same detrimental effect as being mis-
sold unsuitable products.  For example, protection and retirement products may be 
avoided due to their long-term nature resulting in a welfare loss (Llewellyn, 2014).  
He further explains that assurance is sought due to the very nature of financial 
products: complexity; cost; duration of consumption; and also due to the recent past 
experiences which have resulted in a reduction of trust.  Ring (2012) found that some 
consumer knowledge or capability is important in assessing whether an adviser can 
be trusted, and where there are low levels of knowledge trust becomes most 
important; however is most lacking.  The case is made for setting minimum 
standards, which all regulated firms must meet, to increase consumer confidence.  
Of course the consumer may be under the impression that regulation is free and for 
that reason, Llewellyn and the FSA (1999) suggest making them aware there is a 
cost to avoid demand distortion.  Consumer demand as a rationale for the regulation 
of financial services is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
2.4 Regulation 
This theme is split into two distinct sections; context and theory.  The first section 
provides a definition of regulation, followed by an analysis of the evolution of 
regulation of the industry.  The development of a ‘twin peaks’ approach and current 
regulatory structure of the UK financial services sector is then examined, including 
the most significant new development of ring fencing.   
The second half of this theme will address the theoretical framework, which 
evaluates the rationales for regulation such as demand from the public, market 
failures and economic and social justifications.  The research questions have been 
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developed from this framework and the arguments against regulation are also 
appraised to ensure a comprehensive evaluation.   
2.4.1 What is Regulation?   
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking (2014), it is the 
 imposition by a government of controls over the decisions of individuals or 
 firms.  It often refers to the control of industries in which there is monopoly 
 or oligopoly; in order to prevent firms from exploiting their market power at 
 the expense of the public…regulation is especially important in the financial 
 services industry. 
Certainly the UK financial services sector could be argued to be operating an 
oligopoly, with four major players, Barclays plc., Lloyds Banking Group plc., the 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc. and HSBC Holdings plc., collectively accounting 
for approximately 70% of the personal current account market (Competition and 
Markets Authority, 2015).  However, if the purpose of regulation is to protect the 
public against exploitation from these powerful institutions, then in what form is this 
exploitation taking place and what is/can the regulator do to mitigate this?  
Den Hertog (2010, p.223) defines regulation as “the employment of legal instruments 
for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives”.  He identified two 
traditional economic theories of regulation; ‘public interest theories of regulation’ and 
‘private interest theories of regulation’.  Public interest theories assume that the 
regulators pursue the public interest and have sufficient information and 
enforcement powers to do so.  Private interest theories assume that the regulators 
have imperfect information, and therefore can only imperfectly (if at all) promote the 
public interest.  Additionally, some of the economic agents may pursue their own 
interests, at the cost of the public interest.  In essence, the regulators have the same 
motivations as those in the private sector, that is, self-interest.  Private interest theory 
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is the public sector equivalent of the principal-agent problem which is examined 
further in Section 2.6.3.3. 
Harnay and Scialom (2016) argue that the economic theories of regulation have 
played a significant role in moulding banking regulation policy since the 1960s.  They 
suggest that the public interest view of regulation is strongly connected with welfare 
economics.  For example, by promoting public interest and increasing social welfare 
through correcting market failures such as externalities and natural monopolies 
(discussed further in Section 2.6.3.1).  They assert that by the 1970s there was much 
criticism towards this theory of regulation and a move towards the private interest 
view of regulation where it was believed that regulation was actually stifling business 
and paved the way towards deregulation.   
2.4.2 The Evolution of the Regulation of UK Financial Services  
Prior to The Banking Act 1979 there was no regulation of the UK financial services 
sector.  The introduction of regulation was intended to protect depositors, partially in 
response to the secondary banking crisis of the 1970s and primarily due to the need 
to meet the requirements of the Directive 77/780/EEC (Cartwright, 2004).  However, 
the near collapse of Johnson Matthey Bank in 1984 exposed deficiencies in the Act, 
particularly the two-tier system of supervision of recognised banks and deposit 
takers (Cartwright, 2004).  This led to the introduction of The Banking Act 1987 which 
was intended to strengthen the BoE supervisory powers and replaced the 1979 Act. 
The Financial Services Act (1986) established a series of self-regulatory 
organisations for different types of financial institutions and firms under the overall 
supervision of the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) (The Association of 
Futures Brokers and Dealers, the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers 
Regulatory Association, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, the 
Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation, and The Securities 
Association).  The deregulation of the financial services sector led to increased 
competition and an overhaul of the products and services provided by financial 
institutions.  Traditional banks were now able to offer mortgages, investments, 
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general insurance, pensions and life assurance and no longer acted solely as 
deposit takers.  However, this fragmented approach of having 11 separate bodies 
led to both overlap and under-lap issues of regulatory supervision.   
Yet it was not long until the shortcomings of the Banking Act 1987 were realised.  In 
1991, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was forcibly shut down 
by the Bank of England, owing billions around the world (Hemraj, 2005).  The 
collapse “raised serious questions about the effectiveness of bank regulation in an 
era of international finance” (Adams and Frantz, 1992, p.9).  BCCI was accused of 
being a corrupt criminal organisation; banking dictators, drug dealers and arms 
merchants.  This led to its closure in a number of jurisdictions due to fraud, with the 
Bank of England being heavily criticised for failing in its oversight of BCCI. 
In 1997 self-regulation was replaced, after several mis-selling scandals and a series 
of bank failures during that decade, with an independent regulatory body and SIB 
became known as the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  The FSA was granted 
statutory power by the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000).  When this Act 
came into force in December 2001 the FSA became the single regulatory body for 
the UK, responsible for banking, insurance and investment business.  This formed 
part of a tripartite regulatory system in which the BoE, the FSA and HM Treasury 
had collective responsibility for financial stability. 
The FSA was responsible for the systemic, prudential and conduct of business 
regulation for the retail and wholesale markets.  It was believed that having one body 
to oversee the whole market would lead to greater efficiencies.  Goodhart, Hartmann, 
Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez, and Weisbrod, (1998) suggested these efficiencies could 
be realised through a shared infrastructure which would reduce duplication, overlap, 
gaps and inconsistencies; thereby reducing costs.  Additionally, it was believed that 
a more simplified structure would lead to greater regulator accountability and better 
understanding and recognition by both financial firms and consumers.  Furthermore, 
a single regulator would be able to monitor a firm’s full range of activities and there 
would be no conflict in the different objectives used to manage this.  Goodhart et al., 
(1998) did concede that there were limitations, such as problems of coordination due 
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to the need to create divisions to deal with the different aspects of regulation and 
different types of financial institution within the single regulator. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) gave the FSA four statutory 
objectives: 
i. Market (maintaining confidence in the UK financial system). 
ii. Public Awareness (promoting public understanding of the financial system). 
iii. Consumer Protection (securing the appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers). 
iv. Financial Crime Reduction (reducing the possibility of regulated businesses 
to be used for purposes connected with financial crime). 
The Public Awareness objective was later replaced by Financial Stability 
(contributing to the protection and enhancement of stability in the UK financial 
system) by the Financial Services Act 2010. 
In the FSA’s first Annual Report, 2001/02, the regulator set out what they hoped to 
achieve as the new single supervisory power.  In terms of consumer protection, the 
FSA vowed to “help consumers achieve a fair deal” (FSA Annual Report 2001/02, 
p.13).  The Handbook of rules and guidance was created which amalgamated the 
rulebooks of 10 previous regulators and introduced new policies covering money 
laundering, complaint handling and market abuse.  Section 4 of the Annual Report 
was dedicated to ‘a fair deal for consumers’.  This section of the report detailed how 
the FSA undertook a Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) project which examined the 
after-sales experience.  Their key findings suggested that consumers:  
i. did not always fully understand the information they were given about certain 
products 
ii. were not kept fully informed post-sale 
iii. expectations were not met by either the product and/or firm 
iv. switching between product and firm was discouraged 
v. complaints were not always dealt with fairly.   
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The FSA took significant steps to guide firms to improve on these shortcomings by 
highlighting what they considered to be “good and bad practice” (FSA Annual Report 
2001/02, p.34) covering fairness in marketing and advertising, disclosure at point of 
sale, and complaint handling.  Products such as annuities, with-profits policies and 
endowments were reviewed and new disclosure rules introduced to ensure 
consumers understood they had wider options than those that their provider may 
offer.  The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) was established as an independent 
body to deal with complaints that were not satisfactorily resolved between the 
consumer and firm.  The Financial Services Compensation Scheme was also set up 
to provide compensation to consumers where a regulated firm is unable to meet its 
liabilities.  Additionally, the FSA took over some of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations from the OFT.  The pensions review undertaken by the FSA 
required firms to compensate consumers for historic mis-selling.  In its first year the 
FSA seemed to be taking significant steps to safeguard and protect consumers from 
detriment.  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012, p.19) assert that “making information 
more extensively available, accurate, and affordable” encourages a strong 
competitive market and reduces the market failures of imperfect and asymmetric 
information.   
A year later the FSA reported that “38% of consumers now know of the FSA” (FSA 
Annual Report 2002/03, p.14).  They hailed this as “significant” progress and 
attributed this to its considerable work with consumer bodies such at the Citizens 
Advice Bureau (CAB).  The FSA was now turning its attention to educating young 
people, increasing financial literacy in adults and alerting consumers to high-risk 
products and fraudulent firms and individuals.  The consumer had a part to play in 
taking responsibility for their finances and making informed choices.  The FSA 
introduced product comparison tables to encourage consumers to shop around and 
competition between providers.   
From 2003/04 until 2008/09 the FSA Annual Report contained a section dedicated 
to ‘helping retail consumers achieve a fair deal’.  Each report contained key themes 
which were publicised each year. 
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In the 2003/04 publication the FSA shared their belief that better education is the 
key to consumers becoming more capable of making better decisions.  They suggest 
that asymmetric information hinders efficient markets.  This may be the case; 
nevertheless, should consumers be expected to possess the same level of 
knowledge about complex financial products as financial services professionals?  
Just how much knowledge is enough knowledge is not really clear.  The FSA set out 
plans to improve consumer financial capability with advice from the Financial 
Capability Steering Group.  Additionally, the FSA made an announcement about 
reforming the regulation of the retail market, moving from a polarised system to a 
de-polarised system.  This meant that the restrictions on the range of products and 
services that an adviser could sell were removed resulting in increased choice for 
consumers. 
It appears slightly contradictory to provide consumers with more choice when at the 
same time it is suspected they are not sufficiently proficient to make suitable choices.  
The significance of this is addressed in Section 2.6.4.1. 
In 2004/05 the FSA publicised the work they had commenced with partners, the 
Personal Finance Research Centre at the University of Bristol, to undertake a survey 
to measure financial capability in the UK.  Additionally, they announced the 
introduction of ‘Key Facts’ documents which were to be provided to consumers of 
mortgage and/or investment products as a result of the eradication of polarisation.  
These documents would provide consumers with simple, clear and user-friendly 
information about the product and any associated risks and costs.  Depolarisation 
was intended to improve consumer choice by introducing a ‘third way’.  Previously 
financial advisers could either be independent or not.  Now, advisers could be multi-
tied, meaning that they could offer a range of products from a limited range of 
providers.  However, the introduction of more choice for consumers did not coincide 
with the development of a financial education strategy or wider advice networks, 
which was viewed as a missed opportunity which may have led to interim problems 
(Ring, 2004).  The FSA launched a newly designed consumer website which they 
reported experienced an increase of 20% in average monthly visits and an update 
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on their TCF initiative.  The FSA identified that firms were not taking TCF into account 
when developing products or when designing sales staff reward and remuneration 
schemes 
In the 2005/06 publication the FSA focused on the outcome of their survey, ‘Financial 
Capability in the UK; Establishing a Baseline, March 2006’.  Their findings revealed 
four key themes:  
i. there is a significant lack of planning ahead for retirement in general by UK 
consumers 
ii. the moderately small number of people affected by debt are acutely affected 
and those that are just managing would encounter financial strain if there was 
a change in their personal circumstances or a downturn in the economy as a 
whole; as people are not putting money away for a ‘rainy day’ 
iii. people are not choosing products which are suitable for their needs 
iv. the age range most affected by these finding are those in the 18-40 year old 
bracket.   
This younger generation did not appear to be as financially competent as the over 
40s.  The FSA believed that their seven-point programme, ‘Financial Capability in 
the UK, Delivering Change’ could address these issues by reaching over 10 million 
people in five years.   
The FSA also provided an update on their TCF initiative and ‘encouragement’ they 
had given the industry to adopt TCF as part of their organisations culture and values.  
In the 2006/07 publication the FSA announced its intention to review the retail 
investment market, called the Retail Distribution Review (RDR).  The intentions of 
this review were to understand the root causes of the problems in the retail markets 
for investment products.  The FSA estimated that their financial capability 
programme had reached approximately one million people; although the outcome of 
this is not clear from the publication.  With regards to their TCF initiative the FSA 
published a number of examples of good and bad practice and announced fines 
against nine firms for breaches in the selling of PPI policies. 
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In 2007/08 the FSA publicised updates on their TCF initiative, the RDR and their 
financial capability programme.  The FSA reported that there was evidence that 
senior management in most companies were taking TCF seriously and working 
towards embedding it within their organisation’s culture.  This was demonstrated 
through improvements in a few product specific areas such as general insurance 
and mortgage disclosures.  However, there was insufficient evidence of any 
improvement to customer outcomes for retail customers in general.  The RDR had 
now been underway for a couple of years and the FSA had produced an interim 
report after working with both small and large firms for the industry and consumer 
groups.  The FSA reported three major findings:  
i. the need for a clear separation between advice and sales 
ii. the need to raise professional standards 
iii. the need to remove product provider influence on remuneration.   
With regards to the FSA’s progress on their financial capability agenda the five-year 
‘Delivering Change’ strategy was now at the half-way point.  The FSA reported the 
success of the agenda stating that the programme had reached over three million 
people through schools, universities, youth work organisations, workplaces, health 
authorities and charities.  The target was to reach ten million by 2011.  It was 
between the publication of this Annual Report and the next that the financial crisis 
took hold in the UK. 
In the 2008/09 Annual Report the FSA acknowledge the on-going financial crisis and 
the difficulties experienced by consumers over the previous year.  The FSA response 
to this was an increased focus on conduct regulation whilst continuing their work on 
TCF, consumer education and the RDR.  The FSA fined many firms for failing to 
meet the March 2008 deadline to have suitable measures in place to test whether 
they were treating customers fairly and providing sufficient evidence of embedding 
TCF within their organisation’s culture (the financial penalties incurred due to TCF 
implementation failure have not been quantified in the report).  In response to the 
findings of the RDR (mentioned in the previous annual report) the FSA proposed the 
following:  
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i. product providers will no longer be able to offer commission to adviser’s for 
selling their products 
ii. a clear definition of independent and non-independent advice 
iii. an increase in professional standards through increased skills and 
knowledge, raised ethical and behavioural standards and the governance of 
standards of practice.   
These changes would be expected to be implemented by firms by the end of 2012.  
The FSA also undertook reviews of the mortgage and pensions market resulting in 
fines, public censures, prohibitions of individuals and cancellation of firm’s 
permissions for inadequate or unfair practices.  Previously the Conduct of Business 
(COB) of Retail Banking had taken the form of self-regulation via the Banking Code, 
however, the FSA decided to bring it within its remit following its involvement in the 
test case between the OFT and several banks concerning unfair overdraft charges.  
Continuing with their work on consumer education and increasing consumers’ ability 
to manage their own financial affairs, the FSA had now reached over 6.5 million 
people through schools, universities, youth work organisations, workplaces, health 
authorities and charities.  The FSA also published statistics following some of these 
initiatives which demonstrated a marked improvement in the confidence of these 
people to deal with money matters of up to 81% in some participant groups (FSA, 
2009a).   
In the 2009/10 publication of the Annual Report the ‘Helping retail consumers 
achieve a fair deal’ section is replaced with a section entitled ‘Delivering consumer 
protection and education’.  The FSA had launched their new consumer protection 
strategy which aimed to achieve the following:  
 
i. make the retail market work better for consumers 
ii. avoid the crystallisation of conduct risks that exceed our risk tolerance 
iii. deliver credible deterrence and prompt and effective redress for 
consumers. 
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The FSA acknowledged that to achieve these objectives they would have to become 
more ‘proactive’ and ‘intensive’ in their supervisory approach.  In addition to 
increased engagement with firms the FSA also introduced metrics to quantify the 
effect of their work, these included:  
 
i. redress paid by firms 
ii. a consumer awareness survey 
iii. complaints made to the Financial Ombudsman. 
 
During 2009 the FSA took action to ensure ‘financial promotions and accompanying 
literature is fair, clear and not misleading’ by forcing firms to amend or withdraw 450 
financial advertisements after receiving complaints.  However, much of the work in 
this area was undertaken in retrospect; Lehman Brothers-backed products were 
found to have ‘serious deficiencies’ in their literature and sales advice. 
 
As the FSA had taken over the COB for retail banking on 1 November 2009 it was 
now responsible for deposit taking and payment services but announced that their 
consumer education objective would now be taken over by a new consumer 
education body following the passing of the Financial Services Act 2010.   
 
In 2010/11 the FSA dropped the ‘education’ element and focused on ‘delivering 
consumer protection’.  The Mortgage Market Review (MMR) tackled irresponsible 
lending at the same time as setting out how a firm should deal with a consumer in 
financial difficulties and/or arrears.  To some degree these could be partly viewed as 
a cause and effect of the financial crisis.  The Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS) compensation limit was increased to £85,000 per person, per 
authorised firm and extended to all European Economic Area (EEA) member states 
at the end of 2010 (agreed by all members at €100,000). 
 
In the 2011/12 publication of the FSA annual report, in addition to the MMR and 
RDR, the FSA had undertaken a review of packaged bank accounts.  They found 
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cases where the consumer was ineligible or unable to use some of the packaged 
products, for example insurance products, causing detriment.  As a result, the FSA 
published new rules on the sale of general insurance contracts as part of a packaged 
bank account.   Another significant development was the removal of the two stage 
complaint handling process.  This meant that consumers could go straight to the 
FOS if they were unhappy with the first response they received from a financial firm 
when making a complaint.  The FSA also announced an increase in the FOS 
compensation limit to £150,000.  
 
The final annual report published by the FSA was in 2012/13.  On the 31 December 
2012 the RDR came into force, the main obligations being a higher professional 
standard, which included professional qualifications and the removal of commission 
from providers for advice.  The creation of the Money Advice Service, launched in 
2011, acknowledged the importance of ‘guidance’ in the new post-RDR landscape 
(Ring, 2016).  In November 2012 Card Protection Plan (CPP) was fined £10.5M for 
widespread mis-selling of their products through financial firms which was the latest 
in a long line of product mis-selling scandals. 
 
In January 2013 the FSA published its final guidance on ‘Risks to customers from 
financial incentives’ (FSA, 2013).  In this report they begin by emphasising the need 
for consumer trust and confidence in financial services.  The main findings of the 
investigation were that current staff incentives were likely to encourage mis-selling 
and banks were doing little to mitigate that risk.  Indeed, the mis-selling of PPI and 
packaged bank accounts was primarily due to the ‘points’ accumulated by frontline 
staff when they sold these types of products.  Conversely, selling a Basic Bank 
Account (which is not a money-maker for a bank) would accumulate few or no points 
towards a monthly or annual bonus. The FSA also reported that it welcomed the 
changes already implemented by some of the banks.  Specifically, the changing 
incentive schemes so they are not based on sales volume, capping the maximum 
bonus, closer monitoring of high performing sales staff,  identifying poor behaviour 
during face-to-face sales, stronger governance around signing-off incentive 
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schemes and reviewing past sales for possible systemic mis-selling incidents (FSA, 
2013). 
 
It is clear that the FSA carried out substantial work in an attempt to improve the 
marketplace for consumers and secure better protection for them.  However, it was 
heavily criticised for failing to prevent the events that led to the Global Financial 
Crisis.  The expectations of a single regulator leading to greater efficiencies, lower 
costs and improved monitoring of firms appeared to have failed.  In reality, the FSA 
had grown in cost and size due to increased activity for FOS and the FSCS in the 
wake of mis-selling scandals such as PPI and unfair bank charges complaints.  In 
2010, the Guardian reported that the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne, said of the FSA, “at the heart of the crisis was a rapid and unsustainable 
increase in debt that our macroeconomic and regulatory system utterly failed to 
identify let alone prevent” (Elliott, 2010).  Indeed, the FSA’s Turner Review (2009b) 
concluded that the FSA had concentrated its efforts on the supervision of individual 
institutions and was lacking in attention to ‘wider sectoral and system-wide risks’. 
 
The FSA admitted its failings over Northern Rock in a report published in March 
2008.  Crucially, the regulator did not probe for a more comprehensive analysis of 
the risks inherent in the business model and failed to engage at an appropriate level 
for a high impact firm (FSA, 2008a).  The regulator conceded that it must increase 
its focus on prudential supervision, including liquidity and stress testing.  
 
This reignited the debate for a’ twin peaks’ approach to financial services regulation 
with Mervyn King, the then Bank of England governor, championing the approach, 
stating that prudential regulation, and consumer protection and market conduct must 
be separated as they require both different skills and approach (Taylor, 2009). 
 
In The Tripartite Review, Sassoon (2009) details five possible options for discussion 
for a new regulatory model.  The first suggestion was that the FSA should retain its 
current responsibilities but undergo a structural change away from focusing on Retail 
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and Wholesale divisions to Prudential and Conduct of Business divisions, with 
particular attention to financial stability issues.  The second proposal was to 
implement the suggestions above, plus grant new supervisory powers to the Bank 
of England in addition to its new macro-prudential role.  This would create a tripartite 
power, with the Treasury stepping in to resolve any differences between the FSA 
and the Bank of England.  The third proposition was to abolish the FSA and replace 
it with two regulators, each with a clearly defined purpose and focus.  One would be 
responsible for Prudential Regulation and the other for Conduct of Business 
regulation.  The fourth recommendation was to combine proposals two and three 
with the Bank of England as the head of micro-prudential regulation in exceptional 
circumstances.  The fifth, and final, suggestion was for the micro-prudential regulator 
to be merged with and become the joint responsibility of the Bank of England. 
 
The Tripartite Review recommended the ways in which the three regulatory powers, 
the Bank of England, the FSA and HM Treasury could strengthen their capabilities 
in delivering their proposed regulatory roles (Sassoon, 2009).  The Bank of 
England’s main remit would be enhancing financial stability; the FSA would focus on 
financial crime and consumer education, with HM Treasury playing a pivotal role in 
setting the direction of the UK’s economic policy. 
 
The third option proposed by Sassoon was preferred, creating two new regulatory 
bodies (a twin peaks approach); one would be responsible for Prudential Regulation 
and the other for Conduct of Business regulation. 
Cartwright (2004, p.5-6) defines prudential regulation as being “concerned with the 
solvency, safety and soundness of banks…in relation to consumer protection…even 
if there is no question of systemic risk” and conduct of business regulation is 
concerned with “how banks conduct business with their customers”.   
2.4.3 Twin Peaks 
This was not the first time such a regulatory structure had been proposed.  The 
phrase ‘twin peak’ was first coined by Michael Taylor in his 1995 paper for the Centre 
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for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI).  This publication was calling for reform 
of the regulatory system pre-FSA.  Taylor (1995) argued that the twin peaks 
approach to regulation would: 
i. eradicate duplication and over-lap 
ii. create clear and precise objectives and focus for each supervisor 
iii. encourage conflict resolution between the objectives of regulation 
iv. encourage an ‘open’, ‘transparent’ and ‘accountable’ regulatory process.   
His model proposed a Financial Stability Commission who would take responsibility 
for the prudential supervision of the system, ensuring it was sound; banks held 
sufficient capital and managed their risks appropriately (systemic protection).  The 
second peak, the Consumer Protection Commission, would ensure responsibility for 
conduct of business regulation; ensuring consumers receive a fair deal (consumer 
protection).   
The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Howard Davies, considered the 
arguments for a single or two separate regulatory structures in a speech in 1997.  
Davies was opposed to both a single regulator and the twin peaks approach due to 
the costs and ‘upheaval’ associated with regulatory reform.  Davies argued that 
banks were unique and one regulator overseeing many different types of financial 
services firms would not be effective as it would need to ‘tailor the rules’ to meet 
each type of business.  Davies felt that financial firms would not accept two 
regulators and that there would be a gap created as it was unclear where the 
regulation of markets fitted into Taylor’s proposal (Davies, 1997).  Despite these 
reservations, the FSA was granted statutory power by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act (2000).  When this Act came into force in December 2001 the FSA 
became the single regulatory body for the UK.   
Following the Global Financial Crisis, Taylor (2009) published a further paper 
advocating the twin-peaks structure; emphasising that prudential and consumer 
protection goals should indeed be pursued separately.  In 2012 this reform finally 
began to take shape. 
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2.4.4 Current Regulatory Structure of the UK Financial Services Sector 
The Financial Services Act (2012) implemented a new regulatory framework for 
financial services in the UK.  The FCA took over as the regulator alongside the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) to create a twin peaks approach.   
A Memorandum of Understanding between the FCA and PRA set out their separate 
and independent mandates and their relationship to one another.  The PRA is part 
of the Bank of England and is responsible for the prudential regulation of banks, 
building societies, insurance firms, investment firms and credit unions, it aims to 
promote ‘safety and soundness’ and ‘protect policyholders’.  The PRA’s main focus 
is the harm that firms can cause to the stability of the UK financial system.  The FCA 
is accountable to both HM Treasury and Parliament and is responsible for the 
conduct regulation of retail, wholesale and financial markets.  The FCA is also 
responsible for the prudential regulation of firms which are outwith the PRA’s scope. 
The aims of the FCA are threefold:  
i. to secure the appropriate degree of protection for consumers 
ii. to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system 
iii. to promote effective competition 
Both the PRA and FCA aim to have a forward-looking, proactive and judgement-
based approach to their areas of regulation.   
In a speech to the British Bankers Association in early 2012, two months before the 
launch of twin peaks, Hector Sants spoke of ‘independent but coordinated regulation’ 
when he set out his vision for the model (Russell, 2012).  The two regulators will 
have different objectives against which they will make their own separate 
judgements.  They will also engage with firms separately but will share and exchange 
information and data internally ensuring that regulatory data is only collected once.  
However, firms could find that they are asked similar questions from the two 
supervisors as they will be gathering information for different purposes.  Sants 
suggested that meeting objectives will be less challenging due to the greater clarity 
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provided by the Financial Services Act 2010.  In addition to a new regulatory 
framework, there have also been structural changes for the banks.   
2.4.5 Ring Fencing 
Schwarz (2013, p.82) defines ring fencing that is required by government regulation 
as, “legally deconstructing a firm to reallocate and reduce risk more optimally, such 
as by protecting the firm’s assets and operations and minimising its internal and 
affiliate risks”.      
Perhaps the most significant transformation of the sector since the FCA came into 
power is the legal deconstruction of core retail deposits from investment banking.  
The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) produced its Final Report (widely 
known as the ‘Vickers Report’) in September 2011 making several recommendations 
to enhance financial stability and competition; including loss-absorbency and ring 
fencing.   
The ICB (2011) set out three objectives the retail ring fence should achieve ‘at the 
lowest possible cost to the economy’.  The first is to make it easier to resolve troubles 
faced by both ring fenced and non-ring fenced banks, without the need for the 
taxpayer-funded government support.  The second is to protect vital banking 
services from problems elsewhere in the financial system.  The third is to limit the 
level of government guarantees, which should in turn reduce the risks taken by the 
banks.  To achieve all three of these objectives the ICB (2011) set out five principles 
which can be summarised as follows.  Firstly, only ring fenced banks will be given 
the regulatory power to provide mandated services (i.e. the taking of deposits from, 
and the provision of overdrafts to, individuals and small and medium-sized 
organisations).  Secondly, ring fenced banks are prohibited from providing certain 
services which would expose them to global financial markets and the risks beyond 
the provision of payments services and financial intermediation.  Thirdly, a ring 
fenced bank’s ancillary services are limited to those which are essential to carry out 
their non-prohibited activities, and there are limits placed on wholesale funding and 
exposures to non-ring fenced banks and non-bank financial companies.  The fourth 
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and fifth principles relate to operation of a corporate body, where fourthly, the ring 
fenced and non-ring fenced banks should operate as separate legal entities, and 
lastly, the ring fenced bank must conduct its business with other entities in the group 
on a third party basis. 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 was enacted on 18 December 
2013 and legislated for a process for transfer of business known as a ring fencing 
transfer scheme (RFTS).  This enabled firms to restructure their businesses to 
comply with the ring fencing requirements that came into effect on 1 January 2019 
(Bank of England, 2019).  The largest firms (specifically those with deposits of £25bn 
or more) were required to fulfil this, and completed at various stages throughout 
2018: Barclays, April 2018; Lloyds, May 2018; HSBC, July 2018 Santander, July 
2018; and RBS, August 2018.   Schwarz (2013) suggests that ring fencing can be 
used as a regulatory tool to correct market failures and protect against systemic risk.  
The rationales for regulation are discussed in more detail in Section 2.6. 
2.4.6 Economics for Effective Regulation (EFER)  
In March 2016 the FCA published Occasional Paper 13, ‘Economics for Effective 
Regulation’ (EFER), which set out a new approach to economic analysis of financial 
services (FCA, 2016a).  In this paper they identified five key market imperfections 
which could lead to poor outcomes for consumers: 
i. Information asymmetries 
ii. Externalities 
iii. Market power 
iv. Behavioural distortions 
v. Regulatory failure 
The first three categories have traditionally been the focus of economic frameworks 
for public policy.  Information asymmetries are explored in Section 2.6.3.2, 
externalities in Section 2.6.3.1 and market power was discussed in Section 2.4.1 of 
this thesis.  Consideration of behavioural distortions, however, is a relatively new 
approach adopted very early on from the inception of the FCA.  The use of 
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behavioural economics in financial regulation is discussed in greater detail in Section 
2.6.4.1.  
The EFER paper (FCA, 2016a) identified 11 systematic drivers of poor market 
outcomes which are detailed in the Table 2.2 below.  
 
Table 2.2: Systematic Drivers of Poor Market Outcomes 
Driver Group Specific patterns observed 
Consumer 
behaviour 
1.  Appropriate information about products is not available or not used by 
customers 
2.  Difficulty in comparing products and services, and their value (e.g. due 
to complexity or bundling) 
3.  Behavioural or rational inertia in taking appropriate action (e.g. 
switching) 
4.  Errors by consumers in assessing own long-term needs 
Supply-side 
behaviour and 
market structure 
5.  Unrecognised conflicts of interest between provider and their clients, 
leading to misaligned incentives 
6.  Large providers in the market face little or no competitive discipline 
from rivals (market power) 
7.  Barriers to entry and expansion arising from market structure or 
strategic conduct 
8.  Providers coordinating activities in an anti-competitive way 
9.  Restrictive agreements or integration between firms at different levels 
of the supply chain 
Other market 
distortions 
10.  Market participants act without considering side effects on markets or 
society 
11.  Unintended consequences of past interventions (e.g. perverse 
incentives or outdated regulation) 
(Source: FCA, Economics for Effective Regulation (EFER), 2016) 
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The drivers are used by the FCA as a practical tool that helps to structure the 
analysis.  The process of analysis in EFER for designing effective interventions can 
be broadly separated into three stages: 
i. Problem diagnosis 
ii. Intervention design 
iii. Impact assessment 
In diagnosing the root cause of problems the FCA identify the relevant markets, 
describe the facts about the market, identify the ways in which the market is not 
working well, assess the nature of harm caused, and evaluate the rationale for 
intervening.  In designing effective interventions the FCA state the goals of 
intervention based on problem diagnosis, identify alternatives for addressing 
individual goals, eliminate unfeasible or highly inefficient alternative options, and 
combine individual actions into packages.  In assessing the impact of interventions 
the FCA define the baseline, state the direct effects on an intervention, consider how 
market participants will respond, summarise the effects on market outcomes, and 
assess and, where appropriate, quantify the costs and benefits.   
This methodology involves a much more complex analysis and for that reason the 
FCA would not adopt this approach in every situation.  The economic analysis 
adopted will depend on the specific regulatory problem and are likely to be 
proportionate only for major interventions (FCA, 2016a).  The specific rationales for 
adopting such a detailed approach will be outlined in Section 2.6.  This will bring 
together the context and practice covered above with the theoretical framework 
below.  First, the arguments against regulation of the sector are considered. 
2.5 Arguments Against Regulation 
There are several arguments against government intervention into the financial 
sector, such as inefficiency, costs of compliance, ineffectiveness, circumvention, 
impeding innovation and capture, to name a few.    
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First, however, a paper in which Benston (2000) appears to critically respond to the 
rationales set out by Llewellyn in his 1995 paper, ‘Regulation of Retail Investment 
Services’ will be considered. 
On consumer protection as a justification for regulation, Benston (2000) sets out very 
clear arguments against the rationales he has found in the literature.  The six 
consumer protection justifications he identified were:  
i. to maintain consumer confidence in the financial system and financial 
services 
ii. assure that a financial-services supplier on which consumers rely does not 
fail 
iii. assure that consumers receive sufficient information to make good decisions 
and are dealt with fairly 
iv. assure fair prices for financial services 
v. protect consumers from fraud and misrepresentation  
vi. protect invidious discrimination against individuals.   
Each of these justifications and the reasons why he rejects them will now be 
discussed. 
Benston (2000) argues that bank and payments systems failures can be eradicated 
with higher capital requirements.  For this reason, he asserts intervention to maintain 
confidence is not necessary, with the exception of this and deposit insurance.  He 
also argues that holding sufficient capital is the only appropriate regulatory 
requirement needed to provide assurance that a financial services supplier, on which 
consumers depend, does not fail.  Holding sufficient capital would absorb losses, 
thereby avoiding insolvency.  In a later publication, Benink and Benston (2005) reject 
the argument that intervention is required to protect against systemic risk since, they 
argue, retail banks should, without direction, hold sufficient capital reserves to 
mitigate this risk.  Thus, Benston concurs with Llewellyn that capital requirements 
are necessary to maintain a stable and secure financial system, although he does 
not agree that there is a necessity to enforce it through regulation.  The first 
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hypothesis that will be tested in the consumer survey is that the consumer is 
confident the retail banking system is stable and secure. 
In the case of Lender of Last Resort, Benston (2003) argues that should one bank 
fail, it would simply be taken over by another bank and consumers would not notice 
any difference.  Yet, this was not the case with Northern Rock.  Despite four 
expressions of interest (from Virgin Money, J C Flowers, existing Northern Rock 
management, and a Group led by a former Abbey National chief executive) it was 
decided that no bid was good value for the taxpayer and the company was 
nationalised (Milne and Wood, 2009) in February 2008.  After nationalisation the 
bank was split into two parts: Northern Rock plc. and Northern Rock Asset 
Management (NRAM), which have been described as the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts of 
the bank (Osborne, 2011).  It wasn’t until 2012 that an agreement was reached for 
Virgin Money to purchase £465 million of mortgage assets from NRAM loans (Virgin 
Money, 2012).  This demonstrates that it is not a straightforward or speedy process. 
On consumer confidence in the financial system, Benston (2003) disagrees with the 
suggestion that one failed bank would cause a run on other banks.  Indeed, the 
September 2007 bank run on Northern Rock did not spill-over and affect other 
solvent banks which could back his theory that consumers “can distinguish among 
sound and insolvent banks” (2003, p.33).  However, Benston’s theory was not 
entirely proven by the events of 2007 as his belief that consumers do not run when 
their funds are protected by deposit insurance was incorrect.  Depositors of Northern 
Rock clearly did run, despite compensation levels of 100% of the first £2,000, and 
90% between £2000 and £35,000 in place.  The average balance held at Northern 
Rock was £17,500 at 31 December 2006 (Northern Rock Annual Report and 
Accounts, 2006).  Hence, this would suggest, the existence of deposit insurance is 
not sufficient to maintain consumer confidence where the compensation levels are 
not deemed to be adequate – or perhaps understood.  The second hypothesis to be 
tested in the consumer survey is how confident consumers are that their money is 
protected should their bank fail.   
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Clearly there is some level of agreement between Llewellyn and Benston that capital 
requirements and depositor insurance are necessary for the existence of a stable 
and secure system and consumer confidence that their deposits are safe.  However, 
financial products, Benston (1998) argues, are no different to any other type of 
product.  To illustrate his point, Benston asserts Llewellyn’s ‘list of imperfections’ 
could also be applied to electronic goods or cars, where asymmetric information also 
exists in terms of the manufacturing process, and it may be some time before a fault 
develops.  Nevertheless, some financial products are extremely complex and it could 
be decades (in the case of mortgages or pensions for example) before potentially 
harmful issues arise.  Benston (2000) also uses the argument that financial products 
are no different to other products when he argues that consumers do not require 
regulation to ensure fair prices for financial services.  The forces of supply and 
demand may work well in a perfect market.  However, the current oligopoly, or as 
some argue complex monopoly (Competition Commission, 2002), would suggest 
that this argument is flawed.  The same argument is used for fraud and 
discrimination, as is the existence of laws to protect all consumers in these areas.  
However cases of misrepresentation, such as endowment mortgages and payment 
protection insurance, would suggest that laws are deficient.  Additionally, the fact 
that bank products and services are a basic requirement to function in society 
necessitates additional protection for the most vulnerable in society to ensure they 
are not financially excluded. 
2.5.1 Hazards 
As discussed previously, there are well argued and accepted rationale for the 
regulation of financial services; both economic and social.  Banks are a ‘special’ case 
and inefficiencies and externalities such as asymmetric information and contagion 
are such justifications.  However, the provision of financial services regulation gives 
rise to hazards. 
Goodhart et al., (1998) identified the danger of over-regulation as one such hazard.  
Two causes were identified which explained this occurrence.  Firstly, regulation is 
not supplied through a market mechanism, but rather is enforced through institutional 
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requirements, restrictions and guidelines.  A major consequence of this is 
information loss, specifically how much regulation the consumer wants and needs 
and how much they are prepared to pay for it.  Secondly, most consumers of financial 
services perceive regulation as a free good. However, this is not the case and there 
is a cost borne by the sector for regulation and compliance.  Where the regulator 
pursues self-interest there could be ‘excessive’ regulation, which in turn may result 
in the cost of regulatory compliance outweighing the benefits.  Moosa (2015) claims 
regulation should never be viewed in terms of cost only, but rather in terms of the 
costs and benefits.  His line of reasoning is that, as good regulation pays off we 
should not worry about reducing the bonuses of the CEOs of banks. 
Dowd (2009) points out that the existence of moral hazard is an underrated problem 
and it played a central role in the events leading up to the Global Financial Crisis.  
Dowd claims that the existence of deposit insurance is highly destabilising for the 
banking system.  His argument is based on the premise that inefficient banks will go 
out of business as consumers will prefer the more prudent banks.  Moosa (2015) 
opposes this view and suggests that inefficient bank theory is actually an example 
of bad regulation.  Undeniably, the failures of Northern Rock and Royal Bank of 
Scotland were due to poor management decisions and excessive risk-taking 
encouraged by light-touch regulation.  Further, claiming that regulation should be 
avoided as it impedes innovation is, in his view, counterintuitive.  The use of 
derivatives and other ‘synthetic’ financial products actually played a major part in the 
Global Financial Crisis and he points to the use of these products to circumvent 
regulation.   
Some underlying issues have been addressed through legislative or regulatory 
intervention. Moral hazard has been reduced through the introduction of alternative 
mechanisms for dealing with failing banks such as bail-ins.  The Special Resolution 
Regime (SRR) is essentially a process for the Central Bank to step in and ensure 
that a failing bank does so in an orderly way, thus reducing systemic risk (Bank of 
England, 2019).  To avoid a repeat of the bail-out of banks during the Global 
Financial Crisis, with what was fundamentally taxpayers’ money; the Bank of 
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England has put in place a mechanism that will allow banks to dissolve with the costs 
of failure falling on the shareholders and creditors, much like other corporations do, 
but taking into account the special role that they play in the economy.  The resolution 
powers granted to the Bank of England enable them to stabilise the bank so that it’s 
critical functions remain available to its customers and restructure the bank, including 
replacing the senior executives of the bank.  Restructuring may involve selling 
functions of the banks to competitors or moving them to a bridge bank managed by 
the government.  Another alternative is a bail-in.  This is where the balance sheet is 
repaired by swapping debt for equity (bonds for shares), much like what may be 
carried out by a corporation facing financial difficulties.  The last option available to 
the Bank of England is to dissolve the bank by transferring customer deposits to 
another bank, or refunding them through depositor insurance.    
2.5.2 Regulatory Capture 
The term ‘regulatory capture’ was coined by George Stigler in 1971 in his paper, 
‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’.  Stigler begins with a powerful statement, “The 
state – the machinery and power of the state – is potential resource or threat to every 
industry in the society”.  Stigler highlighted the fact that the state can choose who to 
assist and who to harm through penalties, financial or otherwise, or incentives.  
Stigler (1971, p. 3-6) presented the argument that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired 
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”.  Stigler 
identified three policies where this can be evidenced, “control over entry by new 
rivals…substitutes and complements…and price-fixing”.  There has, in recent years, 
been an emergence of new players in the UK financial services sector, hailed 
‘Challenger Banks’ due to the dominance of the big four within the industry.  Lloyds 
Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and HSBC provided 77% of 
current accounts and 85% of business lending (BBC News, 2014) when the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) was formed in 2014.  The CMA was a 
merger between the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission; they launched a competition inquiry into the sector in November 2014, 
the results of which were published in February 2016.  The main findings were that 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 61 
 
the sector was not as innovative or competitive as it needs to be and older banks 
have advantages over new entrants and smaller banks (CMA, 2016).  A major 
consequence of this is that consumers are not switching, even in cases where they 
could make significant savings.   
Baker (2010, p.647) found that a “growing number of respected commentators now 
argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks 
was one of the main casual factors behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009”.  Further, 
he explains that this contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour (during financial booms 
there is an absence of public or political lobbying) and therefore it is the banks 
themselves, through industry lobbies, which have the greatest incentives to influence 
regulatory developments.  In particular, he asserts the Basel II regulations that 
encouraged the use of banks’ own internal risk models, and were not robust enough 
to prevent the Global Financial Crisis, almost completely lacked public scrutiny.  
Whilst Baker observed this pro-cyclical, or positive, correlation between financial 
booms and bank incentives to influence regulation, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014) 
identified countercyclical, negative, net worker inflows from industry to regulator in 
good times.  Their study was interested in the phenomenon of the ‘revolving door’ 
which is discussed further in Section 2.5.3 below.   
2.5.3 The Revolving Door 
Recent studies (Lucca, Seru and Trebbi, 2014; Shive and Forster, 2016), media 
commentary (Arauzo, 2013; Ginsberg, 2014; Gilbert, 2015; Vassalos, 2018) and 
government reports (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2016) have uncovered 
a growing trend for movement back and forth between industry and regulator.  In 
2015 Wheatley, the then Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority 
defended the FCA’s revolving door into the private sector, stating that it is beneficial 
for the regulator to recruit from industry and for staff to take their knowledge into the 
sector (Norman, 2015).  Two years later, Wheatley himself was recruited by a hedge 
fund based in Hong Kong (Denham, 2017).  Wheatley had previously run the 
Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong where he introduced measures 
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to improve short selling transparency (Cash, 2017), before taking up the post with 
the UK regulator. 
Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014) highlight some of the benefits of the revolving door, 
in particular the potential for regulators to employ higher ability workers.  It is clear 
that the regulator would benefit from the practice knowledge of former industry 
workers, and, equally, banks would benefit from employing those who have a 
relevant understanding of compliance.  An interesting finding from their research was 
the theory that regulators preferred to impose stricter and more intense regulations 
as this increased the likelihood that their skills would be required in industry and they 
would be highly rewarded in return.  They call this ‘regulatory schooling’ a widely 
accepted theory in the studies of the revolving door between Washington and Wall 
Street.  They conclude that limiting the mobility between the regulated and the 
regulators may have the negative impact of the reduction of attainment and 
retainment of talent.  
Commentary in Europe tends to be less forgiving.  Arauzo (2013) writes of the threat 
to public interest, where reform is being stifled and undermined, and causing 
repeated financial and social crises.  Vassalos (2018) identified that one third of top 
positions at the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), in the period 2008-2017, were held by people 
who worked for the financial industry before or after leaving it.  The DG FISMA is 
responsible for initiating and implementing EU policy in the area of Banking and 
Finance in Europe.  He demonstrated that the overreliance of regulators on industry 
expertise leads to the crucial question of whether those appointed to serve the public 
interest have the neutrality necessary to fulfil this role, or whether they will naturally 
consider solutions to regulatory problems that are best for the industry.  The 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2016) made recommendations to the UK 
government to manage conflicts of interest when staff revolve in and out of the 
regulator, including the promotion of transparency and a corporate culture of 
integrity, however, there is no specific regulation to deal with this risk. 
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In summary, there is clearly a case against regulation.  The debate about whether 
the current regulatory regime is effective is another matter.  The rationales for 
regulating the retail banking market will be identified and will form the theoretical 
questions that will be used to measure consumer confidence in retail banking 
regulation in the UK.    In the next Section, 2.6, the rationale for regulation will be 
explored.  
2.6 Rationales for Regulation 
Why is regulation especially important in the financial services industry?  Some 
economists believe that market solutions are preferable to government solutions in 
the financial services market (Dowd, 1996; Benston and Kaufman, 1996; Stiglitz, 
2010; Moosa and Ramiah, 2014), as discussed in the previous Section, 2.5. Now, 
the key rationales for regulation that have been identified in the literature will be 
discussed.  These are: demand from the public; market failures; social justifications; 
and fraudulent activities.   
2.6.1 Demand from the Public 
The demand for regulation of financial services is linked to consumer confidence and 
trust (Llewellyn and the FSA, 1999).  In fact, it could be argued to have a negative 
correlation, with demand rising as trust and confidence in the financial system falls.  
Public demand for regulation to correct market inefficiencies or inequities was 
developed initially by Pigou (1932) in Public Interest Theory. As discussed earlier, 
public interest theories assume that the regulators pursue the public interest and 
have sufficient information and enforcement powers to do so (Den Hertog, 2010).    
These theories had become unpopular by the 1970s as the UK government repealed 
their control and the UK moved towards the private interest view of regulation 
(Harnay and Scialom, 2016).   
Llewellyn and the FSA (1999) highlight several reasons why consumers demand 
regulation.  The first being lower transaction costs.  Indeed, if each consumer had to 
investigate the safety and soundness of each institution there would be significant 
costs, both financial and time.  Secondly, he highlights the issue of access to relevant 
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information, and whether the consumer has the knowledge or skills to use the 
information they may be able to gather.  Thirdly, Llewellyn suggests that consumers 
need assurance when carrying out transactions with financial firms, which links to 
his fourth reason, their past experience of bad behaviour by financial firms.  Fifth, 
due to the nature of financial contracts, the value can be determined after it has been 
signed and the product purchased, by the firm’s behaviour and solvency.  Sixth, 
again related to the nature of contract and products, the consumer is often making 
a substantial commitment.  Seventh, the old adage that prevention is better than 
cure.  Llewellyn suggests that regulation will prevent ‘hazardous behaviour’ by firms, 
which is preferable to claiming redress afterwards.  Eighth, the regulator can enjoy 
economies of scale in monitoring, and lastly, a part of the costs of regulation will be 
borne by the firms themselves.  Of course the consumer may be under the 
impression that regulation is free and for that reason, Llewellyn and the FSA (1999) 
suggest making them aware there is a cost to avoid demand distortion. 
Benston (2000) argues that the preservation of consumer confidence in banks and 
the banking system is not a valid reason to regulate banks.  To put this into context, 
Benston is debating the need for regulation to protect the consumer against bank 
failure by regulating products and services.  As discussed earlier, his theory is that 
deposit protection and capital requirements should be sufficient.   
In addition to regulation being imposed to protect the public against monopolistic 
exploitation, Goodhart, et al., (1998) highlight two further reasons:  
i. smaller, retail clients are less informed and so must be protected 
ii. the need to safeguard systemic stability.  
These are examples of ‘market failures’ which Baldwin et al, (2012, p.15) state justify 
the need for regulation as “the uncontrolled market place will, for some reason, fail 
to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public interest”.  As discussed 
previously, this is due, in part, to the unequal bargaining power of banks and 
consumers in the current oligopoly market structure.   
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2.6.2 Market Failures  
The view of Baldwin et al, (2012) matched that of Llewellyn (1998, p.315) who not 
only suggested they were grounds for regulation, but who also stated that “the 
objectives of regulation should be limited to correcting identified market 
imperfections, failures and externalities”.  The market failures highlighted in 
particular by Llewellyn were externalities and asymmetric information.  In his 1999 
publication for the FSA he classifies these as economic rationales for regulation.  
Cartwright (2004) identified that the rationales for regulation can be split into two 
principal categories, economic and social.  It could be argued that consumer demand 
is in fact a social rationale for regulation since it is concerned with social welfare.  On 
the other end of the spectrum, the Chicago economists, including George Stigler and 
Richard Posner amongst others, argued that regulation can be used to give benefits 
to particular individuals or groups.  Stigler’s (1971, p.3) theory was that regulation is 
“acquired by industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”.  Posner 
(1974, p.344) argued that regulation can be viewed as a product whose allocation is 
determined by the basic principles of supply and demand.  He goes on to explain, 
that when viewed in this way it can be accepted that, all other things being equal, 
regulation will be “supplied to those who value it the most”.  Their views are more 
aligned to the private interest theory of regulation, or regulatory capture, which was 
discussed in Section 2.5.2. 
2.6.3 Economic Rationales for Regulation 
The economic rationales for regulation are those which are fundamental to the 
economic well-being of the country. As discussed previously, the UK financial 
system plays a pivotal role in the economy.  The commercial banks play the vital role 
of channelling funds between savers and borrowers and operating the payments 
system.  Confidence in the banking system is critical to the health of households, 
businesses and the overall economy.  Hence, government intervention in the 
financial services sector and the strict regulation of the banking industry is 
rationalised by the need to minimise the occurrence of events that could undermine 
the reputation of banks and threaten confidence in the system.  
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2.6.3.1 Externalities 
The primary external concern is that of systemic risk, “banks are subject to runs, 
which have contagion effects, and which can throw solvent banks into insolvency” 
(Goodhart et al., 1998, p.8-9).  In today’s global economy this is not geographically 
restricted.  The problem cannot be contained at a national level but becomes a global 
crisis.  As witnessed in the Global Financial Crisis, what began as a problem in the 
USA soon rippled across the world.  There are mechanisms in place to deal with the 
issue of both macro and micro risks.   
Macroprudential financial regulation seeks to safeguard the financial system as a 
whole by recognising the importance of general equilibrium effects (Hanson, 
Kashyap, and Stein, 2011).  Since the Global Financial Crisis, the necessity to 
achieve global financial stability has seen macroprudential policy become central to 
the development of public policy (Kenc, 2016).  Kenc (2016) has traced the term 
macroprudential back to unpublished documents by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) and the BoE in the late 1970s.  By 1986 the BIS was using the 
term when discussing policies which aimed to secure the safety and soundness of 
the payments mechanism and the financial system as a whole.  The rationale for 
macroprudential regulation is the existence of externalities which can lead to 
systemic risk and ultimately market failure. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
classified these externalities into three categories:  
i. externalities related to strategic complementarities 
ii. externalities related to fire sales 
iii. externalities related to interconnectedness (De Nicolo, Favara and Ratnovski, 
2012).   
Strategic complementarities arise when banks expose themselves to the same types 
of risk through activities, such as reducing screening intensity and increasing lending 
activity during boom times, hiding losses or maintaining risky lending, and correlated 
asset choice.  Fire sales can lead to the devaluation of similar assets held by other 
banks, reducing the capital ratio of those banks and leading to financial distress, 
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eventually triggering a credit crunch.  The interconnectedness of banks can lead to 
issues of contagion, that is, the failure of one institution can have a spillover effect 
and lead to the failure of otherwise solvent banks.  De Nicolo et al, (2012) emphasise 
that externalities arising from interconnectedness are particularly great in 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  Further, they argue that the 
macroprudential tool that can address the externalities arising from all three 
categories is capital requirements.   
Banks are required to hold capital reserves to enable them to absorb any unexpected 
losses.  Both the UK and USA had minimum capital requirements in place as far 
back as 1981 (Bank for International Settlements, 1999).  However, these 
requirements did not extend to non-domestic banks, giving foreign competitors an 
unfair advantage.   
The collapse of German based Herstatt Bank in 1974 posed a systemic threat due 
to its heavy involvement in the foreign exchange markets (Schenk, 2014).  The bank 
had losses (DM470 million reported, actual losses were much higher) of over 10 
times what they held in capital and reserves (DM44 million).  This led to discussions 
between the G10 central bankers (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) to make 
international efforts to reduce such risks.  The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision was launched in 1975.   
Early in 1987, the UK and USA proposed an international agreement to impose risk-
based capital standards, which by July 1988 had the agreement of the G10 central 
banks and bank regulators of Switzerland and Luxembourg (Wall, 1989).  These new 
rules were to be effective from 1992 and focused on the credit risk of banks.  The 
agreement became known as the Basel Capital Accord.   
The bankruptcy of Barings Bank in 1995 highlighted weaknesses in the Accord.  The 
Barings Bank collapse was mainly due to weaknesses in the bank’s internal controls 
and management systems.  Rogue trader, Nicholas Leeson, was the chief trader 
and floor manager for Barings Bank in Singapore, but, he was also the general 
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manager of the back office (Canac and Dykman, 2011).  Being in control of both the 
front and back office functions allowed Leeson the opportunity to hide financial 
futures trade losses and simultaneously publicly record profits.  By the time the 
losses of over £800 million (Stonham, 1996) were discovered they were so huge that 
they caused the bankruptcy of the over 200 year old merchant bank.  
By 1996 there were proposals to amend the Accord to take account of market risks 
arising from exposure to foreign exchange, traded debt securities, commodities and 
options, and operational risk (BIS, 2018); this became known as Basel II, the revised 
international capital framework.   
However, this was not sufficiently strong enough to prevent the Global Financial 
Crisis.  Even before the collapse of Lehman Brothers it was apparent that 
advancements in financial technology and the development of new sophisticated 
and complex financial products had surpassed the framework of the existing 
guidelines.  Following the Global Financial Crisis, Basel III was proposed which 
extended several areas of the existing framework.  This new framework introduced 
liquidity ratios to deal with short-term shocks as well as enhancing the capital 
requirements to take account of different levels of risk exposures and stable funding 
over the medium- to long-term (BIS, 2018).  Basel III has been implemented in 
Europe through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV package (European 
Banking Authority, 2018). CRD IV is an EU legislative package that contains 
prudential rules for banks, building societies and investment firms.     
From past experience this market failure, and the need for regulation to be in place 
to protect consumers and the economy as a whole is unquestionable.  Indeed, even 
Benston, who asserts that much of the rationale for regulation is weak (2003), 
concedes that bank capital is the exception (2000).  If the consumer is confident that 
the UK retail banking system is stable and secure, and there is sufficient regulation 
in place to ensure that it is, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this 
market failure.  However, it may only become apparent that there is insufficient 
regulation in place, if and when, another crisis arises. 
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The first market failure addressed above is that of systemic risk at a macro-prudential 
level.  The regulations are enforced at both a domestic and international level in an 
effort to reduce the likelihood of contagion, and thus increase the stability and 
security of the financial system.  Therefore as part of this investigation, the 
confidence levels of consumers will be measured to assess the success of these 
macro-prudential regulations in maintaining consumer confidence in the financial 
system.  The first hypothesis that will be tested is:   
H1:  The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure 
Microprudential regulation is aimed at preventing the failure of individual financial 
institutions (Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein, 2011).  In 1983 Diamond and Dybvig 
published a seminal paper providing a model of bank runs and associated financial 
crises.  The principal mechanism proposed to avoid bank runs was the government 
provision of deposit insurance.  In their model they assert that deposit insurance is 
critical for the stability of the banking system.  This was based on the premise that 
consumers would not panic and try to withdraw their demand deposits if they knew 
that their deposits were safe.   
The UK was one of the first countries to introduce a deposit insurance scheme in 
1982, which was later revised in 1995 following the failure of BCCI (Goodhart, 2008).  
The current scheme, operated by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(FSCS), has been in existence since 2001; however, this did not prevent the run on 
Northern Rock in 2007.  Goodhart (2008) identified two main issues that must be 
addressed so that deposit insurance is effective.  First, the large majority of 
consumers’ balances must be covered, and second, depositors must have 
immediate access to their funds.  At the time of the Global Financial Crisis, UK 
depositors may have had to wait up to three months, which is not feasible for most 
individuals.  Ayadi and Lastra (2010) found that deposit insurance was ill-designed 
and insufficiently publicised.  Hamalainen, Pop, Hall, and Howcroft (2011) found that 
the existence of co-insurance did not prevent a bank run as consumers were not 
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prepared to lose any of their funds.  The compensation levels covered by the FSCS 
can be found in Table 1.1.  
Diamond and Dyvbig (1983) also propose the LOLR function can act as a 
preventative tool against bank runs.  However, they point out that if the LOLR were 
to unconditionally bail out every bank that found itself with liquidity problems then 
this in itself would create an incentive for banks to take greater risks.  Conversely, 
the fact that it is not guaranteed does not then provide 100% confidence to 
consumers, and therefore, cannot prevent a bank run.  Indeed, it was the 
announcement that Northern Rock was seeking assistance from the BoE that 
triggered the bank run of 2007.  However, if the consumer is confident that the money 
in their retail bank account(s) is protected should their bank fail, and there is sufficient 
regulation in place to ensure that it is, then it could be argued that regulation has 
corrected this market failure.   
The second market failure addressed above is that of systemic risk at a micro-
prudential level.  The regulations are enforced at a domestic level in an effort to 
reduce the likelihood of a bank run by guaranteeing the protection of a proportion of 
consumer deposits should a bank fail. Therefore as part of this investigation, the 
confidence levels of consumers will be measured to assess the success of these 
micro-prudential regulations in maintaining consumer confidence in the financial 
system.  The second hypothesis that will be tested is:   
H2:  The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) 
is protected should their bank fail 
2.6.3.2 Imperfect and Asymmetric Information 
In financial services it may be the case that the consumer does not have adequate 
information to make a fully informed decision.  Additionally, the problem of 
asymmetric information occurs as the consumer has less information than the 
‘expert’ supplying the financial product and/or advice.  Consumers are unable to 
inform themselves adequately so as to avoid making decisions which may 
disadvantage them (Wood, 2001).  The individual consumer does not have the time 
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or the resources to sufficiently source information on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ products and 
providers (Llewellyn, 1995).  Additionally, the “low level of financial literacy and 
product comprehension” compounds the issue (Gaskill and Ashton, 2008, p.160). 
The nature of financial contracts is such that it may be some time before the 
performance of a product can be determined (Llewellyn, 1995).  
Mullineux (2000) believes that regulation is required to protect the consumer against 
fraud, excessive risk taking, incompetence or bad behaviour on the part of the 
financial organisation.  There were many cases of PPI policies being added to 
personal loans without the consumers’ knowledge, or, the consumer being led to 
believe the policy was compulsory when in fact it was optional.  This misbehaviour 
was largely target-driven and not at all in the interests of the consumer.  This is an 
example of asymmetric information being used to ‘exploit’ the consumer; Llewellyn 
and the FSA (1999) describes this as the ‘agency cost’.  Asymmetric information 
occurs in financial services when there is inequality in information; one party knows 
more than the other (Mishkin and Eakins, 2012).  In retail banking it is almost always 
the case that the consumer will have less (product knowledge) information than the 
representative of the financial institution.  This could, and has in the past, led to a 
situation where the consumer’s lack of knowledge is taken advantage of.  However, 
if the consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions and there is sufficient regulation in place to 
ensure that firms do, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this market 
failure.  
The third market failure addressed above is that of imperfect and asymmetric 
information.  The FCA conduct of business regulations set out how a firm must 
behave in its day-to-day dealing with consumers and the regulator monitors this 
through using tools such as Economics for Effective Regulation (discussed in 
Section 2.4.6).  Therefore as part of this investigation, the confidence levels of 
consumers will be measured to assess the success of conduct of business 
regulations in reducing information problems and maintaining consumer confidence 
in their retail bank.   
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The third hypothesis that will be tested is:   
H3:  The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions  
2.6.3.3 Moral Hazard  
One of the problems that arise when the externalities market failure is corrected is 
the emergence of moral hazard.  Krugman (2008, p.63) describes moral hazard as 
“any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, 
while someone else bears the cost if things go badly”.  This is based on the theory 
that greater risks are taken if a party is “insulated” and therefore does not have to 
fully realise the consequences of their actions (Buckley, 2011, p.58). 
By creating systems in which the consumer deposits are protected it may induce a 
bank to take greater risks (Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000), perhaps even 
provide an incentive to intentionally take on the risk of failure (Boyd and De Nicolo, 
2005), and so is not viable without regulation (Keeley, 1990).  The introduction of 
ring fencing in the UK has reduced this risk in retail banking somewhat, since the 
level of risk that can now be taken by ring fenced banks has been reduced 
significantly.  Ring fencing was introduced as a post-crisis regulatory response to the 
moral hazard problem surrounding ‘Too Big To Fail’ (TBTF) banks (Hardie and 
Macartney, 2016).  Moral hazard can undermine the effectiveness of schemes such 
as LOLR, and magnify costs for the government providing it. The positive effects of 
ring fencing are two-fold: it reduces the firms’ ability to take excessive risk; and the 
firm is no longer able to ‘blackmail’ the state into a bailout (Lehmann, 2014).   
Moral hazard also arises due to the existence of the principal-agent problem.  The 
consumer frequently requires advice when purchasing financial products and the 
quality of the product cannot be ascertained at the point of purchase (Llewellyn and 
the FSA, 1999).  The existence of asymmetric information between the principal (the 
consumer) and the agent (bank staff) can lead to exploitation of the consumer where 
the agent is motivated by self-interest.  Certainly, the mis-selling of PPI and 
packaged bank accounts was primarily due to incentive structures which 
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encouraged high volume sales of these products by frontline staff in exchange for 
monetary reward.  Thus these products were often sold with little consideration of 
whether this was the most suitable product for the consumer. 
The rationale for regulation is to remove the probability that the moral hazard 
(caused by schemes such as LOLR and deposit insurance) and the principal-agent 
problem will be exploited (Llewellyn, 1998).  If the consumer is confident that their 
retail bank will do the right thing and there is sufficient regulation in place to ensure 
that firms do, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this market failure.    
The fourth market failure addressed above is that of moral hazard.  The FCA conduct 
of business regulations set out how a firm must behave in its day-to-day dealing with 
consumers and has published guidance on staff incentives and remuneration.  
Therefore as part of this investigation, the confidence levels of consumers will be 
measured to assess the success of conduct of business regulations in combatting 
moral hazard and maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.  The fourth 
hypothesis that will be tested is:   
H4:  The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
2.6.3.4 Fraudulent Activities  
Fraudulent activity is linked to moral hazard and examples of the banks taking 
excessive risks when the costs are borne by others are plentiful.  In the case of sub-
prime mortgage selling in the US, the fraudulent reporting of income to ensure the 
acceptance of a home loan became standard practice at both small and large 
institutions (Skinner, 2016).  However, the risk of default was not borne by the 
mortgage provider since the mortgages were then bundled together and their cash 
flows sold as securities, such as bonds.  Likewise, in the UK, Northern Rock was 
offering a ‘Together’ mortgage which was made up of a mortgage worth 95% of the 
value of the property and a personal loan worth up to 30% (capped at £30,000) 
meaning that no deposit was required and buyers could borrow up to 5.9 times their 
income (Lythe, 2014).  These ‘Together’ mortgages were then securitised to raise 
more funds for Northern Rock.  Then, in the market for securitised mortgage 
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products, bankers were failing to perform adequate due diligence tests on the 
included loans or practices of the loan providers.  RBS was heavily criticised for 
misrepresenting the risks associated with the underlying collateral of their mortgage 
securities (Skinner, 2016).   
The PPI misconduct case alone amounted to four times the cost (£37bn) of the 
London Olympics (Treanor, 2016).   A culture which focused on sales was also 
behind the mis-selling of several other products, specifically interest rate hedging 
products, endowment mortgages, packaged bank accounts, investment products 
and advice, pensions and ID theft and card protection insurance (Baker, 2016).  
However, fraud was not limited to the practices of a few banks competing with each 
other.  LIBOR and foreign exchange market rate manipulation was essentially 
collusive, collaborative and collegial (Skinner, 2016) between the largest of the 
world’s banks.  It had become industry accepted practice, essentially grid lock (see 
Section 2.6.4), and gave rise to significant social and economic costs. 
Baker (2010) wrote that in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis many 
commentators cited regulatory capture of public bodies and public policy by leading 
banks as one of the main casual factors.  The appointment of a person from the 
private business sector (for example, a bank) to a position of responsibility in 
government or a public body (for example, a regulator), or vice versa, leads to a 
conflict of interests, “such conflicts of interest may give rise to favouritism, abuse of 
power, discriminatory treatment, lack of impartiality and objectivity, and, ultimately, 
waste of public resources” (Cerrillo-i-Martinez, 2017, p.357).  The regulator was 
widely criticised after the Global Financial Crisis for failing to regulate the banks that 
caused the crisis. 
Boyer and Ponce (2012) found splitting supervisory powers between different 
supervisors to be the optimal arrangement, in terms of social welfare, as it could 
lower the potential that a single supervisor could be captured by banks.   Regulatory 
capture was discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.2.  
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The steps taken to restructure the regulatory framework and separate the retail side 
of banks’ business from riskier operations does address some of the causes of 
fraudulent activity that have been experienced in banking in recent times.  
Nonetheless, there is still nothing to address the revolving door in the UK; which is 
not exclusive to the banking industry.  However, if the consumer is confident that 
they are protected from retail bank misconduct and there is sufficient regulation in 
place to prevent it, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this market 
failure.   
The fifth market failure addressed above is that of fraudulent activity.  The FCA 
conduct of business regulations set out how a firm must behave in its day-to-day 
dealing with consumers and the regulator monitors this through using tools such as 
Economics for Effective Regulation (discussed in Section 2.4.6). Therefore as part 
of this investigation, the confidence levels of consumers will be measured to assess 
the success of conduct of business regulations in combatting fraudulent activity and 
maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.  The fifth hypothesis that will 
be tested is:   
H5:  The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
2.6.4 Social Rationales for Regulation  
In the previous section the economic rationales for regulating retail banking were 
discussed.  These are the economic reasons for imposing regulations such as capital 
requirements, depositor insurance and Conduct of Business rules to reduce 
externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard and fraudulent activities.  These 
are justified as they are deemed necessary interventions for the efficient functioning 
of the economy.  As discussed previously, confidence in the banking system is 
critical to the health of the economy. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1997) 
defines social regulations as those that “protect public interests such as health, 
safety, the environment, and social cohesion”.  Further, “the economic effects of 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 76 
 
social regulations may be secondary concerns or even unexpected, but can be 
substantial”. 
Llewellyn (1998, p.315) stated that “the objectives of regulation should be limited to 
correcting identified market imperfections, failures and externalities”.  However, 
Cartwright (2004) identified the following social rationales for regulation:  
i. Paternalism 
ii. Distributive justice 
iii. Community values. 
2.6.4.1 Paternalism 
Paternalism is when there is intervention in the interests of another, against their will.  
An example of this is the Mortgage Market Review (FSA, 2010a).  This put an end 
to self-certified mortgages, consumers could no longer submit false income and 
expenditure information in order to pass the affordability checks.  Additionally, it saw 
the introduction of mandatory advice on regulated mortgage products.  These 
interventions were introduced solely to secure better outcomes for the consumer by 
reducing the likelihood that they will make decisions to their detriment; whether it 
was desired or not.  Behavioural economics has been referred to as ‘light’ 
paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
As stated above, in its strictest sense, paternalism “removes choice and replaces it 
with the choice of the state” (Cartwright, 2004, p.19).  The behavioural economists 
practice a libertarian version of paternalism by ‘nudging’ people to make more 
rational decisions (this is discussed in more detail below).  Although an economic 
theory, it is important to distinguish between behavioural economics and 
neoclassical economics.  In Section 2.4.1 the two traditional theories of economic 
regulation were discussed.  The early neoclassical approach of welfare economics 
from which public interest theory originated, and the Chicago School of economics, 
also a neoclassical school of economic thought, from which private interest theory 
emerged.  Neoclassical economics assumes that agents act rationally and in their 
own self-interests.  Conversely, behavioural economics does not assume that 
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people make rational decisions, and instead studies the behavioural biases that can 
affect the decision making process.  “A principal difficulty with describing a provision 
as paternalistic is that most apparently paternalistic laws can be justified on other 
grounds” (Cartwright, 2004, p.20).  Although an economic theory, the use of 
behavioural economics in this context falls under a social rationale as the primary 
justification for intervention is not an economic one. 
The FCA published its first Occasional Paper in April 2013 where it set out how it will 
apply behavioural economics to meet its overall strategic objective “to make markets 
for financial services work well for consumers” and use the insights to help “choose 
the right interventions” and “secure better outcomes for consumers” and “promote 
effective competition” (Erta, Hunt, Iscenko, Brambley and the FCA, 2013, p.3, p.51-
52). 
The FCA believed that by gaining better insight into consumer behaviour, specifically 
on how behavioural biases can affect the decision making process, particularly in 
financial services decisions, they could help consumers avoid making decisions to 
their detriment.   
In the second occasional paper, also published in April 2013, called ‘Encouraging 
consumers to claim redress: evidence from a field trial’.  An anonymous firm 
reproduced the experiment the government’s Behavioural Insights Team (also 
known as the ‘Nudge Unit’) undertook with non-payers of vehicle tax (The 
Economist, 2012).  In this experiment they made subtle changes to the language 
used in their mailings to encourage a higher response rate.  In the government 
experiment they found that by personalising the letter they experienced an increase 
in response rate of a third.  In the FCA experiment changes were made to letters 
advising consumers of redress owed to them, due to an error identified in the sales 
process.  The results were a sevenfold increase in response rate.  The changes 
made were:  
i. envelope marked ‘act quickly’ 
ii. FSA logo in the letterhead 
iii. salient bullet points 
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iv. simplified text, reduced by 40% 
v. stated in letter that claims process would take only ‘5 minutes’; 
vi. CEO signed the letter instead of generic team 
vii. a reminder letter was sent three to six weeks afterwards. 
The above is a demonstration of the FCA’s commitment to “test remedies before 
implementation more frequently than previously and conduct research to gain 
deeper insights into specific markets” (Erta et al, 2013, p.52).  The outcome of such 
research, using behavioural economics, will then be used by the FCA to decide the 
most appropriate intervention. 
Behavioural economics “has emerged as an alternative view of financial markets” 
(Shleifer, 2000, p.2) and is the study of psychology and economics (DellaVigna, 
2009).  This relatively new field of study developed due to rising scepticism, 
increased by events such as the 1987 stock market crash, about the efficient market 
hypothesis (Mishkin and Easkins, 2012).  Fama (1970, p.388) developed the efficient 
market hypothesis, “security prices at any point in time fully reflect all available 
information”.  In doing so he asserted the financial markets are efficient and cannot 
be beaten.  Theory developed over time to demonstrate that individuals are not fully 
rational (Shleifer, 2000) and therefore cannot make fully rational decisions.  
Consequently, the efficient market hypothesis cannot be applied to financial markets 
in such a way as they can be to alternative economic markets.   
Altman (2012) suggests that due to behavioural biases and errors which are 
‘hardwired in the brain’; financial education and the drive to improve financial literacy 
of the UK population by the FCA (and its predecessor the FSA) will actually do little 
to improve the decisions of consumer of financial services.  Instead, Altman (2012) 
suggests nudging consumers into making decisions which ‘experts’ deem to be 
better for them under this approach to behavioural economics.  Altman suggests that 
the ‘alternative’ approach (which he dubs the ‘Simon-March’ approach after cognitive 
psychologist Herbert A. Simon and behavioural theorist James G. March who 
collaborated on several publications on organisational theory) is more suitable for 
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government intervention to improve financial education and literacy and therefore 
there is less need for ‘nudges’, and quality of information is key. 
The UK government have been using behavioural economics to ‘protect’ the general 
public or ‘persuade’ them to make better decisions.  In a report sponsored by Aviva 
(previously, Norwich Union) Dixon (2006) suggested that as many as 30.5 million 
adults in the UK in early 2006 were experiencing some form of difficulty when it came 
to financial capability.   Dixon (2006, p.2) suggested financial capability was more of 
“social welfare issue” for the government than an issue for the FSA.  He then went 
on to suggest various ways in which the government could apply behavioural 
economics to improve consumers’ financial capability, such as, automated debt 
repayments from benefits and automated transfer of salary increases to savings 
accounts. 
The UK government have been using behavioural economics to make policy 
decisions for some time via the ‘Nudge Unit’.  Harford (2009, p.13) described his 
reservations in ‘nudging’ the public to “behave as the nanny state preferred” when 
he believes that the popularity of the theory has meant that it has become “mutated”.    
Harford’s reservations stem from his observation that behavioural economics has 
quickly become public policy panacea, and his belief that perhaps a more cautious 
approach by government would be to understand what people would prefer if they 
could be persuaded to give some proper thought to decisions. 
Ormerod (2010) demonstrated why despite government assertion that behavioural 
economics can be used to ‘nudge’ the general public into making better decisions 
they are failing to successfully apply it in practice.  For example, in the case of 
workless families the government hopes to change behaviour by cutting or changing 
the benefits they receive.  Additionally, in the case of binge drinking the government 
approach is to increase the cost of alcohol.  These approaches do not take into 
account that we are not “autonomous individuals” and that we are influenced by 
others and what our circle considers to be socially acceptable.  This demonstrates 
that changing behaviour is not simple or straightforward and a deeper insight into 
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what influences consumers is required if the benefits of behavioural economics are 
to be realised. 
Following the FCA’s first occasional paper, Miller (2013) published an article 
summarising how the FCA intended to use behavioural economics to resolve 
consumer issues and the four key ways in which they intend to do this.  Firstly, the 
information provided to consumers would be more closely monitored so that it was 
marketed in a particular way and certain practices were forbidden; such as 
misleading information.  Secondly, the choice that consumers are presented with 
when making financial decisions would be more closely scrutinised by the regulator.  
Thirdly, product distribution would be more closely supervised to ensure that 
products were only sold through the appropriate channels to the appropriate target 
market.  Lastly, products would be more controlled so that their features could not 
lead to the exploitation of consumers.  
Watt (2013) commented that the PPI mis-selling scandal is a perfect example of 
“people’s implied acceptance that the product was appropriate for their 
circumstances”.  If the above four principles had been applied to PPI products, then 
it becomes clear that mis-selling on the scale that was seen would have unlikely 
occurred.   
Chung (2013) suggests that using behavioural economics will only be effective if 
financial institutions have a good understanding of each consumer group’s 
behaviour and motivations, and that they can only do this by undertaking a 
comprehensive review of their profile, specifically: ‘demographics’, ‘channel use’, 
‘affluence’, ‘ability to bear loss’, ‘financial sophistication and capability’, ‘investment 
appetite, investment objectives and willingness to accept loss’, and ‘risk type and 
emotional ability to accept loss’. 
Spicer et. al., (2014) found that customer inertia exists due to information 
asymmetries and lack of transparency in the market.  They suggest that the use of 
league tables and rankings would help consumers to compare offers and identify the 
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best option.  This could alleviate some of the concerns expressed by Harford (above) 
and further enhance good competition in retail banking. 
The sixth rationale for regulation is that of paternalism.  Since coming into power the 
FCA has developed a keen interest in the use of behavioural economics to choose 
the right interventions, secure better outcomes for consumers and promote effective 
competition (Erta et al, 2013).  Therefore as part of this investigation, the confidence 
levels of consumers will be measured to assess the success of paternalism in 
maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.  The sixth hypothesis that will 
be tested is:   
H6:  The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail 
bank 
2.6.4.2 Distributive Justice  
Distributive justice is concerned with distributing resources on the basis of what is 
fair, and when applied to the regulatory system it is concerned with the protection of 
consumers (Cartwright, 2004).  Examples of regulatory protection of the most 
vulnerable financial services consumers are policies of financial inclusion and the 
FCA investigation into payday lenders which resulted in extra rules for firms 
providing high-cost, short-term credit which took effect on 1 July 2014 (FCA, 2014a). 
The FCA published its eighth Occasional Paper, ‘Consumer Vulnerability’ in 
February 2015.  The FCA conceded that much consumer protection legislation is 
“underpinned by the notion of the average or typical consumer” (Coppack, Raza, 
Sarkar, Scribbins, and the FCA, 2015, p.6).  Their study found that many consumers 
in vulnerable circumstances are not being served consistently or well.  The FCA 
defines a vulnerable consumer as, “someone who, due to their personal 
circumstances, is especially susceptible to detriment, particularly when a firm is not 
acting with appropriate levels of care” (Coppack et al, 2015, p.7).  Some of the 
examples of risk factors for vulnerability identified in the FCA’s research were: 
i. Low  literacy, numeracy and financial capability skills 
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ii. Physical disability 
iii. Severe or long-term illness 
iv. Mental health problems 
v. Low income and/or debt 
vi. Caring responsibilities (including operating a power of attorney) 
vii. Being ‘older old’ for example over 80, although this is not absolute (may be 
associated with cognitive or dexterity impairment, sensory impairments such 
as hearing or sight, onset of ill-health, not being comfortable with new 
technology) 
viii. Being young (associated with less experience) 
ix. Change in circumstances (e.g. job loss, bereavement, divorce) 
x. Lack of English skills 
xi. Non-standard requirements or credit history   (e.g. armed forces personal 
returning from abroad; ex-offenders; care-home leavers; recent immigrants). 
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all of the factors identified by the 
FCA.  The researcher, for ethical reasons, is unable to access particular vulnerable 
groups and also does not have access to other specific groups, for example from 
the ‘non-standard’ list above. The specific demographic groups that will be tested for 
any significant difference in levels of confidence in this thesis are: age, education 
and income.  A common problem encountered by each of these groups is access to 
affordable products (Coppack et al, 2015).  In July 2018 the FCA set out a framework 
for considering both economic and distributive fairness considerations in the practice 
of price discrimination (Starks, Reynolds, Gee, Burnik, Vass, and FCA, 2018).  If the 
consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair, and there is 
sufficient regulation in place to ensure it is, then it could be argued that regulation 
has corrected this market failure.     
The seventh rationale for regulation is the principal of distributive justice.  Access to 
financial services should be equal for all and inclusive.  Price tends to be a common 
problem which creates inequality of access.  The FCA has published several papers 
to help firms identify and understand the specific needs of vulnerable groups and 
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challenge financial exclusion.  Therefore as part of this investigation, the confidence 
levels of consumers will be measured to assess the principal of distributive justice in 
maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.  The seventh hypothesis that 
will be tested is:   
H7:  The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
2.6.4.3 Community Values 
Community values are the values which society holds and wish regulation to protect 
and promote; such as trust, honesty and fair dealing (Cartwright, 2004).  Due to 
market failures such as asymmetric information, trust is paramount in retail financial 
services, as without trust demand for products and services may decrease 
(Llewellyn, 2005).  One of the FCA’s statutory objectives is to ‘maintain confidence 
in the UK financial system’ under the terms of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.   
In 2004 the FOS found that not all consumers were receiving fair and equal treatment 
and their 37th newsletter focused on types of discrimination that can occur, namely 
disability, race and sex, which were protected under the Disability Discrimination Act 
(1995), the Race Relations Act (1976), and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975).  In 
their 123rd newsletter published in 2015, the FOS revisited the issues which had 
been brought together, by this previously separate legislation, under the Equality Act 
(2010).  They identified several case studies of discrimination at the hands of 
financial services providers.  The FOS outlined the cases and the outcomes, clearly 
explaining how they had made their decision and how the service provider had fallen 
short of both expectations and the law.  The purpose of these newsletter case 
studies is to provide those working within the industry with essential information on 
how to prevent and/or settle complaints, before escalation to FOS.  Clearly, there is 
UK legislation in place to protect all citizens, not only consumers of financial services.  
However, the FOS has taken on the role of out-of-court settler of complaints which 
means that the consumer does not incur any legal costs (the firms pay a fee for each 
complaint against them).  The FOS does have to consider the law when making a 
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ruling but can depart from it if it would lead to a conclusion contrary to what is fair 
and reasonable (Taylor, 2017).  If the consumer is confident that they will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by their retail bank, and there is sufficient regulation 
in place to prevent it, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this market 
failure.   
The eighth, and final, rationale for regulation studied in this thesis is the preservation 
of community values.  In addition to the guidance and regulations in place, as 
discussed above, there is also an arbitrator, the Financial Ombudsman.  The 
purpose of FOS is to ensure that consumers receive a fair deal and where this is not 
the case it is put right.  This is particularly important for groups who could find they 
are discriminated against but may lack a voice.  Therefore, as part of this 
investigation, the confidence levels of consumers will be measured to assess the 
impact of community values in maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.  
The eighth hypothesis that will be tested is:   
H8:  The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
When applying the philosophies of distributive justice and community values, it is 
clear there are ethical considerations as well as social ones.  The organisational 
culture and ethics of UK financial institutions has come into question for decades, 
but more recently due to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08. 
The above has set out the economic and social rationales for regulation of the 
financial services sector.   
2.8 Conclusions 
The structure and culture of retail banks has been explored, and how these factors 
influence the treatment of consumers and impact consumer confidence in the 
effectiveness of regulation.  Firstly, the consolidation of the retail bank market has 
given rise to a complex monopoly which by its very nature is not conducive to the 
enhancement of consumer welfare.  Additionally, the reduction in diversification of 
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business models gave rise to the incentive structures and cultures which were 
blamed for widespread bad practices and bank failure (Spicer et. al., 2014).  
Conversely, a strong ethical culture is considered to make banks less vulnerable to 
misconduct (Vigeo-Eiris, 2017); despite this there is still no mandatory ethical code 
for the industry (Jenkins, 2016). 
It is important to consider the above factors since they heavily influence the 
behaviour of the firm which has consequences for the consumer.  For example, 
whether the firm ‘will do the right thing’, ‘provide them with sufficient information to 
make informed decisions’, can be trusted ‘in their expertise’, and will ensure they are 
protected against widespread ‘misconduct’ and ‘discrimination’ is inherently down to 
the structure and culture of the organisation. 
The research aim is to answer the question, ‘Are Scottish consumers confident in 
retail banking regulation?’.  After undertaking a critical review of the existing theory 
of financial regulation literature, from the perspective of consumer confidence in 
retail banking, it is clear the areas that regulation seeks to address are the market 
failures which cause economic and/or social detriment. 
Therefore, the theories have been contextualised to develop the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure 
H2: The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) 
is protected should their bank fail 
H3: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions 
H4: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
H5: The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
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H6: The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail 
bank 
H7: The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
H8: The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
H9: In general, the consumer is confident that as a retail bank customer they 
are adequately protected 
These hypotheses will be used to develop a set of consumer survey questions which 
will be evaluated using a triangulated approach.  The evaluation process is part of 
the survey design (from theoretical model to empirical testing) and is undertaken in 
three distinct steps, see Figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3 Triangulated Approach to Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher held a three-stage survey design, the first with subject knowledge 
academics (theorists), the second with industry experts (practitioners) and the third 
with a group of consumers (end-users) who would not be included in the main study.  
The rationale for separating the groups was due to the different levels of technical 
1. Theorists 
3. End-users 2. Practitioners 
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knowledge, additionally, corrections and amendments could be made before ‘testing’ 
on the next group. 
There are numerous studies, in particular those undertaken by the current regulator, 
where there is participation from either industry or consumer.  The regulator and 
academics often conduct collaborative research, as evidenced in this chapter.  
However, the researcher could not find any specific studies where theorists, 
practitioners and consumers had direct input into the design of the study.  The next 
chapter will provide an outline of the research methodology and the methods 
employed by the researcher in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the researcher explored the structure and culture of both the 
retail banking regulator(s) and the retail banking institutions and how this has 
changed over recent decades to become the system known today.  Some of the 
changes were a result of innovation, others the result of failures, but essentially the 
rationales for regulating the sector have remained the same.  The emphasis on the 
importance of confidence in the financial system has intensified since the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007/8.  There are of course still advocates of free-banking, and 
the regulation versus deregulation debate may never cease.  Both the social and 
economic rationales for regulation are widely debated in the literature, and as 
mentioned above, although the industry has transformed over the decades the 
principles behind these have not.  Nonetheless, the measurement of confidence in 
the processes to enforce these appears to be lacking in the literature.  This research 
aims to measure consumer levels of confidence in the rationales for regulation and 
identify whether demographic factors such as age, education and income have any 
relationship to these levels of confidence.  These are factors that the Financial 
Conduct Authority has identified as risk factors for vulnerability (Coppack at el, 
2015).   
i. Being young, or being ‘older old’ 
ii. Low literacy, numeracy and financial capability skills 
iii. Low income  
This chapter will provide an outline of the research methodology and methods 
employed by the researcher in this thesis.  The relationship between the research 
question, the hypotheses previously identified in the Literature Review Chapter, the 
philosophical assumptions and the techniques used to conduct the research will be 
demonstrated.  The researcher’s overall research philosophy is stated in Section 3.2 
Methodology.  The research approach follows a positivist paradigm and there is a 
discussion of the methods deemed appropriate for the primary research and the 
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techniques adopted for analysis, including consideration of academic ethical issues 
arising from the research. 
Finally, an overview of the preliminary research is provided, including changes made 
to the Consumer Survey following examination of the feedback obtained during the 
three-stage survey design.    
A description of the data collected in the final study, including the characteristics and 
demographics of the sample population is defined and the validity of the sampling 
approach is discussed. 
3.2 Methodology 
The terms methodology and methods are often, incorrectly, used interchangeably.  
For example, Trochim (2000) defines epistemology as the philosophy of how we 
come to know, and methodology as the practice of how we come to know. There is 
no separation of methodology and methods in his definition.  McGregor and Murnane 
(2010) offer concise definitions as follows: methodology refers to any philosophical 
assumptions that underpin the study, and methods are the techniques or procedures 
followed to conduct the study.  Moreover, they explain that each research paradigm 
(discussed in section 3.2.1 below) has an associated group of methodological 
principles.  Wainwright (1997) defines methodology as the philosophical analysis of 
research strategies, and the methods as the techniques used to gather and analyse 
the data.  Furthermore, the philosophy of a paradigm is made up of the ontology, 
epistemology and methodology.  
Based on the research outcomes of the study, and a comprehensive review of prior 
literature, the researcher has identified that to describe and explain the methodology 
and methods used there must be two distinct parts.  First, the philosophical approach 
is discussed as the research paradigm; which constitutes ontology, epistemology 
and methodology.  Second, the methods are discussed in terms of data collection 
procedures and data analysis strategy.   
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3.2.1 Research Paradigm 
Kuhn (1970) coined the phrase ‘research paradigm’ in his book, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolution.  He defined the paradigm as a source of guidance for 
conducting and evaluating research which is based on a shared set of theoretical 
assumptions.  A paradigm, therefore, is the identity of a research community based 
on their shared belief system or set of principles (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 
2013).  The theoretical assumptions that characterise the research paradigms are 
ontology, epistemology and methodology (Guba, 1990).   
Hitchcock and Hughes (1995) proposed that ontological assumptions lead to 
epistemological assumptions; these, in turn, lead to methodological considerations; 
and these, in turn, lead to issues of data collection (as cited in Cohen et al, 2013).   
Ontology refers to the study of the nature of reality (Guba, 1990), the nature of 
existence, and understanding ‘what is’ (Gray, 2007).  Velardo (2016) attempts to 
answer the question, ‘What is reality?’, by approaching the question from two 
disciplines, science and philosophy.  He posits that while science focuses on 
empirical evidence and observation, philosophy tends to be more speculative and 
based upon argument and reasoning from values.  Ontology determines what can 
be rationally understood (Poli and Seibt, 2010).  The researcher’s position is that the 
world is external and objective, and through research one single reality, or truth, can 
be discovered.  Objectivism is the epistemology which underpins the positivist stance 
(Crotty, 1998).   
Epistemology refers to the study of knowledge and understanding what it means to 
know (Gray, 2007), how we know what we know (Crotty, 1998), and how we 
legitimise and validate this knowledge.  Essentially, it is the theory of knowledge 
(Benton and Craib, 2011).  In line with the aim and research objectives of this thesis 
the researcher has a positivist theoretical perspective as it is posited that reality can 
be measured in terms of this specific research project; facts are facts.  Moreover, 
the researcher is independent from the study, hence it is purely objective.   Guba 
(1990) proposed that all paradigms can be characterised by the responses to three 
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basic questions.  Table 3.1 overleaf illustrates how the researcher formed a positivist 
philosophical position. 
 
Table 3.1: The Paradigm of Positivist Inquiry  
Theoretical assumption Basic questions Positivist inquiry 
Ontology What is the nature 
of reality? 
Realist – reality exists ‘out there’ 
Epistemology What is the nature 
of the relationship 
between the 
researcher and 
reality? 
Dualist/objectivist – distant and non-
interactive.  Values and other biases are 
automatically excluded from influencing the 
outcome 
Methodology How should the 
researcher go 
about finding out 
the reality? 
Experimental/manipulative – questions or 
hypotheses are stated in advance in 
propositional form and subjected to 
empirical tests under carefully controlled 
conditions 
(Source: adapted from Guba, 1990) 
 
‘Positive’ or confirmatory data is a term used to describe hypothesis-driven research 
at the heart of science (Anderson, Sprott, and Olsen, 2013).  Positivism is the 
philosophy that all knowledge comes from observable experiences.  The positivists 
are driven by their belief that society could be studied like a natural science.   
Criticisms of the positivist approach are that it fails to consider the subjective nature 
of participants and relies on experience as a valid source of knowledge (Scotland, 
2012).  Additionally, research findings are only descriptive; they will not produce in-
depth insight into the issue being examined. Lastly, the reliance of experience as a 
valid source of knowledge has been criticised.  On the contrary, for this study these 
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points are valid reasons for adopting this approach.  In this research the aim is to 
measure the levels of confidence that retail bank consumers have in eight specific 
areas of regulation.  Although individual opinions are subjective, collectively they 
form an objective reality that can be measured, the reality is ‘out there’ and the 
researcher cannot influence this or bias the results.  The researcher will then 
undertake statistical analysis of the captured data; this forms part of the method and 
is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
3.3 Methods 
Owing to the researcher’s positivist ontology and epistemology, a quantitative 
approach to data collection was employed.  Cohen et al, (2013), claim that positivist 
approach researchers will choose from ‘traditional’ tools, such as surveys or 
experiments.   
However, most studies will be a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative 
categories with more emphasis on one or the other (Hackley, 2003).  The researcher 
has opted to use a traditionally qualitative method, in the three-stage survey design, 
to validate the consumer survey questions.  One of the main purposes of the process 
is to ensure the questions were not misleading or likely to be misinterpreted.  A 
disadvantage of a questionnaire is that due to its standardised questions it is not 
possible to explain any points.  It is therefore sensible to test the questions with at 
least one group of people knowledgeable about the issues being examined. The 
researcher held a three-stage survey design; the first with subject knowledge 
academics (theorists), the second with industry experts (practitioners) and the third 
with a group of consumers (end-users) who would not be included in the main study.  
The rationale for separating the groups was due to the different levels of technical 
knowledge, additionally, corrections and amendments could be made before ‘testing’ 
on the next group, see Figure 3.1 overleaf.   
There are numerous studies; in particular those undertaken by the current regulator, 
where there is participation from either industry or consumer, however, the 
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researcher could not find any specific studies where theorists, practitioners and 
consumers had direct input into the design of the study.   
. 
Figure 3.1: Stages of Survey Design: from Theoretical Model to Empirical 
Testing
 
 
For this study the primary data collection method used was a consumer survey in 
the form of a questionnaire.  The researcher designed a consumer survey that would 
collect both demographic data, and, measure levels of confidence using a Likert 
scale.  The data was collected online, over the telephone and face-to-face. 
These three channels were used to ensure no group(s) was excluded from 
participation due to immobility, geographic location, or lack of internet access.  Face-
to-face surveys were conducted in shopping centres in the north, east and central 
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Scotland.  Additionally, a pensioners coffee morning in north east Scotland was 
attended to capture this age demographic.  The participants who were contacted via 
telephone were selected at random from phone books purchased from BT which 
covered households in the south west of Scotland.  Primarily, the researcher sought 
to ensure the widest range of ages and geographic locations were covered.  There 
were practical limits on time and budget in relation to postcode data and specialised 
software (or employing an external company to conduct the research, such as the 
FCA has done in previous studies). 
The advantages and disadvantages of the survey method differ slightly depending 
on the channel utilised to conduct the questionnaire and collect the data.  It’s widely 
recognised that surveys tend to be straightforward, quick and cheap to administer 
(Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992).  However, this very much depends on the chosen 
channel.  In terms of simplicity, an online survey will be easier to analyse than paper 
format conducted via telephone or face-to-face.  In this research, the use of Novi 
Survey removed the requirement for data entry prior to coding.  Another advantage 
the online survey has over paper completion is that the survey can be set up in such 
a way that questions cannot be missed.  For example, one of the clauses on the 
consent form was that an incomplete questionnaire would be treated as a wish to 
withdraw from the research.  It could be the case that some of the face-to-face 
surveys had unintentional gaps; since these were completed independently by the 
participants.   
The online and face-to-face surveys were completed independently by the 
participants; however, the telephone surveys were completed by the researcher on 
the participants’ behalf.  The researcher endeavoured to ensure they did not 
influence the outcome in any way, however, it must be acknowledged that a major 
potential disadvantage of this channel is interviewer bias (Szolnoki and Hoffmann, 
2013).  
It has been argued that an online survey is quicker than face-to-face or telephone 
research (Gunter, Nicholas, Huntington and Williams, 2002).  However, the online 
survey for this research was actually open for 9 months, whereas the face-to-face 
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and telephone surveys were completed in a matter of days.  Certainly, the researcher 
had to dedicate their full attention and time to the latter two methods as these were 
labour intensive.  Nonetheless, this concurs with Duffy, Smith, Terhanian and 
Bremer (2005), that online surveys actually take some time if a wide-reach is 
required. 
In terms of monetary cost, there was nothing incurred for the online or telephone 
surveys (the university had purchased the software licence, and the calls were made 
as part of a contract plan, so the researcher did not incur further charges), however, 
the face-to-face surveys did incur travel costs and other incidental costs. 
In terms of sample representativeness, face-to-face surveys tend to deliver the best 
results, followed by telephone and then online surveys (Szolnoki and Hoffmann, 
2013). In this research, face-to-face surveys were carried out after most of the online 
surveys had been completed.  This enabled the researcher to target particular 
demographic groups that were lacking via the online method.  The telephone surveys 
also targeted a particular demographic: males.  The telephone method had the best 
response rate, with 100% of successful contact resulting in a completed 
questionnaire.  Some face-to-face requests were declined, although not many, and 
it is impossible to determine how many potential participants did not click on the 
survey link, or clicked it and then decided against participation before commencing.  
However, around one fifth of surveys that were started were never completed.    
A clear disadvantage of the online method was sample representativeness; this was 
made-up through the other two channels.  It is clear that some of the disadvantages 
of one method can be overcome by adopting another.  Using three methods to collect 
the survey data ensured a representative sample was achieved, which was the 
researcher’s highest priority.  
The survey was analysed using quantitative methods.  The principal reason for 
choosing to do this was to be able to capture a large, random sample which could 
allow the overall research findings to be generalisable.  Additionally, the aim of the 
research was to address the key issue ‘Are Scottish consumers confident in the retail 
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banking system?’ Based on the answer to this question, the implications of the levels 
of trust afforded by Scottish consumers on the banking sector, wider financial 
services sector, and ultimately the economy, will be assessed.  Therefore, collecting 
data from any other stakeholder was not required to meet the aim and objectives of 
this research.  Furthermore, due to the large sample required, a survey was deemed 
more appropriate than interviews, which are time-consuming and subject to more 
personal biases (both respondent and interviewer).  The advantages of 
questionnaires are that they are relatively inexpensive and quick to administer and 
can be used to capture data from a large number of respondents in different 
geographical locations (Walliman, 2015).   
3.3.1 Data Collection  
The techniques applied for data gathering will be described in this section.  Revisiting 
the research focus will add clarity to the aim of the method; ‘Are Scottish consumers 
confident in retail banking regulation?’  This can only be answered by gathering data 
on the key themes that have been identified in the banking regulation and consumer 
protection literature.  Based on the answer to this question, the implications of the 
levels of trust afforded by Scottish consumers on the banking sector, wider financial 
services sector, and ultimately the economy, will be assessed.     
Accordingly, the reasons for and against the regulation of financial services have 
been examined.  An interesting finding was the consensus, from both sides of the 
debate, that the need for consumer confidence is grounds for regulating the banking 
industry (Llewellyn and the FSA, 1999); although the level of regulation deemed 
appropriate is still debated (Benston, 2000).   
Secondly, the rationales identified in the pro-regulation literature have been 
categorised, and a survey question has been derived from each specific 
rationale.  Each of the identified rationales has been split into one of two categories: 
economic rationales and social rationales.  In total nine hypotheses have been 
derived from the literature. 
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Lastly, as consumer confidence is the main driver of regulation of the system, the 
measure of success in achieving the rationales is not that the regulator or industry 
perceives they are meeting them, but that consumers do.  For that reason, the main 
focus that is being investigated through a number of research hypotheses can only 
be answered by measuring consumer perceptions that each of the rationales for 
regulation is being met.  The results of the three-stage survey design, based on 
feedback from the groups, are discussed in detail in Sections 3.7 – 3.10.  The method 
for obtaining this data will now be described. 
In order to collect the data in a way which did not affect the participants, the 
researcher undertook an observational study in the form of a survey.  The population 
of interest was individuals over 18 years old in Scotland; since retail banking is a 
service which should be available to every adult in Scotland.  Per the CAB Scotland 
(2010) ‘Banking on the Basics’ report approximately 5% of the Scottish adult 
population was unbanked in 2007/8.  Therefore, a question was added to the 
demographics section of the survey to establish if a personal current account was 
held by the participant.  In June 2018, the FCA published ‘The financial lives of 
consumers across the UK’ (FCA, 2018b).  In their findings differences between 
regions of the UK were marginal.  Therefore, although this research is focused on 
Scotland it could be applied more widely to the UK.  
The sample selected and presented with the questionnaire represented a cross-
section of the Scottish adult population.  Selecting a random cross-section avoids 
bias and supports legitimate results.  The sampling frame was created from data 
obtained from the National Records of Scotland official government website.  This 
defined target population did not statistically favour or exclude any groups (based on 
age, gender, and income or education level).  The wording of the survey questions 
was carefully considered to ensure they were not misleading or created bias.  
Feedback from the Theorist group was received around the neutrality of the 
questions and this was acted upon and updated, for example, to change ‘good’ 
financial decisions to ‘informed’ financial decisions.   A test of the validity and 
suitability of the questions was carried out by three groups: 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 98 
 
i. Theorists 
ii. Practitioners 
iii. End-users 
One purpose was to ‘sense-check’ the survey, and obtain feedback, which may have 
led to amendments to the questionnaire before data collection began. 
The sampling frame is the Scottish adult (18+ years) population.  The data used to 
create this was obtained from the National Records of Scotland’s Mid-2016 
population estimates.  The sample was stratified using the subset of age group to 
ensure appropriate numbers were drawn from each set.  The total population size is 
4,372,939 (National Records of Scotland, 2017).  The sample size was then 
determined, the characteristics of which are discussed in full from Section 3.11 
onwards.   
The survey was distributed in two main ways.  First, the software Novi, was used to 
create an electronic questionnaire that could be emailed to participants and posted 
on websites to request participation (see Section 3.13 Data Collection for more 
detail).  Secondly, a paper format was available.  The researcher then visited several 
public locations in Scotland (also see Section 3.13) with the paper version with the 
aim to specifically target the strata of the target population that may not have been 
covered proportionally through the distribution of the electronic questionnaire, e.g. 
elderly respondents, people with limited access to the internet.  The researcher 
decided to utilise a man on the street survey as the results may be biased to only 
those who had access to the internet and therefore some of the target population 
may not have the opportunity to respond if this method had not also been 
undertaken.  Further to the man on street data collection the researcher also 
undertook telephone surveys in areas which it was not possible to visit. 
The main limitations of the study are: 
i. Firstly the location.  Data was collected from residents of Scotland only, and 
therefore the results are specific to Scotland (although previous studies in 
this field have found differences between UK regions were marginal)   
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ii. Secondly, a survey can only report the relationships between variables and 
cannot claim cause and effect, that is, the research will be able to answer the 
‘what’ but not the ‘why’.   
iii. Lastly, a major limitation of stepwise regression is the increased likelihood of 
committing a type 1 error (Pandit and Khairullah, 2015), i.e. rejecting a true 
null hypothesis, due to a sampling error.  However, sampling error is less of 
an issue with a larger sample size (Thompson, 1995). 
Potentially, future research should be undertaken to encompass a wider 
participation in terms of location and examine the ‘why’ questions that this research 
may uncover.   
There are two question sections in the surveys.  The first section is comprised of 
demographic questions such as gender, age, education level, employment status 
and income.  Several studies measuring trust and confidence in the financial 
services sector since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 did not report any 
significant gender differences in their findings, Moin, Devlin and McKechnie, 2017; 
the FCA Financial Lives survey, 2018; YouGov on behalf of Positive Money survey, 
2018; Edelman Trust Barometer (UK results), 2019; and GfK Consumer Confidence 
Index, 2019, are a few recent examples. 
The FCA’s Financial Lives Study (2017) found that confidence in managing financial 
matters increased with age. However, in addition to finding the youngest age group 
(18-24 year olds: 30%) had the least confidence in the financial services industry 
they also found the oldest group (age over 85: 31%) had low confidence.  
Bannier and Schwarz (2018) found that a higher educational attainment increases 
actual and perceived financial knowledge; however, they qualified this by stating 
“there is hardly any evidence of a link between education and confidence in the 
finance context” (p.67).    
Moin et. al. (2017) carried out a study where they measured the influence of 
demographics on trust in financial services.  They found that levels of trust generally 
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increase with income.   This corroborated the findings of research carried out by 
Alesina and La Ferrara in 2002. 
Age, education and income were considered important variables owing to the 
research conducted by the regulators into consumer vulnerability (Coppack et al, 
2015), access to financial services (Collard et al, 2016) and ageing populations 
(McLoughlin et al, 2017).  Clearly, the regulator and academics consider these 
demographics to be of such significance to warrant collaborative research on several 
occasions.  To re-iterate, the demographics this research focus on are age, 
education and income. This follows the risk factors for vulnerability identified by 
Coppack et al, (2015).   
i. Being young, or being ‘older old’ 
ii. Low literacy, numeracy and financial capability skills 
iii. Low income  
Additionally, the researcher included the question ‘Do you currently work in the 
financial services sector’?  The reason this demographic was included was to ensure 
the results were not skewed by a higher proportion of responses from those 
employed in financial services.  This was verified in Chapter 4.  The researcher was 
unable to find any studies that measured the difference (if any) in confidence levels 
between those employed in financial services and those who are not.   
The second section of the survey covers the main theoretical questions which have 
been developed from the Literature Review.  Overleaf and on page 101 and 102 are 
two tables which illustrate what the independent and dependent variables are and 
how they have been categorised. 
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Table 3.2: Demographic Questions and Variable Categorisation 
Demographics Variable Categorisation 
Gender Independent Nominal 
Age Independent Ordinal 
Education level Independent Ordinal 
Income level Independent Ordinal 
Work in Financial 
Services 
Independent Nominal 
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Table 3.3: Theoretical Questions and Variable Categorisation  
Rationales for 
Regulation 
Variable Categorisation Hypothesis 
Capital 
Requirements 
 
Dependent Ordinal H1: The consumer is confident that the UK 
retail banking system is stable and secure 
Depositor 
Insurance 
Dependent Ordinal H2: The consumer is confident that the 
money in their retail bank account(s) is 
protected should their bank fail 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Dependent Ordinal H3: The consumer is confident that their 
retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
Moral Hazard Dependent Ordinal H4: The consumer is confident that their 
retail bank will do the right thing 
Corruption Dependent Ordinal H5: The consumer is confident that  they are 
protected from retail bank misconduct 
Paternalism Dependent Ordinal H6: The consumer is confident that they can 
trust the expertise of their retail bank 
Distributive Justice Dependent Ordinal H7: The consumer is confident that the price 
of retail banking products is fair 
Community Values Dependent Ordinal H8: The consumer is confident that they will 
not be unlawfully discriminated against by 
their retail bank 
Overall Protection  Dependent Ordinal H9: In general, the consumer has 
confidence that as a retail bank customer 
they are adequately protected  
 
 
The dependent variable questions were subject to scrutiny in the three-stage 
empirical testing and this is discussed in detail in Sections 3.7 – 3.10.  As a Likert 
scale was used in Section 2 of the survey these variables are categorical and ordinal.  
In the next section the strategy for analysing the collected data is discussed. 
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3.3.2 Data Analysis 
The data was analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics Software.  The researcher 
consulted several SPSS sources to understand the general assumptions that apply 
to all of the parametric techniques.  They can be summarised as follows: 
i. The level or scale of measurement is of equal interval or ratio scale (Bryman 
and Cramer, 2001; Hinton, McMurray and Brownlow, 2014; Pallant, 2016) 
ii. Random sampling (Hinton, McMurray and Brownlow, 2014; Pallant, 2016) 
iii. Independence of observations (Pallant, 2016) 
iv. The data is drawn from a normally distributed population (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2001; Hinton, McMurray and Brownlow, 2014; Pallant, 2016) 
v. Homogeneity of variance (Bryman and Cramer, 2001; Hinton, McMurray and 
Brownlow, 2014; Pallant, 2016) 
The first assumption is determined by the classification of the dependent variables 
in the study.  Traditionally, Likert scale data is discrete categorical but this has 
sparked some debate.  Analysing and interpreting this data has caused some 
controversy in the academic literature (Glass, Peckham and Sanders, 1972; Kuzon, 
Urbanchek and McCabe, 1996; Blaikie, 2003, Jamieson, 2004; Carifio and Perla, 
2008; Norman 2010; Murray, 2013; Bishop and Herron, 2015; and, Knapp, 2016).  
The Likert Scale was developed by Rensis Likert in 1932 to measure attitudes on an 
ordinal scale where respondents can rate the degree to which they agree or disagree 
with a statement (Sullivan and Artino, 2013), or a level satisfaction/dissatisfaction; 
importance/unimportance.  
In this research, participants were asked to rate the degree to which they agreed or 
disagreed with a statement on a 6-point ordinal scale.  The researcher intentionally 
chose a 6-point rather than a 5- or 7-point scale to avoid participants defaulting to 
neutral and force them “to use cognitive effort to think about their true feelings on 
the subject” (Garland, 1991).  Previous research revealed that in uneven scales 
where a middle/neutral response is offered it is much more likely to be chosen 
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(Moors, 2008); further, it is also claimed that respondents answer differently if forced 
to choose a side (Kalton, Roberts and Holt, 1980; Bishop, 1987).   
The debate around analysing and interpreting Likert scale data has arisen from the 
principle that ordinal data, where the differences between responses (Agree – 
Disagree) cannot be assumed to be equidistant (Sullivan and Artino, 2013), and 
therefore cannot be treated as interval continuous data. Norman (2010) argues that 
studies dating back to the 1930s consistently show that parametric statistics are 
robust even when the data is not normally distributed. Jamieson (2004) maintains 
that due to the unknown distances between the categories, only non-parametric tests 
will produce valid results.  Conversely, concurring with Norman (2010), Murray 
(2013) found no differences in the conclusions drawn from Likert data when using 
parametric and non-parametric analysis.  Carifo and Perla (2008) rationalise that this 
debate only exists due to the problematic classification of Likert data, and, whether 
it is ordinal or interval.  The researcher believes that the scale used in this research 
(Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Slightly Disagree, Slightly Agree, Agree, Strongly 
Agree) can be classified as interval data, much as if the responses had been 
numbered 1 - 6 on a scale.  Bishop and Herron (2015) make the case that there is 
little need to use Likert scales at all in research and that a Visual Analog Scale (VAS) 
is more appropriate and suitable for parametric analysis.  There is some consensus 
for the use of parametric tests; this assumption could be met with supporting 
justifications.   
As the literature was inconclusive (Glass et al, 1972; Kuzon et al, 1996; Blaikie, 
2003, Jamieson, 2004; Carifio and Perla, 2008; Norman 2010; Murray, 2013; Bishop 
and Herron, 2015; and, Knapp, 2016), the researcher decided to take a pragmatic 
approach and tested the data against the remaining assumptions of parametric tests 
first.  
The second assumption is that the sample is not a biased selection.  The researcher 
made all possible efforts to ensure the sample was randomly selected and therefore 
this assumption is met.  In addition, checks were undertaken to ensure the 
characteristics of the respondents in the sample matched those of the wider 
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population in terms of age, gender, income level etc.  This is discussed in more detail 
in Section 3.11 onwards.  
The third assumption is that the observations or measurements are independent.  
The survey was designed in such a way that they would be completed independently 
without influence from the researcher or any other individual.  For the face-to-face 
and telephone surveys this can be confirmed, for the online surveys the researcher 
was not present to police this, however, given the structure of the questions it is clear 
that the survey is seeking an independent opinion.  Therefore it is reasonable to 
assume that this assumption is also met. 
The fourth assumption is that the data is drawn from a normally distributed 
population.  The populations that the researcher is interested in are those that are 
distributed in terms of age, educational level and income level.  None of those could 
be described as normally distributed.  First of all, the sampling frame is the adult 
population of Scotland so clearly there will be a positive skew for each of the three 
main independent variables.  For example, there are more young adults than old 
(see Figure 3.2), there are more adults educated below higher education level than 
at Undergraduate or Postgraduate level (see Figure 3.3), and there are more adults 
earning lower incomes than high incomes (see Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.2: Age Distribution in Scotland 
 
(Source: adapted from National Records of Scotland, 2017) 
 
Figure 3.2 above demonstrates the positive skew of the adult population in terms of 
age. 
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Figure 3.3: Education Distribution in Scotland 
 
(Source: adapted from National Records of Scotland, 2018) 
 
Figure 3.3 above illustrates the positive skew of the adult population in terms of 
level of educational attainment. 
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Figure 3.4: Income Distribution in Scotland 
 
(Source: adapted from Oxfam, 2018)  
 
Figure 3.4 above demonstrates the positive skew of the adult population in terms of 
income. 
Pallant (2016) argues that with a large enough sample size (over 30) violation of this 
assumption is immaterial as most of the techniques are tolerant.  The sample size 
for this research is much larger than 30, therefore it can be argued that this 
assumption does not need to be met. 
The fifth, and final, assumption is that the samples are obtained from populations 
which have equal variances.  In order to check that this assumption is met the 
researcher will carry out a Levene’s test for equality of variances once the data is 
collected (Pallant, 2016).  This is also an assumption that must be met for certain 
non-parametric tests. 
Having considered the assumptions that must be met to perform parametric tests, 
that researcher is confident that their use would be statistically sound.  However, in 
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addition to parametric tests, non-parametric tests will be used for robustness checks.  
The overall data sample selection and population are detailed from Section 3.11 
onwards. 
3.4 Strategy for Analysis 
The first part of the analysis looks at each question based on the individual 
demographic factors in turn: 
i. Employed in financial services sector 
ii. Gender 
iii. Age 
iv. Education 
v. Income 
Correlation analysis will determine relationships between the above variables.  
Excluding the first demographic characteristic (the reason for including this was 
discussed on page 100), these demographic variables have been selected for two 
key reasons.  The first is that they have been used in previous academic research 
on trust and confidence in the financial services sector (Alesina and La Ferrara in 
2002; Moin, Devlin and McKechnie, 2017; and Bannier and Schwarz, 2018).  The 
second is that they have been used in industry research of the same nature (the 
FCA Financial Lives survey, 2018; YouGov on behalf of Positive Money survey, 
2018; Edelman Trust Barometer (UK results), 2019; and GfK Consumer Confidence 
Index, 2019).  The results of these studies were discussed in more detail on pages 
99-100.  It is important to select the same demographics as previous studies so that 
the results can be more accurately compared and the resultant research findings 
contextualised with existing knowledge in the area.  Additionally, it is important in 
primary research, such as this, that the sample is representative of the population 
(this was verified in Chapter 4). 
Finally, step-wise multiple regression analysis will identify only those significant 
variables for each of the eight theoretical questions, and a final question which asks 
about general levels of confidence, in turn:  
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H1: The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure 
H2: The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) is 
protected should their bank fail 
H3: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions 
H4: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
H5: The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
H6: The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail bank 
H7: The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
H8: The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
H9: In general, the consumer is confident that as a retail bank customer they are 
adequately protected 
This may remove some of the significant relationships found in the correlation 
analysis; because certain independent variables are naturally correlated with others.  
So, while age, education and income may each individually be significantly related 
to one particular hypothesis, when they are included in a regression model only one 
of these is significant. 
3.5 Research Ethics and Integrity 
Ethical approval for this study was granted through formal application to the Faculty 
Research Ethics and Governance Committee of the Business School at Edinburgh 
Napier University.   
Signed consent was taken from all participants in the Survey Design Groups and 
from all participants in the main study.  Participants were free to withdraw from the 
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study at any time before submission (afterwards it is impossible to retrieve their 
specific data since it was anonymous).  Additionally, any incomplete questionnaire 
was treated as a wish to withdraw from the research.  This resulted in a significant 
reduction of valid questionnaires (approximately 20% reduction) that were taken 
forward for the formal analysis, however, this is deemed to be preferable than 
including data that cannot be confirmed as being valid.  
The University’s Codes of Practice, Research Integrity and Data Protection, were 
adhered to at all times. 
The ethical committee did have further questions regarding the involvement of 
participants aged over 65 years.  To exclude, marginalise or treat these participants 
as if they were less than fully competent would be unethical.   No new, or 
unconsidered, ethical issues arose during the three-stage survey design process or 
data collection.   
3.6 Survey Design 
Although conducting a pilot study does not guarantee success in the main study it 
does increase the probability (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001).  The main purpose 
of the three-stage survey design conducted for this research was to empirically test 
the validity of the questions in the consumer survey.   
Ruel (2016) distinguishes between the pretesting and piloting of surveys.  Pretesting, 
he explains, are the methods of validating the survey instrument and its 
measurements.  Pilot testing, however, is the trial of survey administration and 
procedures.  Stage 1 and 2 of the survey design were expert-driven pretests and 
stage 3 was a respondent-driven pretest.  The purpose of the pretest was to ensure 
the questions measured what they intended to measure, were unbiased, and free of 
unnecessary technical language and jargon (Ruel, 2016).  The researcher did not 
carry out a small-scale pilot and collect data during the pretests; instead this was an 
intentional three-stage validation process for the design of the survey questions.  The 
key driver of this method was to close any gaps in theoretical and practical 
knowledge and understanding by ensuring each question had the same meaning 
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regardless of the background of the participants and most crucially, that the meaning 
was not lost when translated from a theoretical hypothesis into a simple question for 
the layman. The researcher could find no other studies where this practice had been 
adopted.  This is particularly important when conducting a study with consumers who 
may not be familiar, or even aware of, regulations or industry-specific terms.  It is 
vital, however, that the denotation is not lost in translation.  There is great value in 
future researchers adopting this approach for closing any gaps between principle, 
process and experience. 
Since the survey questions were derived from the specific rationales for regulation 
found in the literature there was no need for a focus group to ascertain the areas to 
survey, but rather, a process to test the actual questions designed for the survey.  
The survey consisted of two parts; the first section is comprised of demographic 
questions such as gender, age, education level, employment status and income.  
These were considered important variables owing to the research conducted by the 
regulator into consumer vulnerability (Coppack et al, 2015), access to financial 
services (Collard et al, 2016) and ageing populations (McLoughlin et al, 2017).  
Clearly, the regulator and academics consider these demographics to be of such 
significance to warrant collaborative research on several occasions.  To re-iterate, 
the demographics this research focus on are age, education and income.  
This follows the risk factors for vulnerability identified by Coppack et al (2015): 
i. Being young, or being ‘older old’ 
ii. Low literacy, numeracy and financial capability skills 
iii. Low income  
The second section of the survey covers the main theoretical questions which were 
developed from the Literature Review. 
A three-stage survey design was undertaken.  The first group, ‘Theorists’ was 
undertaken with subject academics.  The second group, ‘Practitioners’ was 
undertaken with industry professionals.  The participants in the Theorist and 
Practitioner groups were provided with a background to the literature in order that 
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they could understand the context of the study and which area of the literature each 
specific question related to. The purpose of this was to ‘test’ that the rationale for 
regulation identified translated into the question being asked and, as with the third 
group, ‘End-users’, to check that the wording of the question was such that it could 
be easily understood. 
Since no data was collected during these initial studies, and additionally the 
participants were ineligible to take part in the final study, there was no risk of 
contamination (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001).  Ethical approval was obtained 
for each stage of the survey design and the final data collection.   
3.7 Stage 1: Theorists  
Three academics from Edinburgh Napier University were invited via email to take 
part in stage one of the survey design, two of whom agreed and provided feedback.  
Both participants were male, aged over 55 and previously worked in the financial 
services industry before moving to academia.  The participants were asked to 
complete consent forms and sign and return these.  The participants were then 
provided with a copy of the intended consumer survey, including a background to 
the study.  All exchanges took place remotely via email and telephone where further 
clarification was required.   
The following questions were asked: 
1. Do you believe other people may have difficulty in answering this 
questionnaire?  If so, which question may pose a problem?   
2. Given the purpose of the study outlined in the introduction section, 
would you suggest a question may perhaps be added or removed to 
enhance the study?  
3. Did you read the instructions? Were the instructions clear?  Did you 
object to answering any of the questions?   
4. Was the layout of the questionnaire clear and logical?  
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5. Is there any question that the wording could be enhanced to clarify?   
6. How long did it take you to answer the questionnaire?  
3.8 Stage 2: Practitioners 
In total, 12 industry professionals were invited to take part in stage two of the survey 
design, four of whom agreed to take part and provided feedback.  All invitees were 
contacts from the retail banking industry that the researcher had through their own 
professional network.  Three participants were male (40-44, 45-49, 60-64 age 
groups), and one was female (35-39 age group).  Three participants are currently 
employed in the retail banking sector and one had recently retired.  Each participant 
signed and returned a consent form.  All exchanges took place remotely via email 
exchanges and telephone where appropriate.  The industry professionals were 
asked the same questions as the academics (see above). 
3.9 Feedback from Stage 1 and Stage 2 
The feedback provided from the participants was mostly around clarity of the 
survey’s second section of questions.  The first section of the survey covered 
demographic questions such as gender, age, education level, employment status 
and income.   
The second section covered the main questions which had been developed from the 
Literature Review.  This was helpful to the researcher and appropriate amendments 
were made prior to Stage 3 being carried out.  Changes to the relevant questions 
are detailed in Table 3.4 overleaf. 
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Table 3.4: Changes to the Consumer Survey following Stages 1 and 2 of 
Survey Design  
RATIONALE ORIGINAL QUESTION/HYPOTHESIS REVISED QUESTION/HYPOTHESIS 
Externalities 
(macro) 
I have confidence in the UK banking 
system 
I have confidence in the UK retail banking 
system 
Externalities 
(micro) 
I have confidence that my money is  
protected should my bank fail 
I have confidence that the money in 
my bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail 
Asymmetric 
information 
I have confidence that I have enough 
information from my 
bank to make good financial decisions 
I have confidence that my bank will  
provide me with 
sufficient information to make  
informed decisions 
Moral hazard I have confidence that I am protected  
against bank fraud and 
misrepresentation 
I have confidence that my bank will do  
the right thing 
Corruption I have confidence that, if required, my  
bank will face the consequences of its  
actions 
I have confidence that I am  
protected from bank misconduct 
Paternalism I have confidence that my bank will  
help me to make good 
financial decisions 
I have confidence that I can trust  
the expertise of my bank 
Distributive 
Justice 
I have confidence that the price of  
banking products is fair 
No change 
Community 
Values 
I have confidence that I will not be  
discriminated against by my bank 
No change 
N/A - General I have confidence that as a bank  
customer I am protected 
I have confidence that as a bank  
customer I am adequately protected 
 
3.10 Stage 3: End-users 
Five consumers, from across different age groups and both genders, were invited to 
take part in stage three of the survey design, using the revised core questions from 
the feedback captured in stages one and two.  These were acquaintances of the 
researcher who resided in England and who therefore would not be taking part in 
the final study.   Two males (Group 1 and Group 2, see below) and three females 
(two in Group 2 and one in Group 4) provided feedback.  The participants were 
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required to complete and sign a consent form (see Appendix A), four studies took 
place remotely and one face-to-face study was undertaken.  After careful 
consideration of the feedback, further changes were made and are detailed in Table 
3.5 overleaf. 
i. Group 1: 18-29 year olds are defined as ‘Young Professionals’ 
ii. Group 2: 30-44 year olds are defined as ‘Married Professionals’ 
iii. Group 3: 45-59 year olds are defined as ‘Empty Nesters’ 
iv. Group 4: 60+ year olds are defined as ‘Retired’ 
The above groups have been segmented by age.  This is a simplified life cycle model 
historically used by financial institutions due to the close association between age 
and product usage (Stanley, Ford and Richards, 1985).  Of course there are 
deviations from this in reality and product marketing strategies have moved on to 
become much more sophisticated, taking into account larger quantities of data and 
using increasingly advanced techniques to extract and interpret it (Ionut, 2017).  
However, age profile remains a key demographic variable used in a variety of 
academic research, industry surveys and government statistics.  The purpose of 
segmenting by age in this research is to ensure that a proportionate number of 
participants from each group have been included. 
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Table 3.5: Changes to the Consumer Survey Core Questions following Stage 
3 of Survey Design 
RATIONALE ORIGINAL QUESTION REVISED QUESTION 
Externalities 
(macro) 
I have confidence in the UK  
retail banking system 
I have confidence the UK retail banking 
system is stable and secure 
Externalities 
(micro) 
I have confidence that the  
money in my bank account(s)  
is protected should my bank 
fail 
I have confidence that the money in my 
retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my  
bank fail 
Asymmetric 
information 
I have confidence that my  
bank will provide me with  
sufficient information to make  
informed decisions 
I have confidence that my retail bank  
will provide me with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
Moral hazard I have confidence that my  
bank will do the right thing 
I have confidence that my retail bank will  
do the right thing 
Corruption I have confidence that I am  
protected from bank  
misconduct 
I have confidence that I am protected from 
retail bank misconduct 
Paternalism I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my bank 
I have confidence that I can trust the  
expertise of my retail bank 
Distributive 
Justice 
I have confidence that the  
price of banking products is  
fair 
I have confidence that the price of retail 
banking products is fair 
Community 
Values 
I have confidence that I will not 
be discriminated against by my bank 
I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my  
retail bank 
N/A - 
General 
I have confidence that as a  
bank customer I am  
adequately protected 
In general, I have confidence that as a 
retail bank customer I am adequately  
protected 
 
 
The term ‘retail’ was added to all the questions and clarification of what this term 
means was included in the introduction to the survey (see Appendix B).  ‘Don’t know’ 
was added to the last question as one of the consumers expressed this during the 
End-User test.  The consumers who took part in the design group were not eligible 
to participate in the final study. 
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3.11 Reliability and Validity Considerations for Data Collection 
Reliability of data potentially enables study findings to be generalised to the wider 
population (Braham and Finch, 2004).  The level of confidence in the validity of the 
data gives it credence as empirical evidence for a claim (Roberts and Johnson, 
2015).  The next sections will establish if the data can justly be claimed to be a true 
representation of reality and if there were any intervening variables which might 
reduce confidence in the accuracy of the data collected. 
3.12 Sample 
The first consideration for the researcher was the population to be studied.  The aim 
of the research was to measure retail bank consumer confidence levels.  The 
research was limited to Scotland and therefore the adult population (18+ years) 
residing in Scotland was the target population (since almost all adults in Scotland 
are ‘banked’) CAB Scotland (2010).  According to the 2016 Scottish government 
data (National Records of Scotland, 2017) the adult population was 4,372,939.  To 
calculate a representative sample the researcher used Slovin’s Formula (Tejada and 
Punzalan, 2012).  Slovin's Formula is used to calculate an appropriate sample size 
from a population.   
Slovin’s formula: n = N/1+Ne2 
  
Where n is the sample size, N is the total population (4,372,939) and e is the margin 
of error.  Following the study by Tejada and Punzalan (2012), and well established 
practices in the wider research area, the researcher determined a standard 
confidence level of 95% to be appropriate for this research.  Thus, the error 
tolerance, or margin of error, is 0.05. 
 
 
  
n =    399.93 
                              n = 4,372,939   
        1 + 4,372,939 x 0.05
2  
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Using this formula, a minimum sample size of 400 useable surveys was required for 
a representative sample.  In total, 538 surveys were completed, and of these, 432 
were usable.  Incomplete questionnaires were discounted as per the instructions on 
the consent form.  Any incomplete questionnaire was treated as a wish to withdraw 
from the research.  This resulted in a significant reduction of valid questionnaires 
(approximately 20% reduction) that were taken forward for the formal analysis, 
however, this is deemed to be preferable than including data that cannot be 
confirmed as being valid.  
i. 138 paper questionnaires, with 126 being useable  
ii. 400 electronic questionnaires, with 306 being useable 
The target sample size (see Table 3.6 below) was exceeded with a total of 432 
useable surveys being collected. A comparison of the group population and sample 
representation can be seen in Table 3.7 overleaf. 
 
Table 3.6: Sample Required for each Strata 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Records of Scotland Mid-2016 population statistics were used as the 
sampling frame.  The researcher then created a basic segmentation model as 
discussed in Section 3.10.  Using the figure of 4,372,939 obtained for the total adult 
population residing in Scotland (National Records of Scotland, 2017) the sample 
requirements were calculated (see Table 3.6 above). 
 
 
Group Population %age of Population Sample Required 
18-29 865,468 20% 80 
30-44 1,017,304 23% 92 
45-59 1,169,763 27% 108 
60+ 1,320,404 30% 120 
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Table 3.7: Sample Achieved for each Strata 
 
 
 
A chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicates there was a significant difference in the 
proportions of the age groups identified in the current sample (18-29, 16%; 30-44, 
29%; 45-59, 35%; 60+, 20%) as compared with the values (18-29, 20%; 30-44, 23%; 
45-59, 27%; 60+, 30%) that were obtained from official published population 
statistics, x2 (3, n = 432) = 33.53, p <0.001.  However, due to the large population, 
and as the sample required is only 0.01% of the population, there will always be a 
significant difference. 
Table 3.7 above illustrates the differences in representation of the four groups in the 
population and sample.  Although the sample does not match the population age 
categorisation exactly, it reflects the sample in the FCA Financial Lives Survey 
(2017). 
i. My study: age 18-29 16%; FCA study: age 18-24 11% 
ii. My study: age 30-44 29%; FCA study: age 25-44 33% 
iii. My study: age 45-59 35%; FCA study: age 45-65 33% 
iv. My study: age 60+ 20%; FCA study: age 65+ 23% 
 
Group Sample Size %age of 
target sample 
achieved 
Target %age of 
population 
Actual %age 
achieved 
18-29 71 89% 20% 16% 
30-44 125 136% 23% 29% 
45-59 150 138% 27% 35% 
60+ 86 72% 30% 20% 
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Additionally, the FCA Financial Lives Survey (2017) used postcode, rather than 
targeting age or gender, indicating that these demographics are not considered 
critical to a relevant and valid survey in this particular subject area.  For this research, 
postcode targeting was not possible due to the time and cost involved in obtaining 
the data and software.  The FCA hired an external firm to gather this information for 
them (McLoughlin et al, 2017).  However, in this study every effort to capture data 
from various regions of Scotland was made, both face to face and over the 
telephone. 
3.13 Data Collection 
The researcher employed a mixed data collection, whereby 71% of responses were 
achieved via an online survey, with 29% paper surveys attained to ensure the views 
of non-internet users were represented.  These figures represent the total number 
of useable surveys.   
Any incomplete questionnaires were deemed unusable.  Clause 5 of the participants 
consent form stated that ‘a partial completion will indicate a wish to withdraw.  Partial 
completions will not be included in the research and will be void’. 
The data collection ran for a total of nine months.  The online survey tool Novi Survey 
was utilised and the link distributed via email and shared on social media platforms 
such as Twitter, Facebook, Mumsnet, PistonHeads, Digital Spy, LinkedIn and Money 
Saving Expert. The link was removed from PistonHeads forum as it contravened 
their rules of ‘promotion’ as it was a link to a survey.  The post was also removed 
from the Digital Spy forum as it contained a link to a third-party site.  The LinkedIn 
share was not publicly posted but was instead sent via private message to the 
researcher’s connections that do not work in the financial services industry.  Since 
the researcher has previously worked in the industry for over a decade this was done 
to avoid skewed results.  
The paper questionnaires were distributed in shopping centres in Dundee, 
Edinburgh and Inverness.  Additionally, a pensioner’s coffee morning was attended 
in a village in Angus to capture this age group’s opinions.  Lastly, telephone surveys 
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were conducted with households in the South West of Scotland.  The researcher 
made efforts to capture participants from different geographic areas and non-internet 
users.  
The next sections of the data description concentrates on gender and age groups, 
and in particular on the ‘at risk’ groups identified by the FCA, older consumers, low 
income levels and low level of education.  Additionally, those currently employed in 
the financial services sector are considered. 
3.13.1 Gender and Age Groups 
Figure 3.5 below illustrates the gender split of participants in the electronic survey, 
a ratio of females to males of 2.36:1.   
 
Figure 3.5: Gender: Electronic Surveys 
 
 
The paper survey (Figure 3.6, overleaf) reveals a more balanced split of 54% 
females, 44% males (1.2:1) and 2% did not wish to reveal their gender.  Combined, 
approximately one third of participants were male, and almost two thirds were female 
91
215
0
Male Female Prefer not to
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(1.92:1).  Clearly, this is not representative of the population; however, as this study 
was not specifically looking at differences between these variables it was not 
considered a significant limitation.  Additionally, several studies measuring trust and 
confidence in the financial services sector since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009 did not report any significant gender differences in their findings.  Including a 
study by Moin, Devlin and McKechnie (2017); the FCA Financial Lives survey, 2018; 
YouGov on behalf of Positive Money survey, 2018; Edelman Trust Barometer (UK 
results), 2019; and GfK Consumer Confidence Index, 2019, are a few recent 
examples.  
 
Figure 3.6: Gender: Paper Surveys 
 
 
The bar charts overleaf represent the proportion of respondents by age group for 
both electronic (Figure 3.7) and paper format (Figure 3.8).  
The FCA’s Financial Lives Study (2017) found that confidence in managing financial 
matters increased with age. However, in addition to finding the youngest age group 
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(18-24 year olds: 30%) had the least confidence in the financial services industry 
they also found the oldest group (age over 85: 31%) had low confidence. 
 
Figure 3.7: Age: Electronic Surveys 
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Figure 3.8: Age: Paper Surveys 
 
 
These have been combined and are compared to the total population in Figure 3.9 
overleaf.  This demonstrates the representativeness of the sample by age group.  
Overall, the sample is representative, with only Group 4 being significantly under-
represented.  The researcher targeted males and older consumers with the paper 
version of the Consumer Survey to address the sapling problems of the online 
version.  This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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Figure 3.9: Sample Required vs. Sample Obtained 
 
 
 
3.14 Vulnerable Groups 
Although the term ‘vulnerable’ is hard to define the FCA consider a vulnerable person 
to be someone who, “due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible 
to detriment” (Coppack et al, 2015, p.5).  The FCA have carried out several studies 
into these groups, specifically consumer vulnerability (Coppack et al, 2015), access 
to financial services (Collard et al, 2016) and ageing populations (McLoughlin et al, 
2017).   
To reiterate, some of the examples of risk factors for vulnerability identified in the 
FCA’s research were: 
i. Low  literacy, numeracy and financial capability skills 
ii. Physical disability 
iii. Severe or long-term illness 
iv. Mental health problems 
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v. Low income and/or debt 
vi. Caring responsibilities (including operating a power of attorney) 
vii. Being ‘older old’ for example over 80, although this is not absolute (may be 
associated with cognitive or dexterity impairment, sensory impairments such 
as hearing or sight, onset of ill-health, not being comfortable with new 
technology) 
viii. Being young (associated with less experience) 
ix. Change in circumstances (e.g. job loss, bereavement, divorce) 
x. Lack of English skills 
xi. Non-standard requirements or credit history   (e.g. armed forces personal 
returning from abroad; ex-offenders; care-home leavers; recent immigrants) 
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine all of the factors identified by the 
FCA.  The researcher, for ethical reasons, is unable to access particular vulnerable 
groups and also does not have access to other specific groups, for example armed 
forces personnel, ex-offenders, and immigrants. The specific demographic groups 
that will be tested for any significant difference in levels of confidence in this thesis 
are: age, low income and low level of education. 
3.14.1 Older Consumers 
Although older consumers are not necessarily vulnerable it has been recognised by 
the FCA (Collard et al, 2016, p.7) that, “There are risks that older consumers’ 
financial services needs are not being fully met, resulting in exclusion, poor customer 
outcomes and potential harm”.  While the FCA Occasional Paper looked at 
consumers aged 55 years and over, as this is the age at which people can draw a 
defined benefit pension, the researcher will include only those aged over 60 in this 
group (Group 4) since this research is not product focused.  There are a broad range 
of products and services covered by regulation which could be considered to be a 
more specialist or particularly focused area for potential mis-selling due to their very 
nature: complexity; cost; duration of consumption.  
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In total, 20% of the participants who took part in this study were aged over 60.  This 
is lower than the 28% of over 60s in the Scottish population (National Records of 
Scotland, 2017).  However, as the researcher only visited public locations and the 
sample was randomly selected access to this age group was restricted. 
3.14.2 Low Income 
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (2016), 0.8% of the Scottish adult population earned below the minimum 
wage.  As data on hours worked has not been collected in this research the figure is 
based on respondents who indicated that they work full-time but earn less than 
£13,500 per annum.  The figure for participants in this study is 2.8% which is close 
to the population figure of 2.4%. 
According to the ONS the median annual salary was £27,600 in 2016. Participants 
in this study, who work full-time but earn below the national median made up 36% 
of the sample.  This indicates that, on average, the participants in this study were 
better-off than the general population. 
Other income figures are: 
i. 26.4% of participants in this study earn above the national median but below 
the higher tax rate threshold (£43,000 in tax year 2017/18).  
ii. The HM Revenue and Customs statistics (2015) estimate 85.1% of the 
population will be non-higher rate tax payers in 2017/18.  A similar figure of 
84.3% of participants in the study fell into this category. 
iii. 14.4% of participants in this study earn above the higher rate tax rate 
threshold but below the additional rate threshold.  This is in line with HMRC 
statistics of 13.7% estimated for 2017/18. 
iv. 1.4% of participants in this study earn above the additional rate tax threshold 
(over £150,000 in tax year 2017/18).  This is in line with the HMRC statistics 
of 1.2% estimated for 2017/18. 
The income distribution for all participants is presented overleaf in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10: Income Distribution of Sample 
 
 
3.14.3 Low Level of Education   
A study undertaken by the FSA (2006a) in collaboration with Bristol University’s 
Personal Finance Research Centre found that there was a direct correlation between 
levels of education and qualifications, and levels of financial capability.  This is 
important to this study as a low level of capability could lead to financial exclusion.  
Llewellyn and the FSA (1999) argue that if consumers do not feel confident enough 
to purchase suitable financial products it has the same detrimental effect as being 
mis-sold unsuitable products. 
In total, 108 of all respondents held a university degree, this is 25% compared to the 
Scottish national average of 26% recorded in the Scottish 2011 Census.  This 
indicates that the participants who took part in this research were representative of 
the national average. 
Participants who had obtained only the mandatory level of education (Secondary 
School level, not including current students) represented 23% of the sample. 
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Figure 3.11: Education Levels: Groups 
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Figure 3.12: Education Levels: All 
 
3.15 Persons Working in Financial Services 
Persons working in the financial services sector have been a focus of this research 
as it could be expected that they would have more knowledge about the industry and 
the regulatory requirements and consumer protection in place than the average 
layman.  
The financial services sector is important to the Scottish economy, employing almost 
200,000 people and generating over £8.8bn for the UK and Scottish economies 
(Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, 2014).  Based on the adult population 
figures, from the Mid-2016 population estimates by the Scottish government 
(National Records of Scotland, 2017), of 4,372,939, this is equal to 4.6% of the 
population working in the industry. 
In total, 18 of the 432 participants, or 4.2%, currently work in financial services, which 
is in line with the national average. 
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3.16 Data Description Conclusion 
The above has described the data obtained in terms of its reliability to represent the 
wider Scottish population and validity with respect to the appropriateness of the data 
being gathered in this study.  It can be concluded that the sample of data collected 
in this study is representative is terms of: 
i. Size 
ii. Income distribution of participants 
iii. Education levels of participants 
iv. Participants employed in the financial services sector 
In terms of the groups used to stratify the sample, Groups 1, 2 and 3 are 
representative, however Group 4 (over 60+ years), was under-represented due to 
the random sampling technique employed.  It could be expected that fewer elderly 
participants are likely to participate online, and secondly, they may not be so readily 
available in busy public places.  The researcher did attend a pensioner’s coffee 
morning in an attempt to capture the opinions of this age group.  Gender was not 
considered a dependent variable and therefore, the study did not seek to stratify 
based on this demographic. 
In the next chapter an analysis of the collected data has been undertaken focusing 
on the groups described above.  The participants were asked to rank their 
confidence levels; the hypotheses were derived from the literature, and are as 
follows: 
H1: The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure 
H2: The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) 
is protected should their bank fail 
H3: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions 
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H4: The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
H5: The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
H6: The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail 
bank 
H7: The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
H8: The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
H9: In general, the consumer is confident that as a retail bank customer they 
are adequately protected 
In the next chapter an analysis of the collected data has been undertaken focusing 
on the groups outlined in this chapter: 
i. Employed in the financial services sector 
ii. Gender 
iii. Age 
iv. Education 
v. Income 
The analysis will establish differences in levels of confidence between each 
demographic group, the direction of confidence, and the combination of 
demographic factors that have the most impact on levels of confidence in the specific 
areas of regulation. 
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the data from the core theoretical survey questions will be analysed, 
focusing on specific characteristics of the participants, as discussed in the Chapter 
3: 
i. Employed in the financial services sector 
ii. Gender 
iii. Age 
iv. Level of education 
v. Level of income 
In the Methodology chapter the debate around the use of parametric and non-
parametric analysis for Likert scale data was discussed.  This is based on the 
arguments concerning whether Likert scale data can be treated as interval variables 
rather than ordinal variables.  One of the assumptions that must be met for 
parametric tests to be valid is that the data is interval or ratio data (Field, 2013).  As 
the literature was inconclusive (Glass et al, 1972; Kuzon et al, 1996; Blaikie, 2003, 
Jamieson, 2004; Carifio and Perla, 2008; Norman 2010; Murray, 2013; Bishop and 
Herron, 2015; and, Knapp, 2016), the researcher tested the data against the 
remaining assumptions of parametric tests first.  After screening and cleaning the 
data and describing the characteristics of the sample to ensure it was representative 
of the population (discussed in the previous chapter) the data was tested to check 
that it met the assumptions of:  
i. a normally distributed sampling distribution 
ii. homogeneity of variance, and 
iii. independence (Field, 2013) 
4.1.1 Tests for Normality  
In order to check this assumption of parametric statistical procedures is met there 
are various tests that can be conducted.  However, due to the large sample size, 
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tests such as Skewness, Kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov were not required 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014).  Accordingly, the researcher undertook a visual 
inspection of the histograms for the total sample responses to each of the survey’s 
‘levels of confidence’ questions.  The data presented as moderately negatively 
skewed.  The researcher undertook one further test of normality, the Shapiro-Wilk 
test, which confirmed that the data was not normally distributed (see Appendix C). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the central limit theorem (CLT) indicates that 
if a sufficiently large random sample size is taken from a population with a 
determinate level of variance, the mean of the samples (aggregated) will be 
approximately equal to the mean of the population (Kwak and Kim, 2017).  Further, 
the CLT indicates that whether the underlying distribution is normal or skewed, in 
samples of over 30, the sample will be normal (Pallant, 2016; Seaman, Allen and 
Zetumer, 2018).   
4.1.2 Outliers  
The boxplots produced in SPSS were visually inspected for outliers.  In four of these 
questions (44.4%) outliers were found.  However, the 5% trimmed mean, where the 
lowest 5% and highest 5% of the data is excluded, for each question was very close 
to the mean so did not require further investigation (Pallant, 2016).   
4.1.3 Scale Reliability 
Lastly, a test to check the reliability of the scale was undertaken.  The participants 
were asked to rate their levels of confidence on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 
6 (Strongly Agree).   It is important that the scale selected in a study is reliable in 
terms of its ‘internal consistency’ (Pallant, 2016).  That is, how well the survey is 
measuring what the study required it to measure.  In addition to the three-stage 
empirical testing of the validity of the questions, the researcher has also applied one 
of the most commonly used indicators of internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient to test reliability (Pallant, 2016).  A low score may indicate a low number 
of questions, or poor correlation between items, conversely, a high score may 
indicate that some items are redundant (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011).  Tavakol and 
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Dennick (2011) cited studies which suggested acceptable values of alpha, ranging 
from 0.70 to 0.95 (see, Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994 and Bland and Altman, 1997).  
Cronbach’s alpha score for the ‘level of confidence’ questions in this research is 
0.922 (see Table 4.1 below). 
 
Table 4.1: Reliability statistics 
Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardised Items No of Items 
0.922 0.922 9 
 
In summary, the data met the assumptions, where required, of distribution, 
homogeneity of variance and independence 
4.1.4 Labelling of the Variables  
Table 4.2 overleaf, clearly classifies the variables into Nominal and Ordinal.  Levels 
of confidence were measured using a Likert scale.  It has become common practice, 
although controversial, to assume interval status for Likert derived data (Blaikie, 
2003). 
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Table 4.2 Variable Classification 
Survey Question: Demographics Variable Classification 
Gender Independent Nominal 
Age Independent Ordinal 
Education level Independent Ordinal 
Employment status Independent Nominal 
Income level Independent Ordinal 
Work in Financial Services Independent Nominal 
Survey Question: Theoretical Variable Classification 
H1: The UK retail banking system is stable 
and secure 
Dependent Ordinal 
H2: The money in my retail bank account(s) 
is protected should my bank fail 
Dependent Ordinal 
H3: My retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed 
decisions 
Dependent Ordinal 
H4: My retail bank will do the right thing Dependent Ordinal 
H5: I am protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Dependent Ordinal 
H6: I can trust the expertise of my retail bank Dependent Ordinal 
H7: The price of retail banking products is fair Dependent Ordinal 
H8: I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank 
Dependent Ordinal 
H9: In general, as a retail bank customer I 
am adequately protected 
Dependent Ordinal 
 
As can be seen from the above table, all of the hypotheses are classified as ordinal 
scale data which, as discussed below, has some contradictory advice concerning 
analysis. 
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4.2 Methods of Data Analysis and Presentation of Data 
Following the statistical tests of the assumptions the researcher adopted parametric 
statistical techniques to compare groups for this research; the independent-samples 
t-test and one-way between-group analysis of variance.  Due to the controversy 
surrounding the treatment of ordinal scales and interval scales (Jamieson, 2014) 
non-parametric tests were used as robustness checks, and as an opportunity to 
contribute to the literature in this area. 
Table 4.3 overleaf, outlines the tests adopted in the preliminary analysis, and any 
observed variance. 
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Table 4.3 Observed Variance of Parametric vs. Non-Parametric Tests 
Demographic Statistical Test Robustness Check Outcome 
Employed in the 
financial services 
sector 
Parametric test: 
Independent-
samples t-Test 
Non-parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney U 
Test 
Both the parametric and 
non-parametric tests 
revealed the same 
findings 
Gender Parametric test: 
Independent-
samples t-Test 
Non-parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney U 
Test 
Both the parametric and 
non-parametric tests 
revealed the same 
findings 
Age Parametric test: 
One-way 
between-group 
analysis of 
variance 
Non-parametric test: 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Both the parametric and 
non-parametric tests 
revealed the same 
findings 
Level of education  Parametric test: 
One-way 
between-group 
analysis of 
variance 
Non-parametric test: 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Both the parametric and 
non-parametric tests 
revealed the same 
findings 
Level of income Parametric test: 
One-way 
between-group 
analysis of 
variance 
Non-parametric test: 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Non-parametric test 
recorded a difference 
across the groups under 
‘fraudulent activities’ but 
no difference recorded 
between the groups. 
All other tests revealed 
the same findings 
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To explore the differences between groups an independent sample t-test was used 
where there were two different groups of variables (employed in financial services 
sector/not employed in financial services sector and male/female) and a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used where there were more than two 
independent groups (age, education and income).  As ANOVA can only determine 
whether groups differ and not where the significant difference is, post-hoc 
comparisons were performed to establish which groups were significantly different 
from one another.  The non-parametric alternatives adopted were the Mann-Whitney 
U Test (for the Independent-samples t-Test) and Kruskal-Wallis Test (for the 
ANOVA). 
To detect and describe the relationship among variables and explore the association 
between pairs of variables, correlation analysis was used.   Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient (r) was used to describe the strength and direction of 
the linear relationship between an independent variable and dependent variable.  
Further, Spearman Rank Order Correlation (rho), the non-parametric alternative, 
was used as a robustness test.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section each hypothesis based on each of the individual demographic factors 
is examined in turn.  There are certain assumptions based on previous studies 
conducted by the regulator: 
i. Employed in the financial services sector.  Although the researcher could find 
no specific studies which compare the levels of confidence in these two 
groups, it would not be unreasonable to surmise that those employed may be 
more likely to have a higher level of confidence, based on their industry 
knowledge and expertise. 
ii. Gender. The researcher could find no recent studies which suggested that 
gender played a significant role in the levels of consumer confidence in the 
retail banking sector.  Additionally, recent studies did not base their 
methodology on gender differences or present their results by analysing the 
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effect of gender.  For these reasons, it would be rational to conclude that there 
would be no difference found in the results of this study, which looks 
specifically at confidence in regulation of the sector.   
iii. Age. The FCA associate being young with less experience and being ‘older 
old’ (over 80) with increased vulnerability (Coppack et al, 2015).  Although 
this does not lead to a conclusion about whether these groups will have lower 
or higher levels of confidence in retail banking regulation, it does indicate that 
the results of these groups would be of particular relevance. 
iv. Education.  The FCA associate low literacy, numeracy and financial capability 
skill with financial vulnerability.  The results of this group would be relevant to 
both the regulator (who looks to protect the most vulnerable groups) and the 
banks (who profile consumers using factors such as education since it often 
leads to higher net worth).  However, higher levels of confidence in dealing 
with financial matters does not necessarily equate to higher levels of 
confidence in retail banking regulation.  Given the focus of regulator initiatives 
on vulnerable groups it may actually suggest lower education groups would 
have higher levels of confidence in regulation. 
v. Income. Low income has been identified as a higher risk factor for financial 
vulnerability.  Given the profiling used by banks to attract higher net worth 
consumers the results would be of particular interest to them, and to the 
regulator who look to ensure vulnerable groups are protected.  It would not 
be entirely unreasonable to surmise that higher income consumers, who have 
typically more exposure to the system, may feel more confident in dealing 
with financial matters.  However, as mentioned above, it is not possible to 
predict whether those on a higher income have higher levels of confidence in 
regulation. 
4.3.1 Externalities 
The first two theoretical questions of the survey tested how confident consumers 
were that they were protected against failure at a macro and micro level.  Question 
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one concerned the risk of contagion, or systemic risk.  That is, the failure of one 
institution could cause the collapse of other, solvent institutions.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, the interconnectedness of banks can lead to issues of 
contagion, that is, the failure of one institution can have a spillover effect and lead to 
the failure of otherwise solvent banks.  De Nicolo et al (2012) emphasise that 
externalities arising from interconnectedness are particularly great in Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  Further, they argue that the macroprudential 
tool that can address the externalities arising from all three categories is capital 
requirements.  Banks are required to hold capital reserves to enable them to absorb 
any unexpected losses.  The first consumer survey question will test the hypothesis 
that consumers are confident in this area that regulation seeks to address.  The 
statement participants were asked to consider was, “I have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure”.   
Currently employed in the Financial Services sector: An independent-samples 
t-test was conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the 
financial services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services 
sector.  There is a significant difference in the scores for non-Financial Services 
employees (M = 3.86, SD = 1.190) and Financial Services employees (M = 4.83, SD 
= 0.857; t (430) = -3.45, p = 0.001, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness check and also revealed there is 
a significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 5410.5, z = 3.374, p = 0.001, r = 
0.16. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a significant difference in levels of confidence of those who are 
employed in financial services and those who are not 
ii. Participants who are employed in the financial services sector agree, 
whilst participants who are not employed in the financial services sector 
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slightly agree that they have confidence the UK retail banking system is 
stable and secure 
iii. Therefore, those employed in the sector have more confidence 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure: employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
 
 
This finding is not unexpected since those employed in the financial services sector 
are more likely to be aware of the Capital Requirements regulations. 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 4.01, SD = 1.22) and females (M = 3.85, SD = 1.17; t (427) = 1.34, p = 0.180, 
two-tailed).   
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A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness check and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 4.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 18,981.5, z = -1.488, p = 0.137, r = -0.072. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no significant difference in the levels of confidence of males or 
females 
ii. Both males and females slightly agree that they have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2: I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure: male vs. female participants 
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Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was no statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 1.483, 
p = 0.218.   
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across the four different age groups (Group 1, n = 
71: 18-29yrs, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44yrs, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59yrs, Group 4, n = 
86: 60+yrs, x2 (3, n = 432) = 4.19, p = 0.241, all groups recorded median values of 
4.00. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
between age groups. 
ii. All age groups slightly agree that they have confidence the UK retail banking 
system is stable and secure. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.3 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.3: I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 2.689, p = 0.046.  
However, post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for each group did not differ significantly from any groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 8.30, p = 0.040, 
however, all groups recorded a median value of 4.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons 
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with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that despite the significant 
overall difference, none of the specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Both the parametric and the non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
between education levels. 
ii. Participants with different levels of education slightly agree they are confident 
the UK retail banking system is stable and secure. 
This is graphically represented in the chart Figure 4.4 below. 
 
Figure 4.4: I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure: level of education 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
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£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was no statistically significant difference at the p< 
0.05 level in confidence scores for the five income groups.   
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups (Group 1, n = 
128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: £27,601-
£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, x2 (4, n = 
432) = 7.21, p = 0.125, all groups recorded median values of 4.00. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
between income levels. 
ii. Participants at all levels of income slightly agree they have confidence the 
retail banking system is stable and secure. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.5 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.5: I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure: level of income 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Microprudential regulation is aimed at preventing the failure of individual 
financial institutions (Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein, 2011).  In 1983 Diamond and 
Dybvig published a seminal paper providing a model of bank runs and associated 
financial crises.  The principal mechanism proposed to avoid bank runs was the 
government provision of deposit insurance.  In their model they assert that deposit 
insurance is critical for the stability of the banking system.  This was based on the 
premise that consumers would not panic and try to withdraw their demand deposits 
if they knew that their deposits were safe.  In the UK the deposit insurance scheme 
is run by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS).  The second 
question focused on the rationale that consumer deposits should be protected if a 
bank becomes insolvent, “I have confidence that the money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should my bank fail”.   
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Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is a significant difference in the scores for non-FS employees (M = 4.45, SD 
= 1.112) and FS employees (M = 5.17, SD = 0.707; t (20.8) = -4.10, p = 0.001, two-
tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed there is a 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 414), U = 5186, z = 2.991, p = 0.003, r = 
0.144.  
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence of those 
who are employed in FS and those who are not 
ii. The parametric test reported a higher mean score (5.17) for those employed 
in FS compared to those not employed in FS (4.45), however, the non-
parametric test recorded a median of 5, agree for both groups 
iii. This is due to the small sample size of the group employed in the sector (n = 
18)  
iv. Figure 4.6 overleaf reveals that although the medians were the same, a higher 
proportion of respondents in the FS Group recorded a level of confidence 
above the median than in the non-FS Group. 
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Figure 4.6: I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail: employment in sector vs. non-employment in 
sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 4.55, SD = 1.16) and females (M = 4.45, SD = 1.07; t (427) = 0.928, p = 0.354, 
two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness  test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 5.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 5.00, n = 282), U = 19,215.5, z = -1.318, p = 0.188, r = -0.064.  
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
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i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence of 
males and females. 
ii. Both groups agree they have confidence that the money in their retail bank 
account(s) is protected should their bank fail. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.7 below. 
 
Figure 4.7: I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) 
is protected should my bank fail: male vs. female 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was no statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 1.90, 
p = 0.129.   
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A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29yrs, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44yrs, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59yrs, Group 4, n = 86: 
60+yrs, x2 (3, n = 432) = 4.57, p = 0.206, all Groups recorded median values of 5.00.  
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the confidence levels across 
the age groups. 
ii. All age groups agree they have confidence that the money in their retail bank 
account(s) is protected should their bank fail. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.8 below.  
 
Figure 4.8: I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 154 
 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was no statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level 
in confidence scores for the four education Groups: F (3, 428) = 1.7, p = 0.157.   
A Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed no significant difference in levels of confidence 
across the four different levels of education (Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, 
Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: 
Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 5.57, p = 0.135, Groups 1, 3 and 4 recorded the same 
median score (Md = 5.00), and Group 2 recorded a median value of 4.50.  
The parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in confidence levels between 
education levels. 
ii. Only Group two (College) recorded a lower level of confidence: between 
slightly agree and agree 
iii. Overall, the participants agree they have confidence that the money in their 
retail bank account(s) is protected should their bank fail. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.9 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.9: I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail: education level 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.5 
level in confidence scores for the five income groups: F (4, 427) = 4.567, p = 0.001.  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for 
the groups did not differ significantly from each other; Group 1 (M = 4.41, SD = 
1.075), Group 2 (M = 4.20, SD = 1.206), Group 3 (M = 4.64, SD = 1.032), Group 4 
(M = 4.79, SD = 1.010), and Group 5 (M = 5.17, SD = 0.408). 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed a statistically significant difference in levels of 
confidence across five different income groups (Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 
2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: £27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: 
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£43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, x2 (4, n = 432) = 17.76, p = 0.001.  
Group 2 (£13,501-£27,600) recorded a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than the 
other four groups, which all recorded median values of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 2 
(£13,501-£27,600) was statistically different to Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000), p = 
0.029, r = -0.194.  Group 2 was also statistically different to Group 4 (£43,001-
£150,000), p = 0.009, r = -0.246.  None of the other specific comparisons between 
groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels 
of income. 
The parametric and non-parametric tests revealed slightly different findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence across 
the income level groups 
ii. The parametric test found no significant difference between the groups 
iii. The non-parametric test found a statistically significant difference between 
those earning £13,501-£27,600 (slightly agree) and two other income Groups: 
£27,601-£43,000 and £43,001-£150,000 (agree) 
iv. Overall, the respondents agree they are confident that the money in my retail 
bank account(s) is protected should my bank fail: education level 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.10 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.10: I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail: income level 
 
 
4.3.2 Asymmetric Information 
“I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with sufficient information to 
make informed decisions” 
In financial services it may be the case that the consumer does not have adequate 
information to make a fully informed decision.  Additionally, the problem of 
asymmetric information occurs as the consumer has less information than the 
‘expert’ supplying the financial product and/or advice.  Consumers are unable to 
inform themselves adequately so as to avoid making decisions which may 
disadvantage them (Wood, 2001).  This survey question was designed to test how 
confident consumers are that regulation can overcome this market failure.   
Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
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services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.16) and non-FS employees (M = 4.18, SD = 1.15; t (430) = 0.455, p = 
0.649, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 3362.5, z = -0.738, p = 0.461, r = 
-0.36. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence of the 
two groups 
ii. Both those who are employed in financial services and those who are not, 
slightly agree they have confidence that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decision. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.11 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.11: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions:  employment in sector vs. 
non-employment in sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for 
males (M = 4.21, SD = 1.18) and females (M = 4.17, SD = 1.12; t (427) = 0.380, p 
= .704, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 5.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 20,002.5, z = -0.626, p = 0.532, r = -0.03. 
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Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in levels of confidence of males 
and females 
ii. However, males agreed and females slightly agreed they have confidence 
that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information to make 
informed decision 
iii. Therefore although males recorded a higher level of confidence in this 
question it is not of statistical significance 
iv. Overall, the results indicate they slightly agree with this statement. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.12 below.  
 
Figure 4.12: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions:  males vs. females 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
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according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < .05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 6.7, 
p = .000.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for Group 1 (M = 4.676, SD = 0.92) was statistically different from Group 2 (M 
= 3.952, SD = 1.26) and Group 3 (M= 4.094, SD = 1.08).  Group 4 (M = 4.233, SD = 
1.12) did not differ statistically from Groups 1, 2, or 3. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 
1, n = 71: 18-29yrs, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44yrs, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59yrs, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+yrs, x2 (3, n = 432) = 20.46, p = < 0.001. Groups 2 and 3 both recorded 
a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than Groups 1 and 4, which both recorded median 
values of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni 
correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29yrs) was statistically different to Group 2 
(30-44yrs), p = < 0.001, r = 0.299.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 
3 (45-59yrs), p = 0.001, r = 0.264.  None of the other specific comparisons between 
groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to difference in 
age.  
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence levels between the 
age groups 
ii. The lowest age group (18-29yrs) agreed they have confidence that their retail 
bank will provide them with sufficient information to make informed decision 
iii. Group 2 (30-44 years) and Group 3 (45-59 years) only slightly agreed they 
have confidence that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decision. 
iv. Group 4, (60+ years) who slightly agreed, is not statistically different from any 
other group. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.13 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.13: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< .05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 3.5, p = 0.017.  Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 4.42, SD = 1.025) was statistically different from Group 4 (M = 3.93, SD = 
1.152).   Group 2 (M = 4.25, SD =1.077) and Group 3 (M = 4.14, SD = 1.264) did not 
differ significantly from either Group 1 or 4. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 12.74, p = 0.005.  
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Groups 3 (Undergraduate) and 4 (Postgraduate) recorded the lowest median score 
(Md = 4.00).  Group 2 recorded a median value of 4.50 and Group 1 (Secondary 
School education) recorded the highest median value of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = 0.003, 
r = 0.243.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence levels across the 
groups 
ii. Between the groups there is a statistically significant difference between the 
lowest and highest education level groups 
iii. Group 1 (Secondary School) recorded the highest level of confidence; they 
agreed with the statement that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
iv. Group 2 (College) recorded a level of confidence between slightly agree and 
agree 
v. Group 3 (Undergraduate) and Group 4 (Postgraduate) only slightly agreed 
that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information to make 
informed decisions 
vi. The group with the highest level of education has the lowest level of 
confidence that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information 
to make informed decisions. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.14 overleaf.  
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Figure 4.14: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions: education level 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.5 
level in confidence scores between the five groups: F (4, 427) = 4.787, p = 0.001.    
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
Group 1 (M = 4.48, SD = 1.050) was significantly different to Group 3 (M= 3.92, SD 
= 1.184).  Group 2 (M = 4.17, SD = 1.155), Group 4 (M = 4.10, SD = 1.097) and 
Group 5 (M = 3.33, SD = 1.211) did not differ significantly from any other group. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed a statistically significant difference in levels of 
confidence across five different income groups (Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 
2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: £27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: 
£43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, x2 (4, n = 432) = 21.91, p = <0.001.  
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The lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded the highest median score (Md = 
5.00), Groups 2, 3 and 4 recorded median values of 4.00, and the highest earning 
Group (£150,001+) recorded the lowest median score (Md = 3.50).  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(<£13,500) was statistically different to Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000), p = <0.001, r = 
0.266.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a significant 
difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of income. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence across the five 
groups 
ii. The lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded the highest level of 
confidence; they agree with the statement, ‘I have confidence that my retail 
bank will provide me with sufficient information to make informed decisions’ 
iii. The highest earning group (£150,001+) recorded the lowest level of 
confidence; their confidence score falls between slightly disagree and slightly 
agree 
iv. Groups 2, 3 and 4 slightly agree with the statement 
v. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence between groups one 
and three (£27,601-£43,000) 
vi. The level of confidence is lowest for the highest income group and confidence 
is highest for the lowest income group. This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.15 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.15: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions: income level 
 
 
4.3.3 Moral Hazard arising from the Principal-Agent problem. 
‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing’. 
One of the problems that arise when the externalities market failure is corrected is 
the emergence of moral hazard.  Krugman (2008, p.63) describes moral hazard as 
“any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, 
while someone else bears the cost if things go badly”.  This is based on the theory 
that greater risks are taken if a party is “insulated” and therefore does not have to 
fully realise the consequences of their actions (Buckley, 2011, p.58). 
By creating systems in which the consumer deposits are protected it may induce a 
bank to take greater risks (Hellman et al, 2000), perhaps even provide an incentive 
to intentionally take on the risk of failure (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), and so is not 
viable without regulation (Keeley, 1990).  The introduction of ring fencing in the UK 
has reduced this risk in retail banking somewhat, since the level of risk that can now 
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be taken by ring fenced banks has been reduced significantly.  Ring fencing was 
introduced as a post-crisis regulatory response to the moral hazard problem 
surrounding ‘Too Big To Fail’ banks (Hardie and Macartney, 2016).  Moral hazard 
can undermine the effectiveness of schemes such as LOLR, and magnify costs for 
the government providing it (Allen, Carletti, Goldstein and Leonello, 2015).  The 
positive effects of ring fencing are two-fold: it reduces the firms’ ability to take 
excessive risk; and the firm is no longer able to ‘blackmail’ the state into a bailout 
(Lehmann, 2014).   
Moral hazard also arises due to the existence of the principal-agent problem.  The 
consumer frequently requires advice when purchasing financial products and the 
quality of the product cannot be ascertained at the point of purchase (Llewellyn and 
the FSA, 1999).  The existence of asymmetric information between the principal (the 
consumer) and the agent can lead to exploitation of the consumer where the agent 
is motivated by self-interest.  Certainly, the mis-selling of PPI and packaged bank 
accounts was primarily due to incentive structures which encouraged high volume 
sales of these products by frontline staff in exchange for monetary reward.  Thus 
these products were often sold with little consideration of whether this was the most 
suitable product for the consumer. 
The rationale for regulation is to remove the probability that the moral hazard 
(caused by schemes such as LOLR and deposit insurance) and the principal-agent 
problem will be exploited (Llewellyn, 1998).  If the consumer is confident that their 
retail bank will do the right thing and there is sufficient regulation in place to ensure 
that firms do, then it could be argued that regulation has corrected this market failure.    
The fourth market failure addressed above is that of moral hazard.  The FCA conduct 
of business regulations set out how a firm must behave in its day-to-day dealing with 
consumers and has published guidance on staff incentives and remuneration.  
Therefore as part of this investigation, the confidence levels of consumers will be 
measured to assess the success of conduct of business regulations in combatting 
moral hazard and maintaining consumer confidence in their retail bank.   
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Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
3.83, SD = 1.34) and non-FS employees (M = 3.88, SD = 1.21; t (430) = 0.157, p = 
0.876, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 3581, z = -0.290, p = 0.772, r = -
0.14. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence of the 
two groups 
ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that my retail 
bank will do the right thing’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.16 overleaf.  
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Figure 4.16: I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing:  
employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.27) and females (M = 3.84, SD = 1.18; t (427) = 1.103, p = 0.271, 
two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 4.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 19,104.5, z = -1.382, p = 0.167, r = -0.067. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence of the 
two groups 
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ii. Males and females both slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence 
that my retail bank will do the right thing’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.17 below. 
 
Figure 4.17: I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing:  males 
vs. females 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 
10.5, p = <0.001.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that 
the mean score for Group 1 (M = 4.465, SD = 1.03) was statistically different from 
Group 2 (M = 3.524, SD = 1.28) and Group 3 (M= 3.80, SD = 1.16).  Group 2 (M = 
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3.524, SD = 1.28) was also statistically different from Group 4 (M = 3.88, SD = 1.22).  
There was no statistical difference between Groups 1 and 4, Groups 2 and 3, or 
Groups 3 and 4. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistical 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 years, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 32.23, p = <0.001. Groups 2, 3 and 4 all 
recorded a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than the youngest age Group (18-29yrs), 
which recorded a median value of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted 
p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29yrs) was statistically 
different to Group 2 (30-44yrs), p = < 0.001, r = 0.386.  Group 1 was also statistically 
different to Group 3 (45-59yrs), p = < 0.001, r = 0.274.  Group 2 was statistically 
different to Group 4 (60+yrs), p = 0.008, r = -0.220.  None of the other specific 
comparisons between Groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence 
due to difference in age. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the confidence levels across 
the four groups 
ii. The youngest group (18-29 years) recorded the highest level of confidence; 
they agreed with the statement ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do 
the right thing’ 
iii. The other age groups slightly agreed with the statement 
iv. There was a statistical difference in levels of confidence across the four 
groups 
v. There was a statistical difference in levels of confidence between Group 1 
(18-29 years) and Group 2 (30-44 years), Group 1 and Group 3 (45-59 years), 
and Group 2 and Group 4 (60+ years). This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.18 overleaf.  
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Figure 4.18: I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing:  age 
groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< .05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education Groups: F (3, 428) = 7.2, p = <0.001.  Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 4.1, SD = 1.07) and Group 3 (M = 3.83, SD = 1.31) and Group 4 (M = 3.54, 
SD = 1.19).  Group 2 (M = 3.89, SD = 1.18) did not differ significantly from any of the 
groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
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Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 24.55, p = <0.001.  
Group 1 (Secondary School education) recorded the highest median score (Md = 
5.00), the other three groups all recorded median values of 4.00.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 2 (College), p = 0.033, r = 
0.191. Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 3 (Undergraduate), p = 0.027, 
r = 0.198.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = 
<0.001, r = 0.341.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate 
a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant different level of confidence across the four 
groups 
ii. Group 1 (Secondary School) recorded the highest level of confidence; they 
agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do the 
right thing’ 
iii. Group 2 (College education), Group 3 (Undergraduate) and Group 4 
(Postgraduate) all slightly agree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically different level of confidence between Group 1 and all 
 the other groups 
v. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.19 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.19: I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing:  
education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.5 
level in confidence scores between the five groups: F (4, 427) = 5.262, p = <0.001.    
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
Group 1 (M = 4.21, SD = 1.050) was significantly different to Group 3 (M = 3.75, SD 
= 1.149), Group 4 (M= 3.53, SD = 1.264), and Group 5 (M= 2.83, SD = 1.169).   
However, there was no statistical difference recorded between Group 2 (M= 3.87, 
SD = 1.206) and any other groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups 
(Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: 
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£27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, 
x2 (4, n = 432) = 23.86, p = <0.001.  The lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded 
the highest median score (Md = 5.00), Groups 2 and 3 recorded a median value of 
4.00, Group 4 (£43,001-£150,000) recorded a median value of 3.50, and the highest 
earning group (£150,001+) recorded the highest median score (Md = 3.00).  Dunn's 
pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that 
Group 1 (<£13,500) was statistically different to Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000), p = 
0.008, r = 0.216.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 4 (£43,001-
£150,000), p = 0.001, r = 285.  None of the other specific comparisons between 
groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels 
of income. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings:  
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the confidence levels across 
the income groups 
ii. The parametric test recorded a significant difference between the lowest and 
highest earners 
iii. The lowest income group recorded the highest level of confidence, agreeing 
with the statement that their retail bank will do the right thing. 
iv. The highest earners recorded the lowest level of confidence, slightly 
disagreeing with the statement. 
v. The non-parametric test did not record a significant difference between the 
lowest and highest earners, however, this is likely due to the small sample 
size of Group 5 (n = 6)  
vi. Although the level of confidence recorded lowered as earnings increased, 
overall, the participants slightly agreed that their retail bank will do the right 
thing. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.20 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.20: I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing:  
income levels 
 
 
4.3.4 Fraudulent Activities 
‘I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct’. 
Fraudulent activity is linked to moral hazard and as discussed in the Literature 
Review, the examples of the banks taking excessive risks when the costs are borne 
by others are plentiful.  The steps taken to restructure the regulatory framework and 
separate the retail side of banks’ business from riskier operations does address 
some of the causes of fraudulent activity that have been experienced in banking in 
recent times.  The FCA conduct of business regulations set out how a firm must 
behave in its day-to-day dealing with consumers and the regulator monitors this 
through using tools such as Economics for Effective Regulation (discussed in 
Section 2.4.6). 
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Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.16) and non-FS employees (M = 4.03, SD = 1.17; t (430) = -0.077, p = 
0.939, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 3741.5, z = 0.031, p = 0.975, r = 
0.002. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between those who work in the financial sector and those who don’t 
ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I am 
protected from retail bank misconduct. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.21 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.21: I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct: 
employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 4.102, SD = 1.25) and females (M = 4.01, SD = 1.18; t (268) = 0.743, p = 0.458, 
two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 4.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 19,362.5, z = -1.169, p = 0.242, r = -0.056. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between males and females 
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ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I am 
protected from retail bank misconduct’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.22 below. 
 
Figure 4.22: I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct: 
males vs. females 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 
3.721, p = 0.012.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that 
the mean score for Group 1 (M = 4.408, SD = .99) was statistically different from 
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Group 2 (M = 3.905, SD = 1.26) and Group 3 (M= 3.913, SD = 1.10).  Group 4 (M = 
4.128, SD = 1.23) did not differ statistically from Groups 1, 2 or 3. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 years, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 11.60, p = 0.009. Groups 2, 3 and 4 all recorded 
a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than the youngest age group (18-29 years), which 
recorded a median value of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-
values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29 years) was statistically 
different to Group 2 (30-44 years), p = 0.038, r = 0.195.  Group 1 was also statistically 
different to Group 3 (45-59 years), p = 0.012, r = 0.208.  None of the other specific 
comparisons between groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence 
due to difference in age. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded across the four age groups 
ii. The youngest group (18-29 years) recorded the highest confidence score; 
they agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I am protected from 
retail bank misconduct’ 
iii. The three other age groups all slightly agree with the statement 
iv. There was a statistical difference in levels of confidence between Group 1 
and Group 2 (30-44 years), and Group 1 and Group 3 (45-59 years).  This is 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.23 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.23: I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank 
misconduct: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level in 
confidence scores across the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 3.8, p = 0.01.  Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 4.33, SD = 1.12) was statistically different from Group 4 (M = 3.79, SD = 
1.18). Group 2 (M = 3.97, SD = 1.16) and Group 3 (M = 4.08, SD = 1.17) did not 
differ significantly from any of the groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across the four different levels of 
education (Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, 
n = 108: Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 14.85, p 
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= .002.  Group 1 (Secondary School education) recorded the highest median score 
(Md = 5.00), the other three groups all recorded median values of 4.00.  Dunn's 
pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that 
Group 1 (Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 2 (College), p = 
0.049, r = 0.182.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), 
p = 0.001, r = 0.275.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups 
indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of 
education. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence across 
the levels of education 
ii. Between groups, both tests revealed a significant difference between the 
lowest (agree) and highest education groups (slightly agree). 
iii. The non-parametric test also recorded a significant difference between 
Groups 1 and 2 which was not recorded in the parametric test 
iv. All groups slightly agreed they are protected from retail bank misconduct. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.24 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.24: I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct: 
education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less (M = 4.20, 
SD = 1.23); Group 2: £13,501-£27,600 (M = 4.01, SD = 1.09); Group 3: £27,601-
£43,000 (M = 4.01, SD = 1.15); Group 4: £43,001- £150,000 (M = 3.89, SD = 1.23); 
Group 5: £150,001 and above (M = 3.17, SD = 0.98). There was no statistically 
significant difference at the p < 0.5 level in confidence scores between the five 
groups: F (4, 427) = 1.715, p = 0.146.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD 
test indicated no statistical differences in the means between groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups 
(Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: 
£27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, 
x2 (4, n = 432) = 9.78, p = 0.044.  The highest earning group (£150,001+) recorded 
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the lowest median score (Md = 3.50), Groups 2, 3 and 4 recorded median values of 
4.00, and the lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded the highest median score 
(Md = 5.00).  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni 
correction) revealed that despite the significant overall difference, none of the 
specific comparisons between groups indicate a significant difference in levels of 
confidence due to differing levels of income. 
There was a difference in the findings reported by the parametric and non-parametric 
tests: 
i. The parametric tests found no statistically significant differences across or 
between the income groups 
ii. The non-parametric tests revealed a statistically significant difference across 
the groups but not between the groups 
iii. Overall, the levels of confidence recorded fell as income increased 
iv. Across the income groups the median recorded they slightly agree they have 
confidence they are protected from retail bank misconduct.  This is discussed 
in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.25 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.25: I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct: 
income levels 
 
 
The above has described the findings for the economic rationales for regulation.  The 
non-economic rationales, specifically social rationales, are arguments for regulatory 
intervention to protect the social values of a group of individuals.  Where economic 
rationales seek to address market failures which could ultimately damage the 
economy, social rationales arise due to the very nature of the UK’s highly developed 
and market-oriented economy.     
SOCIAL RATIONALES  
4.3.5 Paternalism (opposite of freedom of choice) 
“I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank” 
Paternalism can exist in the form of interventions in the interests of another, against 
their will, such as the FCA’s Mortgage Market Review directions. Behavioural 
economics has been referred to as ‘light’ paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
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Since coming into power the FCA has developed a keen interest in the use of 
behavioural economics to choose the right interventions, secure better outcomes for 
consumers and promote effective competition (Erta et al, 2013).  In particular, retail 
bank consumers should be able to trust that their retail bank will, through their 
expertise, help them avoid making decisions which are detrimental to their welfare.  
Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
3.83, SD = 1.51) and non-FS employees (M = 3.94, SD = 1.17; t (17.91) = 0.282, p 
= 0.781, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 3649.5, z = -0.153, p = 0.878, r = 
-0.007. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between those who work in the financial sector and those who don’t 
ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my retail bank’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.26 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.26: I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank: 
employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.29) and females (M = 3.94, SD = 1.13; t (427) = -0.035, p = 0.972, 
two-tailed). 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 4.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 20,337.5 z = -0.332, p = 0.740, r = -0.016. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between males and females 
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ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my retail bank’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.27 below. 
 
Figure 4.27: I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank: 
males vs. females 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 
10.955, p = <0.001.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that 
the mean score for Group 1 (M = 4.606, SD = .978) was statistically different from 
Group 2 (M = 3.690, SD = 1.26), Group 3 (M= 3.779, SD = 1.11) and Group 4 (M = 
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3.988, SD = 1.18).  Group 2 did not differ statistically from Groups 3 or 4, and Group 
3 did not differ statistically from Group 4. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 years, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 35.17, p = <0.001. Groups 2, 3 and 4 all 
recorded a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than the youngest age group (18-29 
years), which recorded a median value of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with 
adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29 years) was 
statistically different to Group 2 (30-44 years), p = <0.001, r = 0.389.  Group 1 was 
also statistically different to Group 3 (45-59 years), p = <0.001, r = 0.357.  Group 1 
was statistically different to Group 4 (60+ years), p = 0.002, r = 0.284.  None of the 
other specific comparisons between groups indicate a significant difference in levels 
of confidence due to difference in age. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded across the groups 
ii. The youngest Group (18-29 years) recorded the highest level of confidence; 
they agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I can trust the expertise 
of my retail bank’ 
iii. Group 2 (30-44 years), Group 3 (45-59 years) and Group 4 (60+ years) all 
slightly agreed with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between Group 1 and Groups 2, 3 and 4.  This is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.28 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.28: I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank: 
age groups 
 
 
Education level:  A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 4.91, p = 0.002.    Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 4.18, SD = 1.19) was statistically different from Group 4 (M = 3.63, SD = 
1.16). Group 2 (M = 4.09, SD = 1.07) was also statistically different from Group 4.  
Group 3 (M = 3.85, SD = 1.27) did not differ significantly from any of the groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 19.95, p = .000.  
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Group 1 (Secondary School education) recorded the highest median score (Md = 
5.00), the other three groups all recorded median values of 4.00. Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = <0.001, 
r = .275.  Group 2 was also statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = 
0.012, r = 0.206.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
four groups. 
ii. The group with the lowest level of education (Secondary School) recorded the 
highest level of confidence; they agreed with the statement ‘I have confidence 
that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank’. 
iii. Group 2 (College), Group 3 (Undergraduate) and Group 4 (Postgraduate) all 
slightly agreed with the statement. 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores between 
Group 1 and Group 4, and Group 2 and Group 4. This is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.29 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.29: I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank: 
education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.5 
level in confidence scores for the five income groups: F (4, 427) = 5.052, p = 0.001.  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
Group 1 (M = 4.21, SD = 1.141) was significantly different from Group 3 (M = 3.76, 
SD = 1.192), Group 4 (M = 3.61, SD = 1.150) and Group 5 (M = 2.83, SD = 1.329).  
Group 2 (M = 4.01, SD = 1.168) did not differ significantly from any other groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups 
(Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: 
£27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, 
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x2 (4, n = 432) = 22.70, p = <.001.  The lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded 
the highest median score (Md = 5.00), Groups 2 and 3 recorded median values of 
4.00, and Groups 4 and 5 recorded median values of 3.00.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(<£13,500) was statistically different to Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000), p = 0.015, r = 
0.205.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 4 (£43,001-£150,000), p = 
0.002, r = 0.274.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of income. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. Both tests revealed a significant difference in levels of confidence across the 
income groups  
ii. Between groups, the parametric test revealed a significant difference 
between Groups 1, 3, 4  and 5 
iii. The non-parametric test did not record a significant difference between 
Groups 1 and 5, however, this can be explained by the small sample size of 
Group 5 (n = 6) 
iv. The level of confidence recorded reduced as earnings increased 
v. Overall, the participants slightly agreed they could trust the expertise of their 
retail bank 
vi. The findings are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.30 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.30: I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank: 
income levels 
 
 
4.3.6 Distributive Justice (moral guidance) 
‘I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair’. 
Distributive justice is concerned with distributing resources on the basis of what is 
fair, and when applied to the regulatory system it is concerned with the protection of 
consumers (Cartwright, 2004).  A common problem encountered by the vulnerable 
groups identified by the FCA, and discussed in the Literature Review, is access to 
affordable products (Coppack et al, 2015). 
Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
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3.61, SD = 1.46) and non-FS employees (M = 3.57, SD = 1.24; t (430) = -0.128, p = 
0.898, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.00, n = 414), U = 3751, z = 0.050, p = 0.960, r = 
0.002. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between those who work in the financial sector and those who don’t 
ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that the price 
of retail banking products is fair’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.31 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.31: I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair: 
employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 3.66, SD = 1.36) and females (M = 3.53, SD = 1.20; t (427) = 1.002, p = 0.317, 
two-tailed). 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 4.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 19,406, z = -1.114, p = .265, r = -0.054. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between males and females 
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ii. Both groups slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my retail bank’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.32 below. 
 
Figure 4.32: I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair: 
males vs. females 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < .05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 
10.936, p = .000.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that 
the mean score for Group 1 (M = 4,296, SD = 1.11) was statistically different from 
Group 2 (M = 3.365, SD = 1.29), Group 3 (M= 3.383, SD = 1.13) and Group 4 (M = 
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3.616, SD = 1.29).  Group 2 did not differ statistically from Groups 3 or 4, and Group 
3 did not differ statistically from Group 4. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 years, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 32.28, p = <0.001. The youngest age group 
(18-29 years recorded the highest median score (Md = 5.00), the oldest age group 
(60+ years) recorded a median value of 4.00, and Groups 2 and 3 both recorded the 
lowest median score (Md = 3.00).  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-
values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29 years) was statistically 
different to Group 2 (30-44 years), p = <0.001, r = 0.362.  Group 1 was also 
statistically different to Group 3 (45-59 years), p = <0.001, r = 0.352.  Group 1 was 
statistically different to Group 4 (60+yrs), p = 0.005, r = 0.267. None of the other 
specific comparisons between groups indicate a significant difference in levels of 
confidence due to difference in age. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups. 
ii. The youngest group (18-29 years) recorded the highest level of confidence; 
they agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that the price of retail 
banking products is fair’ 
iii. The oldest group (60+ years) slightly agree with the statement. 
iv. Group 2 (30-44 years) and Group 3 (45-59 years) recorded the lowest levels 
of confidence; they slightly disagree with the statement.  
v. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 and Groups 2, 
3 and 4.  This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9.   
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.33 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.33: I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair: 
age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 3.95, p = 0.008.  Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 3.90, SD = 1.17) was statistically different from Group 4 (M = 3.32, SD = 
1.22). Group 2 (M = 3.61, SD = 1.27) and Group 3 (M = 3.50, SD = 1.28) did not 
differ significantly from any of the groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 12.61, p = 0.006.  
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Group 4 (Postgraduate education) recorded the lowest median score (Md = 3.00), 
the other three groups all recorded median values of 4.00.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = 0.003, 
r = 0.239.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. The group with the highest level of education attainment (Postgraduate) 
recorded the lowest confidence score; they slightly disagree with the 
statement ‘I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair’ 
iii. The other three groups slightly agree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 and Group 4.  
This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.34 overleaf.  
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Figure 4.34: I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair: 
education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.5 
level in confidence scores for the five income groups: F (4, 427) = 5.425, p = <0.001.  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
Group 1 (M = 3.98, SD = 1.204) was significantly different from Group 2 (M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.220), Group 3 (M = 3.45, SD = 1.198) and Group 4 (M = 3.24, SD = 1.302).  
Group 5 (M = 3.33, SD = 1.633 did not differ significantly from any other groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups 
(Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: 
£27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, 
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x2 (4, n = 432) = 22.04, p = <0.001.  The lowest earning group (<£13,500) recorded 
the highest median score (Md = 4.00), Groups 2 and 4 recorded median values of 
3.00, and Groups 3 and 5 recorded median values of 3.50.  Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(<£13,500) was statistically different to Group 2 (£13,501-£27,600), p = 0.004, r = 
0.225.  Group 1 was also statistically different from Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000), p = 
0.004, r = 0.228, and Group 1 was also statistically different from Group 4 (£43,001-
£150,000), p = 0.001, r = 0.280.  None of the other specific comparisons between 
groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels 
of income. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. The group with the lowest level of income (<£13,500) recorded the highest 
confidence score; they slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence 
that the price of retail banking products is fair’ 
iii. Group 2 (£13,501- £27,600) and Group 4 (£43,001-£150,000) recorded the 
lowest confidence scores; they slightly disagree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 and Groups 2, 
3, and 4 
v. The highest income group is not statistically significantly different from the 
other groups. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.35 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.35: I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair: 
income levels 
 
 
4.3.7 Community Values (core values of society) 
‘I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated against by my retail 
bank’. 
Community values are the values which society holds and wish regulation to protect 
and promote; such as trust, honesty and fair dealing (Cartwright, 2004).  Due to 
market failures such as asymmetric information, trust is paramount in retail financial 
services, as without trust demand for products and services may decrease 
(Llewellyn, 2005).  One of the FCA’s statutory objectives is to ‘maintain confidence 
in the UK financial system’ under the terms of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.  This is particularly important for vulnerable groups who could find they 
are discriminated against but may lack a voice.   
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Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
4.44, SD = 1.46) and non-FS employees (M = 4.43, SD = 1.05; t (430) = -0.047, p = 
0.963, two-tailed).   
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 414), U = 4114, z = 0.802, p = 0.422, r = 
0.039. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between those who work in the financial sector and those who don’t 
ii. Both groups agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my retail bank’ 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.36 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.36: I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank: employment in sector vs. non-employment in 
sector 
 
 
Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 4.47, SD = 1.14) and females (M = 4.42, SD = 1.03; t (427) = 0.436, p = 0.663, 
two-tailed). 
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used a as robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 5.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 5.00, n = 282), U = 19,554, z = -1.032, p = 0.302 r = -0.05. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
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i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between males and females 
ii. Both groups agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my retail bank’. 
The mean recorded was slightly lower, however, this can be explained by the 
outliers. 1.4% (N=6) of the participants strongly disagreed with the statement and 
4.7% (N=20) of the participants disagreed with the statement.  As discussed 
previously, the 5% trimmed mean, where the lowest 5% and highest 5% of the data 
is excluded, for each question was very close to the mean so did not require further 
investigation (Pallant, 2016).   
This is graphically represented Figure 4.37 below. 
 
Figure 4.37: I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail: males vs. females 
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Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was no statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 2.35, 
p = 0.071.   
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 1, n = 71: 
18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 years, Group 
4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 6.35, p = 0.096, all groups recorded median 
values of 5.00. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. All age groups agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my retail bank’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.38 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.38: I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was no statistically significant difference at the p< .05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education Groups: F (3, 428) = 1.4, p = 0.248.  The 
mean score for the groups was: Group 1 (M = 4.56, SD = .942), Group 2 (M = 4.51, 
SD = 1.07), Group 3 (M = 4.38, SD = 1.08) and Group 4 (M = 4.29, SD = 1.15). 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education (Group 1, 
n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 4.05, p = 0.257, 
all groups recorded a median value of 5.00. 
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Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. All education levels agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I will not 
be unlawfully discriminated against by my retail bank’. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.39 below. 
 
Figure 4.39: I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank: education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 
level in confidence scores for the five income groups: F (4,427) = 3.507, p = 0.008.  
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Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for 
Group 1 (M = 4.69, SD = 0.945) was significantly different from Group 2 (M = 4.32, 
SD = 1.054) and Group 4 (M = 4.13, SD = 1.235).  Group 3 (M = 4.44, SD = 1.081) 
and Group 5 (M = 4.33, SD = 0.816) did not differ significantly from any other groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups 
(Group 1, n = 128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: 
£27,601-£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, 
x2 (4, n = 432) = 14.22, p = .007.  Groups 1, 2 and 3 recorded the higher median 
score (Md = 5.00).  Group 4 (£43,001-£150,000) recorded the lowest median value 
of 4.00; the highest earners (£150,001+) recorded a median value of 4.50.  Dunn's 
pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that 
Group 1 (<£13,500) was statistically different to Group 2 (£13,501-£27,600), p = 
.037, r = .183.  Group 1 was also statistically different to Group 4 (£43,001-
£150,000), p = .009, r = .241.  None of the other specific comparisons between 
groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels 
of income. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. Group 4 (£43,001-£150,000) recorded the lowest confidence score; they 
slightly agree with the statement ‘I have confidence I will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by my retail bank’ 
iii. The other income groups agree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 and Groups 2 
and 4.  This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.40 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.40: I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank: income levels 
 
 
4.3.8 Protection 
‘In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected’. 
The final question in the consumer survey tested overall confidence that consumers 
felt they were protected by retail banking regulation 
Currently employed in the FS sector: An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the confidence scores of those employed in the financial 
services sector and those who are not employed in the financial services sector.  
There is no statistically significant difference in the scores for FS employees (M = 
4.28, SD = 1.045) and non-FS employees (M = 4.44, SD = 1.097; t (430) = -0.661, 
p = 0.509, two-tailed).   
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A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of FS employees (Md = 5.00, n = 18) 
and non-FS employees (Md = 4.50, n = 414), U = 4152.5, z = 0.876, p = 0.381, r = -
0.042. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between those who work in the financial sector and those who don’t 
ii. Those who work in financial services agree with the statement ‘I have 
confidence that as a retail bank customer I am adequately protected 
iii. Those who do not work in the sector recorded a confidence level between 
slightly agree and agree 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.41 below. 
 
Figure 4.41: I have confidence that I as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected: employment in sector vs. non-employment in sector 
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Gender: An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the confidence 
scores of males and females.  There was no significant difference in scores for males 
(M = 4.41, SD = 1.046) and females (M = 4.22, SD = 1.038; t (427) = 1.809, p = 
0.071, two-tailed).  
A Mann-Whitney U Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no 
significant difference in the confidence levels of males (Md = 5.00, n = 147) and 
females (Md = 4.00, n = 282), U = 18,467, z = -1.976, p = 0.048, r = -0.095. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was no statistically significant difference in the levels of confidence 
recorded between males and females 
ii. Males agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that that as a retail bank 
customer I am adequately protected’  
iii. Females slightly agree with the statement. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.42 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.42: I have confidence that I as a retail bank customer I am 
adequately protected: males vs. females 
 
 
Age: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into four groups 
according to their age (Group 1: 18-29 years; Group 2: 30-44 years; Group 3: 45-59 
years; Group 4: 60 years and above).  There was a statistically significant difference 
at the p < 0.05 level in the confidence scores for the four age groups: F (3, 428) = 
4.671, p = 0.003.  Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that 
the mean score for Group 1 (M = 4.606, SD = .95) was statistically different from 
Group 2 (M = 4.063, SD = 1.15).  Groups 3 and 4 did not differ significantly from any 
other groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to test robustness and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different age groups (Group 
1, n = 71: 18-29 years, Group 2, n = 126: 30-44 years, Group 3, n = 149: 45-59 
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years, Group 4, n = 86: 60+ years, x2 (3, n = 432) = 11.73, p = 0.008. Groups 2 and 
3 both recorded a lower median score (Md = 4.00) than Groups 1 and 4, which both 
recorded median values of 5.00.  Dunn's pairwise comparisons with adjusted p-
values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 (18-29 years) was statistically 
different to Group 2 (30-44 years), p = 0.011, r = 0.221.  None of the other specific 
comparisons between groups indicate a significant difference in levels of confidence 
due to difference in age. 
Both the parametric and non-parametric tests reveal the same findings: 
i. There was a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. The lowest age group (18-29 years) and the highest age group (60 years and 
above) both agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that that as a retail 
bank customer I am adequately protected’ 
iii. The other two groups slightly agree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 and Group 2 
(30-44 years).  This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.9. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.43 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.43: I have confidence that I as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected: age groups 
 
 
Education level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of education on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided 
into four groups according to their level of educational attainment (Group 1: 
Secondary School; Group 2: College; Group 3: Undergraduate; Group 4: 
Postgraduate).  There was a statistically significant difference at the p< 0.05 level in 
confidence scores for the four education groups: F (3, 428) = 4.7, p = 0.003.  Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 
1 (M = 4.57, SD = .908) was statistically different from Group 4 (M = 4.04, SD = 
1.15). Group 2 (M = 4.26, SD = 1.06) and Group 3 (M = 4.31, SD = 0.990) did not 
differ significantly from any of the groups. 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed a statistically 
significant difference in levels of confidence across four different levels of education 
(Group 1, n = 98: Secondary School, Group 2, n = 114: College, Group 3, n = 108: 
Undergraduate, Group 4, n = 112: Postgraduate, x2 (3, n = 432) = 15.27, p = 0.002.  
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Group 1 (Secondary School education) recorded the highest median score (Md = 
5.00), the other three groups all recorded median values of 4.00. Dunn's pairwise 
comparisons with adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) revealed that Group 1 
(Secondary School) was statistically different to Group 4 (Postgraduate), p = 0.001, 
r = 0.266.  None of the other specific comparisons between groups indicate a 
significant difference in levels of confidence due to differing levels of education. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is a statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. The group with the lowest level of education (Secondary School) recorded the 
highest confidence score; they agree with the statement ‘I have confidence 
that I as a retail bank customer I am adequately protected’ 
iii. The other three groups slightly agree with the statement 
iv. There is a statistically significant difference between Group 1 (Secondary 
School) and Group 4 (Postgraduate).   
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.44 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.44 I have confidence that I as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected: education levels 
 
 
Income level: A one-way between-group analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of income on levels of confidence.  Participants were divided into 
five groups according to their annual income: Group 1: £13,500 or less; Group 2: 
£13,501-£27,600; Group 3: £27,601-£43,000; Group 4: £43,001- £150,000; Group 
5: £150,001 and above.  There was no statistically significant difference at the p< 
0.05 level in confidence scores for the five income groups: F (4,427) = 1.261, p = 
0.285.  . 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test was used as a robustness test and also revealed no significant 
difference in levels of confidence across five different income groups (Group 1, n = 
128: <£13,500, Group 2, n = 122: £13,501-£27,600, Group 3, n = 114: £27,601-
£43,000, Group 4, n = 62: £43,001-£150,000, Group 5, n = 6: £150,001+, x2 (4, n = 
432) = 7.52, p = 0.111.   
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Parametric and non-parametric tests revealed the same findings: 
i. There is no statistically significant difference in confidence scores across the 
groups 
ii. The lowest income group (£13,500 or less) recorded the highest confidence 
score; they agree with the statement ‘I have confidence that I as a retail bank 
customer I am adequately protected’ 
iii. Groups 2 (£13,501-£27,600), Group 3 (£27,601-£43,000) and Group 4 
(£43,001- £150,000) slightly agree with the statement 
iv. The highest earning group (£150,001+) recorded a confidence level between 
slightly agree and agree. 
This is graphically represented in Figure 4.45 below. 
 
Figure 4.45 I have confidence that I as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected: income levels 
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4.3.9 Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
There is a pattern of findings within the demographic groups.  First of all, the 
youngest group tended to record the highest levels of confidence.  For example, in: 
i. ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing’ 
ii. ‘I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct’ 
iii. ‘I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair’ 
iv. ‘I have confidence that that as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected’. 
The oldest age group also recorded higher levels of confidence in the last two 
statements above.  In 2011, Blanchflower and Oswald conducted an international 
study that found that the most happy, confident and satisfied people are 
disproportionately the young and old (not middle-aged). Their findings also produced 
the U-curve found in the results of this study for the areas mentioned above. 
Secondly, in terms of levels of educational attainment the group with the lowest level 
(Secondary School) tended to record the highest levels of confidence.  For example, 
in: 
i. ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions’ 
ii. ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing’ 
iii. ‘I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank’. 
 
The group with the highest level of education attainment (Postgraduate) recorded 
the lowest confidence score: 
i. ‘I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair’. 
It is important to question why those who are educated to a higher level have less 
confidence in retail banking regulation.  Although it is beyond the scope of this 
research to answer the ‘why’ questions, some possible explanations for the findings 
are presented in Chapter 6. 
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The last demographic group was that of income.  Again, some interesting and 
unexpected findings were recorded.  The levels of confidence recorded tended to 
decrease as levels of income increased.  For example: 
i. ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions’ 
ii. ‘I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank’ 
iii. ‘I have confidence I will not be unlawfully discriminated against by my retail 
bank’. 
This finding is important as higher income consumers tend to purchase products and 
services which generate a higher income for banks.  Although these products may 
not fall into the category of ‘retail’ products as they may be investments or other 
wealth products, loyal current account customers provide an opportunity for cross-
selling.  Therefore, it is vital that these consumers are confident that they can trust 
their retail bank and have confidence in the regulation that is in place to protect them.  
As mentioned above, it is beyond the scope of this research to answer the ‘why’ 
questions, some possible explanations for the findings are presented in Chapter 6.  
Table 4.4 overleaf outlines the findings presented above: 
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Table 4.4: Summary of Findings from First Stage of Analysis 
 WORK IN FS GENDER AGE EDUCATION 
LEVEL 
INCOME LEVEL RELATED 
SECTION 
H1 Yes: Agree 
 
No: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
All: Slightly 
agree 
All: Slightly 
agree 
All: Slightly agree 5.3.1 
H2 Both: Agree Both: 
Agree 
All: Agree All: Agree All: Agree 5.3.1 
H3 Both: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Highest: 
Slightly agree 
 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Mid-earners: 
Slightly agree 
5.3.2 
H4 Both: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Highest: Slightly 
disagree 
5.3.3 
H5 Both: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Highest: 
Slightly agree 
All: Slightly agree 5.3.4 
H6 Both: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Rest: Slightly 
disagree 
5.3.5 
H7 Both: Slightly 
agree 
Both: 
Slightly 
agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Oldest:  
Slightly agree 
Lowest: 
Slightly agree 
 
Highest: 
Slightly 
disagree 
Lowest: Slightly 
agree 
 
Mid-high earners: 
Slightly disagree 
5.3.6 
H8 Both: Agree Both: 
Agree 
All: Agree All: Agree Lowest: Agree 
 
High earners: 
Slightly agree 
5.3.7 
H9 Both: Agree Both: 
Agree 
Youngest: 
Agree 
 
Mid-age: 
Slightly agree 
Lowest: Agree 
 
Highest: 
Slightly agree 
All: Agree 5.3.8 
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The table on the previous page reveals the following: 
i. There is an overwhelming response of slightly agree to most statements 
ii. There doesn’t appear to be any difference in the levels of confidence of those 
employed and not employed in the sector 
iii. There doesn’t appear to be any difference in the levels of confidence between 
the genders 
iv. The younger group tends to be most confident of the age groups 
v. The lowest education group tends to be most confident of the education 
groups 
vi. The lowest income group tends to be the most confident of the income 
groups. 
From an academic/theorist perspective a number of significant differences have 
been found from the hypothesis tests when examining the influence of certain 
demographic factors on certain hypothesis statements.  The data is now analysed 
using correlations to identify if any such patterns exist. 
4.4 Correlations 
In this section the relationship between variables will be explored using correlation 
analysis.  To detect and describe the relationship among variables and explore the 
association between pairs of variables, correlation analysis was used.   Correlation 
analysis was calculated on the independent variables described as ‘ordinal’ in Table 
3.2, page 101, Section 3.3.1. 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) was used to describe the strength 
and direction of the linear relationship between an independent variable and 
dependent variable.  Further, Spearman Rank Order Correlation (rho), the non-
parametric alternative, was used as a robustness test.  There were no differences in 
the findings of the parametric and non-parametric tests and therefore only the 
parametric tests are recorded below.  The tabulated data can be found in Appendix 
E. 
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4.4.1 Age 
Question six tested the social rationale for regulation, paternalism.  Specifically, that 
retail bank consumer’s should be able to trust that their retail bank will, through their 
expertise, help them avoid making decisions which are detrimental to their welfare. 
The question asked consumers how confident they were that they ‘can trust the 
expertise of their (my) retail bank’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
was computed to assess the relationship between age and confidence in their bank’s 
expertise. There was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -
0.120, n = 432, p = 0.012.   That is, older consumers tended to be less confident that 
they could trust the expertise of their retail bank.   
Question seven tested the social rationale for regulation, distributive justice.  This 
relates to the perceived fairness of outcomes.  Explicitly, how confident consumers 
are ‘that the price of retail banking products is fair’.  There was a moderate negative 
correlation between these two variables, r = -0.136, n = 432, p = 0.005.   That is, 
older consumers tended to be less confident that the price of retail banking products 
is fair.  This differs to the ANOVA test, where a U-shaped curve was found.   The 
other variables did not establish a correlation; they did not tend to either increase or 
decrease.   
4.4.2 Education  
Question one concerned the risk of contagion, or systemic risk.  That is, the failure 
of one institution could cause the collapse of other, solvent institutions.  The 
statement participants were asked to consider was, “I have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure”.  A Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between education levels and 
levels of confidence that consumers are protected against the market failure, 
contagion.  There was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = 
-0.098, n = 432, p = 0.042.  That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease 
confidence that the banking system is stable and secure.    
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Question three tested the economic rationale for regulation, asymmetric information.  
Particularly that the seller of a financial product or service has greater knowledge 
than the consumer.  The consumer frequently requires advice when purchasing 
financial products and the quality of the product cannot be ascertained at the point 
of purchase (Llewellyn, 1999). The question asked consumers how confident they 
were that their retail bank will provide them ‘sufficient information to make informed 
decision’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between education levels and levels of confidence that 
consumers are protected against the market failure, asymmetric information.  There 
was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.211, n = 432, p 
= < 0.001.  That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that 
their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information to make informed 
decisions.  
Question four tested the economic rationale for regulation, moral hazard.  One of the 
problems that arise when the externalities market failure is corrected is the 
emergence of moral hazard.  Krugman (2008, p.63) describes moral hazard as “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while 
someone else bears the cost if things go badly”.  This is based on the theory that 
greater risks are taken if a party is “insulated” and therefore does not have to fully 
realise the consequences of their actions (Buckley, 2011, p.58). 
By creating systems in which the consumer deposits are protected it may induce a 
bank to take greater risks (Hellman et al, 2000), perhaps even provide an incentive 
to intentionally take on the risk of failure (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), and so is not 
viable without regulation (Keeley, 1990).  The survey asked consumers how 
confident they were that ‘retail bank will do the right thing’.  A Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between 
education levels and levels of confidence that consumers are protected against the 
market failure, moral hazard.  There was a weak negative correlation between these 
two variables, r = -0.211, n = 432, p = < 0.001.   That is, a higher level of education 
tended to decrease confidence that their retail bank will do the right thing. 
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Question five tested the economic rationale for regulation, fraudulent activity.  
Dishonest or fraudulent behaviour by those in power has become something of a 
norm in modern banking.  LIBOR and foreign exchange market rate manipulation 
was essentially collusive, collaborative and collegial (Skinner, 2016) between the 
largest of the world’s banks.  It had become industry accepted practice and gave rise 
to significant social and economic costs.  Add to this the ubiquitous mis-selling of 
Payment Protection Insurance and subprime mortgages for no reason other than 
profit.   Baker (2010) wrote that in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis many 
commentators cited regulatory capture of public bodies and public policy by leading 
banks as one of the main casual factors.  Fraudulent activity is linked to moral hazard 
and examples of the banks taking excessive risks when the costs are borne by 
others are plentiful.   
The survey asked consumers how confident they are ‘that they are protected from 
retail bank misconduct’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was 
computed to assess the relationship between education levels and levels of 
confidence that consumers are protected from retail bank misconduct.  There was a 
weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.138, n = 432, p = 
0.004.   That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that 
fraudulent activity was reduced.   
Question six tested the social rationale for regulation, paternalism.  Specifically, that 
retail bank consumer’s should be able to trust that their retail bank will, through their 
expertise, help them avoid making decisions which are detrimental to their welfare. 
The question asked consumers how confident they were that they ‘can trust the 
expertise of their (my) retail bank’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
was computed to assess the relationship between education levels and levels of 
confidence that the expertise of their retail bank could be trusted.  There was a weak 
negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.180, n = 432, p = < 0.001.   
That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that positive 
paternalism (that is decisions that are detrimental to consumer’s welfare are 
avoided) is increased by regulation. 
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Question seven tested the social rationale for regulation, distributive justice.  This 
relates to the perceived fairness of outcomes.  Explicitly, how confident consumers 
are that ‘the price of retail banking products is fair’.  A Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between education 
levels and levels of confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair. There 
was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.161, n = 432, p 
= 0.001.   That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that 
distributive justice was maintained by regulation. 
Question eight tested the social rationale for regulation, community values.  
Community values are the values which society holds and wish regulation to protect 
and promote; such as trust, honesty and fair dealing (Cartwright, 2004).  Due to 
market failures such as asymmetric information, trust is paramount in retail financial 
services, as without trust demand for products and services may decrease 
(Llewellyn, 2005).  This is particularly important for vulnerable groups who could find 
they are discriminated against but may lack a voice.  The survey asked consumers 
how confident they are ‘that they will not be unlawfully discriminated against by their 
retail bank’.   A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between education levels and levels of confidence that they 
will not be unlawfully discriminated against by their retail bank.  There was a weak 
negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.097, n = 432, p = 0.044.   
That is, a higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that community 
values were protected by regulation.   
The final question tested overall confidence that consumers felt they were protected 
by retail banking regulation, ‘In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank 
customer I am adequately protected’.   A Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between education levels and 
levels of confidence that they were adequately protected.  There was a weak 
negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.164, n = 432, p = 0.001.   
That is, consumers with a higher level of education tended to be less confident that, 
in general, they were adequately protected.   
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The only variable which did not establish a correlation, that did not tend to either 
increase or decrease, was the second survey question that focused on the rationale 
that consumer deposits should be protected if a bank becomes insolvent, ‘I have 
confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is protected should my bank 
fail’.   
4.4.3 Income  
Question two focused on the rationale that consumer deposits should be protected 
if a bank becomes insolvent, “I have confidence that the money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should my bank fail”.  A Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between income levels and 
levels of confidence that the system was stable and secure.  There was a weak 
positive correlation between these two variables, r = 0.153, n = 432, p = 0.001.   That 
is, the higher the level of income the higher the level of confidence that deposits 
were protected should the bank fail.    
Question three tested the economic rationale for regulation, asymmetric information.  
Particularly that the seller of a financial product or service has greater knowledge 
than the consumer.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was 
computed to assess the relationship between income levels and levels of confidence 
that consumers are protected against the market failure, asymmetric information.  
There was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.175, n = 
432, p = < 0.001.  That is, a higher level of income tended to decrease confidence 
that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information to make informed 
decisions.  
Question four tested the economic rationale for regulation, moral hazard.  The survey 
asked consumers how confident they were that ‘retail bank will do the right thing’.  A 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the 
relationship between income levels and levels of confidence that consumers are 
protected against the market failure, moral hazard.  There was a weak negative 
correlation between these two variables, r = -0.208, n = 432, p = < 0.001.   That is, 
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a higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that their retail bank will do 
the right thing. 
Question five tested the economic rationale for regulation, fraudulent activity.  The 
survey asked consumers how confident they are ‘that they are protected from retail 
bank misconduct’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed 
to assess the relationship between income levels and levels of confidence that 
consumers are protected from retail bank misconduct.  There was a weak negative 
correlation between these two variables, r = -0.105, n = 432, p = 0.029.   That is, a 
higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that fraudulent activity was 
reduced.   
Question six tested the social rationale for regulation, paternalism.  The question 
asked consumers how confident they were that they ‘can trust the expertise of their 
(my) retail bank’.  A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed 
to assess the relationship between income levels and levels of confidence that the 
expertise of their retail bank could be trusted.  There was a weak negative correlation 
between these two variables, r = -0.206, n = 432, p = < 0.001.   That is, a higher 
level of income tended to decrease confidence that positive paternalism (that is 
decisions that are detrimental to consumer’s welfare are avoided) is increased by 
regulation. 
Question seven tested the social rationale for regulation, distributive justice.  This 
relates to the perceived fairness of outcomes.  Explicitly, how confident consumers 
are ‘that the price of retail banking products is fair’.  A Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between income 
levels and levels of confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair. There 
was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r = -0.192, n = 432, p 
= < 0.001.   That is, a higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that 
distributive justice was maintained by regulation. 
Question eight tested the social rationale for regulation, community values.  The 
survey asked consumers how confident they are ‘that they will not be unlawfully 
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discriminated against by their retail bank’.   A Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between income levels and 
levels of confidence that they will not be unlawfully discriminated against by their 
retail bank.  There was a weak negative correlation between these two variables, r 
= -0.143, n = 432, p = 0.003.   That is, a higher level of income tended to decrease 
confidence that community values were protected by regulation.   
There were two hypotheses which did not establish a correlation; they did not tend 
to either increase or decrease: 
i. ‘I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and secure’ 
ii. ‘In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected’. 
From the industry/practitioner perspective not only have the relationships between 
demographic factors and the research hypotheses been confirmed, but now the 
direction of these relationships have been identified.  This can be used to inform the 
sector of these consumer behaviours, e.g. young; low education; low income people 
have higher confidence, so old; well-educated; high income people need to be the 
focus of industry advertising and education. 
4.4.4 Summary of Correlation Analysis Findings 
Below is a summary of the main findings grouped by demographic: 
i. Age: Older customers tended to be less confident that they could trust the 
expertise of their retail bank and that the price of retail products was fair. 
ii. Education: The higher the level of educational attainment the lower the 
confidence level that the banking system is stable and secure; that their retail 
bank will provide them with sufficient information to make informed decisions; 
that their retail bank will do the right thing; that they were protected from retail 
bank misconduct; that they can trust the expertise of their retail bank; that the 
price of retail banking products is fair; that they will not be unlawfully 
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discriminated against by their retail bank; and that they were adequately 
protected overall. 
iii. Income: The higher the level of income, the higher the level of confidence that 
deposits are protected should their retail bank fail.  However, the lower the 
level of confidence that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions; that their retail bank will do the right 
thing; that they are protected from retail bank misconduct; that they can trust 
the expertise of their retail bank; that the price of retail banking products is 
fair; and that they will not be unlawfully discriminated against by their retail 
bank. 
In this chapter, the survey data was analysed using two different approaches.  In the 
first instance, and with reference to an academic/theorist standpoint, parametric and 
non-parametric tests were used to identify if there are any statistically significant 
differences in the hypotheses results based on an underlying demographic factor(s).  
It was established that for many of the research hypotheses there were indeed 
different responses based on groupings established within the demographic factors. 
There were no recorded differences in the levels of confidence in the economic 
rationales for regulation or the social rationales for regulation.  The economic 
rationales for regulation measured as slightly agree, as did the social rationales.   
Only one economic rationale recorded higher, consumers agree, that the money in 
their retail bank account(s) is protected should their bank fail.  The regulation that is 
in place to correct the market failure of systemic risk at a micro-prudential level is the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS).  During the Global Financial 
Crisis this particular area of regulation gained considerable exposure due to the bank 
run on Northern Rock.  This may explain the higher level of confidence recorded. 
Only one social rationale recorded higher, consumers agreed, that they will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by their retail bank.  The Equality Act (2010) is the 
UK anti-discrimination law.  Given the current climate for diversity and inclusion, both 
at organisational and societal levels, it would be surprising to find that consumers 
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did feel discriminated against.  However, as discussed earlier, the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) did find cases in a study in 2015.  
The second analysis approach then attempted to identify the direction of these 
relationships.  This was achieved using correlation analysis and the ordinal 
demographic factors, namely, age; education level and income level.  The results 
from this analysis therefore provide industry/practitioners with a key insight into the 
nature of the differences to responses that can then be used to inform education, 
customer support, and even marketing initiatives to address any issues pertinent to 
the focus of this study area.  In particular, older respondents; those with relatively 
high income levels; and those with higher educational attainment had broadly lower 
trust and satisfaction levels for many of the key hypotheses. 
In the next chapter, the final analysis using multiple linear regressions focuses on 
the end-user/consumer.  This analysis will determine which of the behavioural 
factors, in terms of the key demographics, are ultimately relevant in the overall 
appraisal of trust and satisfaction in the industry and regulator as they relate to the 
consumers own bank experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 233 
 
CHAPTER 5 REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS  
5.1 Introduction  
The correlation analysis in Chapter 4 looked at each independent variable 
(demographic data) in turn and its relationship with each dependent variable (levels 
of confidence measured by the hypotheses).  The limitation of correlation analysis is 
that it only looks at the relationship between two variables at a time.  Regression 
analysis helps to overcome this limitation by looking at the relationship between 
more than one variable.  In this chapter, stepwise multiple regression analysis is 
used to identify the combination of independent (demographic) variables that would 
be used to predict the levels of confidence in the dependent variable (rationales for 
regulation). 
5.2 Demographic Groups 
Below is a table which presents the groupings used for each demographic variable.   
 
Table 5.1: Demographic Groupings 
Demographic Variable Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
Work in financial services No Yes - - - 
Gender Male Female - - - 
Age 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+ - 
Education  Secondary 
School 
College Undergraduate Postgraduate - 
Income <£13,500 £13,501-
£27,600 
£27,601- 
£43,000 
£43,001-
£150,000 
£150,001+ 
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5.3 Levels of Confidence in the Rationales for Regulation 
In this section the significant demographic factors that predict the level of confidence 
in each rationale for regulation will be presented.  Although regression will tell us 
which independent variables influence the dependent variable, it will not tell us the 
reasons why.  Nonetheless, as the factors that are not important are removed, future 
studies can be carried out to understand the underlying qualitative reasons.  
In order to assess the impact of demographics on confidence levels a multiple 
regression model must be adopted.  Logistic regression is not suitable in this study 
as the dependent variable of interest is not categorical (Pallant, 2016).  Multiple 
stepwise regressions were used in an attempt to find the best regression model. This 
analysis tool adds or deletes variables one at a time using the p value as a predictor 
for each step (Frey, 2018). There is criticism of this method; however, it is useful for 
exploratory research such as this (Field, 2013).  Stepwise regression simply allows 
the data to reveal potential predictors; in this research there were no theoretical 
predictions based on the demographics of the participants.  Stepwise regression was 
selected in order to explore avenues for future research and not to test hypotheses 
(Field, 2013).  Had the aim of the research been to predict, or determine the order 
of prediction, a standard or hierarchical regression model may have been more 
appropriate since a major limitation of stepwise regression is the increased likelihood 
of committing a type 1 error (Pandit and Khairullah, 2015), i.e. rejecting a true null 
hypothesis, due to a sampling error.  However, sampling error is less of an issue 
with a larger sample size (Thompson, 1995).  Stepwise regression has the 
advantage over hierarchical regression of the software algorithm selecting the order 
of the variables, rather than the researcher having to determine this based on 
previous theory and research (Lewis, 2007). In addition, stepwise regression has 
been recommended for exploratory and predictive research (Menard, 1995); 
although Lewis (2007) advises that it should only be used for preliminary research, 
such as this.  The purpose of this research was to determine if there was a 
relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence in retail 
banking regulation and the findings are that there is a negative correlation between 
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confidence and income and education levels, and a positive correlation between 
confidence and age. 
5.3.1 Macro externalities: ‘I have confidence the UK retail banking system is 
stable and secure’ 
When confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and secure was predicted 
it was found that working in financial services1 (Beta = -1.0456, p <0.001), level of 
education1 (Beta = 0.397, p = 0.003), and age1 (Beta = 0.376, p = 0.013) were 
significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.059.  See Appendix F for the 
tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1work in FS1 + b2education1 + b3age1 
= 4.745 + (-1.045 work in FS1) + (0.397 education1) + (0.376 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Not being employed in financial services 
This confirms the independent sample t-test in Section 4.3.1, where mean of workers 
in Financial Services sector is 4.83 and non-workers is 3.86. 
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Table 5.2: Hypothesis Test 1 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable and 
secure 
Independent 
Variable  
Does not work in the 
Financial Services 
Industry 
Aged between 18-29 
 
Educated to 
Secondary School 
level 
 
Confidence  
↓ ↑ ↑ 
 
The first dependent variable concerns the capital requirement regulations that 
ensure banks hold sufficient capital.  These regulations are in place to avoid 
systemic risk, in particular contagion.  Those who are not employed in the financial 
services industry have lower levels of confidence in this intervention.  This could be 
expected since those working in the banking sector would perhaps be more aware 
of these regulations.  The second dependent variable relates to the age group.  The 
youngest age group (18-29) recorded the higher levels of confidence.  The FCA 
(2015) identified being young as a risk factor for vulnerability.  They justified this as 
this group are associated with having less experience.  The increased confidence 
could perhaps be explained by naivety rather than proficiency.  The third dependent 
variable concerns the education level of the consumer.  The lowest level of 
educational attainment group (Secondary School) recorded higher levels of 
confidence in this intervention.  The FCA (2015) identified low literacy, numeracy 
and financial capability skills as a risk factor for vulnerability.  Possibly, a lack of 
understanding of the issues and risks in the financial system may result in a higher 
level of confidence being recorded. 
5.3.2 Micro externalities: ‘I have confidence that the money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should my bank fail’ 
When confidence that the money in my retail banks account(s) is protected should 
my bank fail was predicted it was found that working in financial services2 (Beta = 
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0.598, p = 0.023), level of income2 (Beta = -0.369, p = 0.002), and age1 (Beta = -
0.324, p = 0.022) were significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.049.  
See Appendix F for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1work in FS2 + b2income2 - b3age1 
= 4.609 + (0.598 work in FS2) + (-0.369 income2) + (-0.324 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being employed in financial services 
The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Having an annual income between £13,501-£27,600  
 
Table 5.3: Hypothesis Test 2 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) is 
protected should their bank fail 
Independent 
Variable  
Works in the Financial 
Services Industry 
Aged between 18-29 
 
Income between 
£13,501-£27,600 
Confidence  
↑ ↓ ↓ 
 
 
The second dependent variable concerns depositor insurance regulations that 
ensure consumer deposits are guaranteed should a bank fail.  These regulations are 
in place to avoid a bank panic and ultimately contagion.  Those who are employed 
in the financial services industry have higher levels of confidence in this intervention.  
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 238 
 
This could be expected since those working in the banking sector would perhaps be 
more aware of these regulations.  Certainly in retail banking the customer-facing staff 
would be well-versed in this type of protection.  The second dependent variable 
relates to the age group, this has been discussed above.  The third dependent 
variable concerns the income level of the consumer.  Although not the lowest income 
group, this income bracket is below the national average.  The FCA (2015) identified 
low income as a risk factor for vulnerability.  Possibly, a lack of understanding of the 
issues and risks in the financial system may result in a higher level of confidence 
being recorded, or conversely, the lack of high value savings imply they are not 
exposed to this risk. 
5.3.3 Asymmetric information: ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will 
provide me with sufficient information to make informed decisions’ 
When confidence that my retail bank will provide me with sufficient information to 
make informed decisions was predicted it was found that level of education1 (Beta = 
0.313, p = 0.015), level of income3 (Beta = -0.243, p = 0.050), and age1 (Beta = 
0.557, p <0.001) were significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.061.  
See Appendix F for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education1 - b2income3 + b3age1 
= 4.077 + (0.313 education1) - (0.243 income3) + (0.557 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Having income between £27,601- £43,000  
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Table 5.4: Hypothesis Test 3 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
Independent 
Variable  
Aged between 18-29 
 
Educated to Secondary 
School level 
Income between 
£27,601-£43,000 
Confidence  
↑ ↑ ↓ 
 
 
The third dependent variable concerns the market failure, asymmetric information.  
The problem of asymmetric information occurs as the consumer has less information 
than the ‘expert’ supplying the financial product and/or advice.  Consumers are 
unable to inform themselves adequately so as to avoid making decisions which may 
disadvantage them (Wood, 2001).  The individual consumer does not have the time 
or the resources to sufficiently source information on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ products and 
providers (Llewellyn, 1995).  The FCA conduct of business regulations set out how 
a firm must behave in its day-to-day dealing with consumers including how it markets 
products and services and the literature provided to consumers.  Those in the 
youngest age group and with the lowest levels of education have higher levels of 
confidence in this intervention.  This could be due to a combination of naivety and 
better quality information being available for basic products, or as a result of the 
extensive initiatives the regulator has run for this classification of consumers.  The 
third dependent variable concerns the income level of the consumer.  The middle 
income group (between national average and higher-rate tax payers) have lower 
levels of confidence that their retail bank will provide them with sufficient information.  
This income level group could find themselves in need of advice for more complex 
products, but priced out of the market for independent advice.  
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5.3.4 Moral hazard: ‘I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing’ 
When confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing was predicted it was found 
that level of education1 (Beta = 0.562, p = < 0.001) and age1 (Beta = 0.723, p <0.001) 
were significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.084.  See Appendix F 
for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education1 + b2age1 
= 3.631 + (0.562 education1) + (0.723 age1) 
  
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 
Table 5.5: Hypothesis Test 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
Independent 
Variable 
Aged between 18-29 Educated to Secondary School level 
 
Confidence  
↑ ↑ 
 
 
The fourth dependent variable concerns the market failure moral hazard.  One of the 
problems that arise when the externalities market failure is corrected is the 
emergence of moral hazard.  By creating systems in which the consumer deposits 
are protected it may induce a bank to take greater risks (Hellman et al, 2000), 
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perhaps even provide an incentive to intentionally take on the risk of failure (Boyd 
and De Nicolo, 2005), and so is not viable without regulation (Keeley, 1990).  The 
rationale for regulation is to remove the probability that the moral hazard (caused by 
schemes such as LOLR and deposit insurance) and the principal-agent problem will 
be exploited (Llewellyn, 1998).  The independent variables of lowest age and lowest 
education level presented higher levels of confidence that they are protected against 
these risks.  The possible reasons behind this have been discussed above. 
5.3.5 Fraudulent activities: ‘I have confidence that I am protected from retail 
bank misconduct’ 
When confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct was predicted it 
was found that level of education1 (Beta = 0.390, p = 0.003) and age1 (Beta = 0.461, 
p = 0.002) were significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.040.  See 
Appendix F for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education1 + b2age1 
= 3.870 + (0.390 education1) + (0.461 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
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Table 5.6: Hypothesis Test 5 
Dependent 
Variable 
The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Independent 
Variable 
Aged between 18-29 Educated to Secondary School level 
Confidence  
↑ ↑ 
 
 
The fifth dependent variable concerns protecting consumers against the fraudulent 
activities of retail banks.   Fraudulent activity is linked to moral hazard and examples 
of the banks taking excessive risks when the costs are borne by others are plentiful, 
and are discussed in the Literature Review chapter.  Fraudulent activity was not 
limited to the practices of a few banks competing with each other.  LIBOR and foreign 
exchange market rate manipulation was essentially collusive, collaborative and 
collegial (Skinner, 2016) between the largest of the world’s banks.  It had become 
industry accepted practice, and gave rise to significant social and economic costs.  
The steps taken to restructure the regulatory framework and separate the retail side 
of banks’ business from riskier operations does address some of the causes of 
fraudulent activity that have been experienced in banking in recent times.  The 
independent variables of lowest age and lowest education level presented higher 
levels of confidence that they are protected against these risks.  The possible 
reasons behind this have been discussed above. 
5.3.6 Paternalism: ‘I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail 
bank’ 
When confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank was predicted it was 
found that level of education1 (Beta = 0.464, p = 0.001), education2 (Beta = 0.349, p 
= 0.008), age1 (Beta = 0.801, p = <0.001) and income5 (Beta = -0.975, p = 0.037) 
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were significant predictors.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.103.  See Appendix F 
for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education + b2education + b1age - b5income 
= 3.615 + (0.464 education1) + (0.349 education2) + (0.801 age1) - (0.975 income5) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 College education being the highest level completed 
The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Having income of £150K+ 
 
 
Table 5.7: Hypothesis Test 6 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail 
bank 
Independent 
Variable  
Aged between 18-
29 
 
Educated to 
Secondary School 
level 
Educated to 
College level 
Income 
over 
£150K 
Confidence  
↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
 
 
The sixth dependent variable concerns the social justification for intervention by the 
regulator of protectiveness.  An example of paternalistic regulation is the FCA’s 
Mortgage Market Review directions.  Since coming into power the FCA has 
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developed a keen interest in the use of behavioural economics to choose the right 
interventions, secure better outcomes for consumers and promote effective 
competition (Erta et al, 2013).  The lowest age and education groups presented 
higher levels of confidence in this area.  The speculative reasons have been 
discussed above.  Interestingly, the highest income group reported lower levels of 
confidence in this area of regulation.  This could perhaps be explained by the fact 
that they potentially have a much greater need for specialist advice, the type they 
cannot perhaps access via their retail bank, and are likely to have access to an 
Independent Financial Adviser.  
5.3.7 Distributive justice: ‘I have confidence that the price of retail banking 
products is fair’ 
When confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair was predicted it was 
found that level of education1 (Beta = 0.378, p = 0.008), income1 (Beta = .0294, p = 
0.035) and age1 (Beta = 0.744, p <0.001) were significant predictors.  The overall 
model fit was R2 = 0.097.  See Appendix F for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education1 + b2income1 + b3age1 
= 3.279 + (0.378 education1) + (0.294 income1) + (0.744 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 Having income of <£13,500 
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Table 5.8: Hypothesis Test 7 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
Independent 
Variable  
Aged between 18-29 
 
Educated to Secondary 
School level 
 
Income less than 
£13,500 
Confidence  ↑ ↑ ↑ 
 
The seventh dependent variable is concerned with distributing resources on the 
basis of what is fair, and when applied to the regulatory system it is concerned with 
the protection of consumers (Cartwright, 2004).  Examples of regulatory protection 
of the most vulnerable financial services consumers are policies of financial inclusion 
and the FCA investigation into payday lenders which resulted in extra rules for firms 
providing high-cost, short-term credit which took effect on 1 July 2014 (FCA, 2014a).  
A common problem encountered by each of these groups is access to affordable 
products (Coppack et al, 2015).  The three independent variables groups (young, 
low income, low educational attainment) have been identified by the FCA (2015) as 
at risk for vulnerability.  These groups have recorded higher levels of confidence in 
this particular area.  This could be due to the significant number of regulator 
initiatives aimed at protecting and informing these groups, or, it could be that the 
basic products these groups have access to do not attract high fees (possibly due to 
regulator interventions to create basic accounts and reduce fees, charges and 
interest). 
5.3.8 Community values: ‘I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by my retail bank’ 
When confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated against was predicted it 
was found that level of income1 (Beta = 0.362, p = 0.001) was the only significant 
predictor.  The overall model fit was R2 = 0.024.  See Appendix F for the tabulated 
data. 
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Confidence = b0 + b1income1  
= 4.207 + (0.143 income1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Having income of <£13,500 
 
Table 5.9: Hypothesis Test 8 
Dependent Variable The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
Independent Variable  Income less than £13,500 
Confidence  ↑ 
 
 
The eighth dependent variable relates to the values which society holds and wish 
regulation to protect and promote; such as trust, honesty and fair dealing (Cartwright, 
2004).  There is UK legislation in place to protect all citizens, not only consumers of 
financial services.  However, the Financial Ombudsman Service is also available to 
banking consumers as an independent arbitrator for no fee where they feel they have 
been mistreated by their retail bank (banks are subject to fees for cases brought 
before them).  The lowest income group reported higher levels of confidence that 
they are protected.  The potential reasons have been discussed above. 
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5.3.9 Overall confidence: ‘In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank 
customer I am adequately protected’ 
When overall confidence that as a retail bank customer I am adequately protected 
was predicted it was found that level of education1 (Beta = 0.382, p = 0.001) and 
age1 (Beta = 0.398, p = 0.003) was the only significant predictor.  The overall model 
fit was R2 = 0.042.  See Appendix F for the tabulated data. 
 
Confidence = b0 + b1education1 + b2age1 
= 4.133 + (0.382 education1) + (0.398 age1) 
 
The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 Being aged between 18-29 
 
Table 5.10: Hypothesis Test 9 
Dependent 
Variable 
The consumer is confident that as a retail bank customer they are adequately 
protected   
Independent 
Variable 
Aged between 18-29 Educated to Secondary School level 
 
Confidence  
↑ ↑ 
 
 
The final dependent variable measured levels of confidence that the consumer feels 
adequately protected overall.  The lowest age and education level groups recorded 
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higher levels of confidence, possible reasons why these particular groups may have 
higher levels of confidence have been discussed above. 
5.4 Summary of Regression Analysis Findings 
As can be seen in Table 5.11 below, age, education and income are the most 
important demographic variables when predicting levels of confidence in the 
rationales for regulation.   
 
Table 5.11: Summary of Regression Analysis Findings 
 Work in FS Gender Age Education Income 
The UK retail banking system is 
stable and secure ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
The money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should my 
bank fail 
✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
My retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make 
informed decisions 
✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
My retail bank will do the right thing ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
I am protected from retail bank 
misconduct ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
I can trust the expertise of my retail 
bank ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
The price of retail banking products 
is fair ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
I will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ 
As a retail bank customer I am 
adequately protected  ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
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5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter of the thesis has set out what the best combination of independent 
(demographic) variables would be to predict the levels of confidence in the 
dependent variable (rationales for regulation).  The significant demographic factors 
that predict the level of confidence in each rationale for regulation has been 
presented.  Although regression has identified which independent variables 
influence the dependent variable, it has not revealed the underlying reasons; 
although hypothetical explanations have been presented. 
Being young, earning a low income and having a low level of educational attainment 
are clearly important factors in the level of confidence the consumer has in retail 
banking regulation.  Future qualitative studies should be undertaken to determine 
the causes behind this.  This would be of particular interest to Consumer Groups, 
the regulator and the retail banks. 
The next, and final chapter, will revisit the research question, methodology, 
hypotheses and analysis.  The overall findings will be presented along with the 
contributions, limitations and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 6: OVERALL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, the aim and objectives of the research will be revisited and the 
findings and limitations will be discussed.  The contributions to theory, practical 
implications and recommendations for future research will also be presented. 
6.2 Background 
Confidence in the banking system is critical to the health of households, businesses 
and the overall economy.  Hence, government intervention in the financial services 
sector and the strict regulation of the banking industry is rationalised by the need to 
minimise the occurrence of events that could undermine the reputation of banks and 
threaten the stability of the system.  The purpose of this research was to answer the 
question, ‘Are Scottish consumers confident in retail banking regulation’?  This 
question is important for the reasons mentioned above, confidence in the banking 
system is critical to the health of households, businesses and the overall economy.  
This research has taken a unique approach to answering this question by measuring 
the levels of confidence in each of the specific rationales for regulating the retail 
banking system.  This is the first of three significant contributions this study has made 
and is discussed further in Section 6.3 below.   
6.3 Theory 
The first objective of this research was to undertake a critical review of the existing 
theory of financial regulation literature to determine the specific rationales for 
monitoring and supervision.  The justifications for regulating the banking system 
largely fall into two categories: correcting economic market failures and preventing 
social detriment.  The economic rationales identified were: 
i. Externalities: systemic risk caused by problems in the wider system and 
contagion caused by events such as a bank run 
ii. Asymmetric Information: the inequality of information between bank and 
consumer  
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iii. Moral Hazard: incentives for banks to take greater risks, created by 
interventions into the market (such as lender of last resort and deposit 
insurance) 
iv. Fraudulent Activities: misconduct and mis-selling scandals which have 
plagued the industry over recent decades. 
The social rationales identified were: 
i. Paternalism: to avoid less well-informed consumers making decisions which 
are detrimental to their welfare 
ii. Distributive Justice: ensuring fair outcomes for, the less powerful, consumers  
iii. Community Values: protecting and promoting trust, honesty and fair dealing, 
particularly those who may lack a voice. 
6.4 Method 
The second objective of this research was to contextualise the above and develop a 
set of key research questions.  Each question would be designed to measure the 
level of confidence in the outcome of the corrective or protective intervention.  The 
researcher approach to survey design was original, at least in the financial regulation 
research context, as all three stakeholders played a crucial role in modelling the 
questions.  Three stages of survey design were undertaken to develop a consumer 
survey from the theoretical model established in Chapter 2.  At each stage, empirical 
testing was undertaken with three distinct participant groups, and in a logical order 
that considered theory, practice and end-users, see Figure 6.1 overleaf.   
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Figure 6.1: Stages of survey design: from theoretical model to empirical 
testing
 
 
 
The rationale for separating the groups was due to the different levels of knowledge; 
theory traditionally informs practice (academics and practitioners often collaborate 
to improve standards).  Additionally, corrections and amendments could be made 
before ‘testing’ on the next group.  The final group of end-users were consumers 
who would not be included in the final study and could feedback on the suitability 
and validity of the questions whilst understanding the context behind them.  There 
are numerous studies, in particular those undertaken by the current regulator, where 
there is participation from either industry or consumer.  However, the researcher 
couldn’t find any specific studies were theorists, practitioners and end-users had 
direct input into the design of the study.  At each stage of the empirical testing of the 
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survey, recommendations for change to the questions were made and acted upon 
(see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in Chapter 3). 
6.5 Data Collection 
The researcher employed a mixed data collection, whereby 71% of responses were 
achieved via an online survey, with 29% paper surveys attained to ensure the views 
of non-internet users were represented. The research was limited to Scotland and 
therefore the adult population (18+ years) residing in Scotland was the target 
population (since almost all adults in Scotland are ‘banked’) CAB Scotland (2010).  
According to the 2016 Scottish government data (National Records of Scotland, 
2017) the adult population was 4,372,939.  Previous FCA research (Coppack et al, 
2015) had found the differences in results between UK regions to be marginal so it 
could be argued that a survey undertaken in Scotland would produce results that 
can be applied to the UK as a whole.  The sample was inspected in terms of its 
reliability to represent the wider Scottish population and validity with respect to the 
appropriateness of the data being gathered in this study.  It was concluded that the 
sample of data collected in this study was representative is terms of: 
i. Size 
ii. Income distribution of participants 
iii. Education levels of participants 
iv. Participants employed in the financial services sector 
The survey consisted of two parts; the first section was comprised of demographic 
questions such as gender, age, education level, and income.  These were 
considered important variables owing to the research conducted by the regulators 
into consumer vulnerability (Coppack et al, 2015), access to financial services 
(Collard et al, 2016) and ageing populations (McLoughlin et al, 2017).   
The second section of the survey covered the main theoretical questions which have 
been developed from the rationales highlighted in Section 6.3 above.   
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6.6 Analysis 
The third objective of the research was to analyse and evaluate the data to 
determine: 
i. differences in the hypotheses results based on underlying demographic 
factors 
ii. the direction of the relationship between each demographic and each 
rationale for regulation  
iii. which of the demographic factors have the most impact on confidence in 
each of the hypotheses. 
The second contribution this research has made is in respect of the continued debate 
into the use of parametric methods of data analysis when using Likert scales.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, having considered the assumptions that must be met to 
perform parametric tests the researcher was confident that their use would be 
statistically sound.  To verify this, non-parametric tests were used as robustness 
checks.  As Table 4.3 in Chapter 4 illustrates, no meaningful differences were found.  
Therefore, this study also contributes to this field of the literature. 
In summary, the first method of analysis looked at each theoretical question based 
on the individual demographic factors in turn.  The second method of analysis looked 
at correlations between certain demographic variables.  The third method of analysis 
used multiple stepwise regressions to assess which demographics had the biggest 
influence on each theoretical question.  Lastly, which factors had the biggest 
influence across the whole range of questions was evaluated. 
6.7 Findings 
In this section, each hypothesis and a summary of the findings from each of the 
statistical data analysis methods will be presented in turn. 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 255 
 
6.7.1 The consumer is confident that the UK retail banking system is stable 
and secure 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Those employed in the sector agreed, those not employed in the sector 
slightly agreed  
b. Both males and females slightly agree  
c. All age groups slightly agree  
d. Participants with different levels of education slightly agree  
e. Participants at all levels of income slightly agree  
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. Working in the financial services sector tended to increase confidence 
that the banking system is stable and secure 
b. The higher the level of education, the lower the confidence that the 
banking system is stable and secure 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29  
 Secondary education being the highest level completed  
b. The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Not being employed in financial services 
 
Overall, consumers slightly agree that the UK retail banking sector is stable and 
secure.  The correlation and regression analysis results concur, however, the 
regression analysis also identified the youngest age group as an impact factor in 
confidence levels.  
The main implication of consumers from all demographic backgrounds only slightly 
agreeing that they are confident that the retail banking system is stable and secure 
is the threat to the stability of the financial system itself.  As discussed in the 
Literature Review, when levels of trust and confidence are high banks can rely on 
stable funding.  However, when levels of trust and confidence are low, systemic risk 
is higher.  Younger consumers with low levels of education tended to present higher 
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levels of confidence, yet traditionally these demographics are not likely to hold the 
majority of the wealth in the system.  Therefore, if already low levels of confidence 
were to be impacted by yet another scandal, this could cause significant stress to 
the system. 
 
6.7.2 The consumer is confident that the money in their retail bank account(s) 
is protected should their bank fail 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
agreed  
b. Both males and females agree 
c. All age groups agree 
d. Overall, all education levels agree 
e. Those earning above the minimum wage but below the national average, 
slightly agree 
f. Those earning above the national average, and those earning above the 
higher rate agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. Working in financial services tended to increase confidence that deposits 
were protected should the bank fail 
b. The higher the level of income, the higher the level of confidence that 
deposits were protected should the bank fail 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being employed in financial services 
b. The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Having an annual income between £13,501-£27,600  
 
The correlation and regression analysis results concur, however, the regression 
analysis also identified the youngest age group as an impact factor in confidence 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 257 
 
levels and detected the specific income range which had the lowest level of 
confidence; the group earning between minimum wage and the UK national average.  
Overall, consumers agreed they are confident that the money in their retail bank 
account(s) is protected should their bank fail.  Even so, those with higher levels of 
income tended to record lower levels of confidence.  The main implication of this is 
the risk of bank runs.  This could cause significant stress to individual banks if higher-
net-worth consumers suddenly withdrew their funds.  Conversely but predictably, 
those working in financial services, which are most likely to be well-versed in the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme, tended to record higher levels of 
confidence.  
 
6.7.3 The consumer is confident that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
slightly agreed  
b. Males agreed and females slightly agreed although there was no 
statistical difference between the groups 
c. The youngest and oldest age groups agreed, however, the two age 
groups between slightly agreed 
d. The group with the highest level of education has the lowest level of 
confidence, slightly agree 
e. The level of confidence is lowest, between slightly disagree and slightly 
agree, for the highest income group, and highest, agree, for the lowest 
income group 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that their retail 
bank will do the right thing 
b. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that their retail 
banks will provide them with sufficient information to make informed 
decisions 
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iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
b. The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Having income between £27,601- £43,000  
 
The correlation and regression analysis results concur, however, the regression 
analysis also detected the youngest age group as an impact factor in confidence 
levels.  Additionally, the income group earning over the national average but under 
the higher-rate tax band was also identified as a significant factor. 
Overall, consumers only slightly agreed that their retail bank will provide them with 
sufficient information to make informed decisions.  The main implication of those 
earning above the UK national having the lowest levels of confidence is the potential 
for loss of business for the retail banks.  There is a risk that these consumers could 
turn to alternative providers to assist them with financial matters. This could indirectly 
impact other consumers since a loss of profit for the retail banks may see a rise in 
fees and charges in other areas to ‘balance the books’. 
 
6.7.4 The consumer is confident that their retail bank will do the right thing 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
slightly agree 
b. Both males and females slightly agree 
c. The youngest age group recorded the highest level of confidence, agree, 
however, the other age groups slightly agree 
d. The group with the lowest level of education recorded the highest level of 
confidence, agree 
e. The highest earners recorded the lowest level of confidence, slightly 
disagree, however, the lowest earners recorded the highest level of 
confidence, agree 
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ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that their retail 
bank will do the right thing 
b. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that their retail 
bank will do the right thing 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 
The correlation analysis identified a relationship with income that is not considered 
to be a significant impact factor.  Regression analysis also identified the youngest 
age group as an impact factor in confidence levels. 
Overall, consumers only slightly agreed they were confident that their retail bank will 
do the right thing.  Education and income were significant factors, with increased 
levels of these factors having a negative correlation with levels of confidence. The 
main implication of this is the potential for consumer detriment if they do not buy 
suitable financial products due to the belief that their retail bank will not behave in 
their best interests. 
 
6.7.5 The consumer is confident that they are protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
slightly agree 
b. Both males and females slightly agree 
c.  The youngest group recorded the highest level of confidence, agree 
d. The group with the lowest level of education recorded the highest level of 
confidence, agree 
e. The lowest earners recorded the highest level of confidence, agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
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a. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that fraudulent 
activity was reduced 
b. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that fraudulent 
activity was reduced 
iii.  Regression analysis:  
b. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 
A relationship with income was detected in the correlation analysis which is not 
considered to be a significant impact factor; again age was a significant impact factor 
in confidence levels, however, there doesn’t appear to be a directional relationship. 
Overall, consumers only slightly agreed they are confident that they are protected 
against retail bank misconduct.  The financial crises and numerous mis-selling 
scandals caused a substantial deterioration in the reputation of the banking industry, 
which even after more than a decade, is still recovering.  The main implications of 
this include those discussed above, namely, unstable funding, increased risk of bank 
runs, loss of business for retail banks and reduction in consumer welfare.  There is 
again a negative correlation with levels of confidence and levels of income and 
educational attainment.  The youngest age group recorded the highest levels of 
confidence which may be a result of being too young to remember the crisis; at least 
for some. 
 
6.7.6 The consumer is confident that they can trust the expertise of their retail 
bank 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
slightly agree 
b. Both males and females slightly agree 
c. The youngest age group recorded the highest level of confidence, agree, 
however, the other age groups slightly agree 
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d. The group with the lowest level of education recorded the highest level of 
confidence, agree 
e. The highest earners recorded the lowest level of confidence, slightly 
disagree, however, the lowest earners recorded the highest level of 
confidence, agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. Older consumers tended to be less confident that they could trust the 
expertise of their retail bank 
b. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that they 
could trust the expertise of their retail bank 
c. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that they could 
trust the expertise of their retail bank 
i. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
i. Being aged between 18-29 
ii. Secondary education being the highest level completed   
iii. College education being the highest level completed 
b. The demographic variables that decrease confidence in this area are: 
 Having income of £150K+ 
 
The correlation and regression analysis results concur; however, the regression 
analysis also identified the highest earning group, the additional tax rate band, is a 
significant impact factor in confidence levels. 
Overall, consumers only slightly agreed they are confident that they can trust the 
expertise of their retail bank.  There is, again, a negative correlation with levels of 
confidence and levels of income and educational attainment.  Also, age was found 
to be negatively correlated.  The highest level of income, the additional rate band, 
was a significant impact factor for decreased confidence.  The highest earners 
responded that they slightly disagree that they are confident that they can trust the 
expertise of their retail bank.  As discussed above the implications of this include 
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unstable funding, increased risk of bank runs, loss of business for retail banks and 
reduction in consumer welfare. 
 
6.7.7 The consumer is confident that the price of retail banking products is fair 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
slightly agree 
b. Both males and females slightly agree 
c. The youngest group recorded the highest level of confidence, agree 
d. The group with the highest level of education recorded the lowest level of 
confidence, slightly disagree 
e. The lowest earners recorded the highest level of confidence, slightly 
agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. Older consumers tended to be less confident that the price of retail 
banking products was fair 
b. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that distributive 
justice was maintained by regulation 
c. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that distributive 
justice was maintained by regulation 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Being aged between 18-29 
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 Having income of <£13,500 
 
The correlation and regression analysis results concur, however, the correlation 
analysis also demonstrates the negative relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. 
Overall, consumers only slightly agreed they are confident that the price of retail 
banking products is fair.  There is, again, a negative correlation with levels of 
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confidence and levels of income, educational attainment and age.  Ernst and Young 
(2014) found that 66% of consumers who had switched in the past 12 months had 
done so due to fees and charges.  The main implication of this is that the big four 
could lose some of their market share to the ‘Challenger Banks’.   
 
6.7.8 The consumer is confident that they will not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by their retail bank 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
agree 
b. Both males and females agree 
c. All age groups agree  
d. All education groups agree  
e. The higher rate - additional rate income group recorded the lowest level 
of confidence, slightly agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that they will 
not be unlawfully discriminated against by their retail bank 
b. A higher level of income tended to decrease confidence that community 
values were protected by regulation 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Having income of <£13,500 
 
Education was detected in the correlation analysis as having a negative relationship; 
however, this has not been identified as a significant impact factor for confidence in 
the regression analysis. 
Overall, consumers agreed they are confident that they will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by their retail bank.  This is particularly important for vulnerable 
groups who could find they are discriminated against but may lack a voice.  Income 
was a significant factor, with those on the lowest income having the highest levels of 
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confidence, the additional rate taxpayer slightly agreed that they are confident that 
they will not be unlawfully discriminate against by their retail bank.  All other 
demographic groups, and categories within the groups, agreed with the statement.  
The UK has legislation in place to protect all citizens, not only consumers of financial 
services.  The Financial Ombudsman Service (2004; 2015) has found examples of 
discrimination of consumers at the hands of their retail banks.  The main implication 
of this is that if any particular bank appears to repeatedly fall short of expectations 
and the law they could suffer both reputational and financial loss, leading to unstable 
funding, increased risk of bank runs, and loss of business and increased consumer 
detriment. 
 
6.7.9 In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank customer I am 
adequately protected 
i. Results of individual demographic factors: 
a. Both those employed in the sector, and those not employed in the sector 
agree 
b. Males agree and females slightly agree, although there was no statistical 
difference in the results 
c. The lowest age group and the highest age group agree, the other two 
groups slightly agree  
d. The lowest level of education group, agree, has a higher level of 
confidence than the other groups 
e. The lowest income group recorded the highest level of confidence, agree 
ii. Results of correlation analysis:  
a. A higher level of education tended to decrease confidence that, in general, 
they were adequately protected 
iii. Regression analysis:  
a. The demographic variables that increase confidence in this area are:  
 Secondary education being the highest level completed   
 Being aged between 18-29 
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Age was identified as a significant impact factor for overall confidence levels, 
however, no directional relationship was found. 
 
This is the third contribution of this study.  The three methods of analysis inform the 
three key stakeholders of certain phenomena discovered in this research: 
i. Hypothesis tests.  These examined the differences in levels of confidence 
between each demographic group. This would be of interest to a range of 
consumer groups who may support consumers of different ages, and those who 
have require specific support due to lower literacy and numeracy skills, or those 
facing financial difficulties.  An interesting finding, however, is that higher 
education and income consumers reported lower levels of confidence.  This is 
discussed further in Section 6.11. 
ii. Correlation analysis.  The regulator would potentially be very interested to 
understand the demographic factors that determine whether confidence is 
increased or decreased in a specific area of regulation.  Particularly as they tend 
to focus initiatives based on targeting demographic factors such as age, 
education and income.  This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.9. 
iii. Regression analysis.  This analysis determined which demographic factors have 
the most impact on levels of confidence in specific areas of regulation.  This 
would be of particular interest to banks who are taking a more holistic approach 
to consumer segmentation.  This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.10 
6.7.10 Structure 
As discussed in the Literature Review, the structure of an organisation can influence 
consumer confidence levels.  With levels of confidence across almost all areas low, 
consideration should be given to Llewellyn’s (2014) argument that a more diversified 
financial system would bring economic, systemic and welfare benefits.  Indeed, it 
could lead to a reduction in some of the market failures that regulation seeks to 
address.  For example, as mutual firms focus on their members the agency problem 
is better addressed and consumers can be more confident that they will be provided 
with sufficient information to make informed decisions.  This was the third hypothesis 
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tested in the study and consumers only slightly agreed they felt confident in this area.  
Additionally, the Competition Commission (2002) found that the complex monopoly 
that is currently operating in the UK has led to consumer detriment due to reduced 
competition and through exploitative practices such as excessive pricing.  
Diversification of the market could lead to fairer pricing practices.  Confidence that 
the price of retail banking products is fair was tested under hypothesis seven in the 
study; again consumers were only slightly confident that this was the case.   
6.7.11 Culture 
As discussed in the Literature Review, Spicer (2014) found that retail bank culture 
was to blame for widespread bad practices and failures.  Specifically, aggressive 
sales techniques were encouraged, if not a direct result of, incentive structures which 
were designed to reward maximum sales with uncapped bonuses; the ultimate goal 
being shareholder wealth maximisation (due to the shareholder value model 
structure). All the while that the sales culture in retail banking was growing, the FSA 
was trying, with limited success, to embed ‘Treating Customer’s Fairly’ (TCF) into 
product and remuneration design.  The FSA undertook substantial work to improve 
the culture of regulated firms, including their TCF initiative which is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.  Following their demise in 2013 the FCA published an update of 
their thematic review, ‘Risks to customers from financial incentives’ (2014c).  This 
report promoted the need for firms to develop a culture that focuses on customers, 
rather than maximising profits and bonuses for sales staff.  The correlation between 
poorly designed incentive structures and numerous mis-selling scandals could not 
be denied.  The FSA’s previous investigations had revealed that incentive schemes 
were likely to lead staff to mis-sell to meet targets and gain bonuses.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2, this prompted Barclays, the Cooperative Bank and HSBC to remove 
sales targets from frontline staff.  The FCA have continued to promote the need for 
cultural change within the industry, a recent publication, ‘FCA Mission: Approach to 
Supervision’ (2019), details how they expect both the individual and the firm to 
behave and the roles they play with respect organisational culture. In particular 
senior managers, who ‘lead and shape’ the culture of the organisation, are subject 
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to minimum standards checks and must be approved by the regulator as ‘fit and 
proper’ to perform their role.  The Senior Managers and Certification Regime 
(SM&CR) introduced a statutory duty of responsibility in March 2017 and is 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  Even the financial crisis did not appear 
to have provided sufficient lessons.  Spicer (2014) found that sales targets had 
simply been rebranded ‘customer needs’ or ‘customer outcomes’ in some cases.  He 
predicted it would be a whole generation before a marked change would be realised.  
Hypothesis four tested how confident the consumer was that their retail bank will do 
the right thing.  Consumers slightly agreed that they were confident in this area.  
Doing the right thing may come down to an individual’s moral compass.  However, 
when taken in an organisational context, it broadly comes down to the culture of the 
company, their ethical code.  Yet, as discussed in the Literature Review there is no 
mandatory ethical code for the banking industry.  Hypothesis five tested how 
confident the consumer was that they were protected against retail bank misconduct.  
Consumers only slightly agreed that they were confident in this area.  Interestingly, 
Vigeo-Eiris (2017) found that a strong ethical culture decreased a bank’s vulnerability 
to misconduct.  Hypothesis six tested how confident the consumer was that they can 
trust the expertise of their retail bank.  The FCA has published several papers (2014; 
2015; 2018) which identify the groups that are most likely to depend on this 
expertise.  Yet again, consumers recorded that they only slightly agreed they were 
confident in this question.  It would appear that the issue of culture cannot be 
successfully addressed without considering the ethics of the organisation.  This is 
discussed in more detail in the next section.   
6.7.12 Organisational Ethics 
As discussed in the Literature Review, there are questions about who is accountable 
and responsible for a firm’s ethical, or otherwise, decisions.  Since the financial crisis 
there have been reforms within the industry to increase the accountability of the 
board, and of senior managers, of financial institutions.  In March 2017, the SM&CR 
introduced a statutory duty of responsibility.  Each senior manager must have an 
agreed Statement of Responsibility which sets out in detail the areas of the business 
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they are accountable for.  The aims of the regime are twofold: to foster a culture 
where staff at all levels take personal responsibility for their actions; and to ensure 
firms and their staff can clearly demonstrate where the responsibility lies.  Senior 
managers are also responsible for ensuring that employees - who do not have to be 
approved by the FCA, but whose roles could cause significant detriment to the firm 
or consumers –undergo an annual fit and proper check for their role.  The FCA intend 
to pursue individual responsibility rigorously (FCA, 2019a).  
However, there is a general consensus that regulation should not be expected to 
ensure an ethical industry (Jackman, 2012; Black and Anderson, 2013); rather the 
institutions themselves should be striving to create a visibly ethical culture from the 
‘top-down’.  Every regulated firm must adhere to the FCA Principles for Business, 
which set out ‘fundamental obligations’.  Additionally, an industry-wide ethical group, 
the Banking Standards Board, shares best practice across the industry and conducts 
an annual survey, the last three years results of which have been somewhat mixed 
(BSB, 2018).    Nonetheless, the use of ethical codes within an organisation has 
been found to lead to more ethical responses to common business dilemmas 
(McKinney, Emerson and Neubert, 2010); each of the ‘Big 4’ subscribe to such 
codes.  Such codes should seek to address some of the market failures; however, 
the results of this research reveal that levels of confidence in these areas are low.  
For example, taking advantage of the consumer’s lack of knowledge (H3), actions 
that are not in the best interests of the consumer (H4), protection against misconduct 
(H5); protection of vulnerable consumers (H6); and protection against unfair pricing 
(H7). Hypothesis three tested how confident consumers were that their retail bank 
will provide them with sufficient information to make informed decisions. It is clear 
that there is some overlap between regulation, culture and ethics and that the 
industry still has some way to go to find the right balance and repair the reputation 
and trustworthiness of the sector.   
6.8 Limitations 
The main limitations of the study are: 
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i. Firstly the location.  Data was collected from residents of Scotland only, and 
therefore the results are specific to Scotland (although previous studies in 
this field have found differences between UK regions were marginal).  
ii. Secondly, a survey can only report the relationships between variables and 
cannot claim cause and effect, that is, the research can answer the ‘what’ but 
not the ‘why’.   
iii. Lastly, a major limitation of stepwise regression is the increased likelihood of 
committing a type 1 error (Pandit and Khairullah, 2015), i.e. rejecting a true 
null hypothesis, due to a sampling error.  However, sampling error is less of 
an issue with a larger sample size (Thompson, 1995). 
6.9 Practical Implications 
The hypothesis tests revealed that those with higher incomes and those with higher 
educational attainment recorded the lowest confidence scores.  Given that 
Consumer Groups are mainly, although not always, targeted at vulnerable 
consumers such as those on low incomes and facing financial difficulties, or those 
with lower literacy and numeracy skills this may indicate that some of these more 
vulnerable consumers are not accessing these specialist services due to a 
misplaced confidence.  Consumer Groups may be interested to find out the reasons 
why there is this disparity so that they can target their interest groups accordingly. 
The correlation analysis revealed a negative correlation between level of confidence 
in retail banking regulation and educational attainment and levels of confidence in 
retail banking and income levels.  The FCA’s Consumer Protection Objective should 
address issues which cause consumer’s detriment.  The FCA has stated that this is 
their most important objective.  Perhaps then, their targeted initiatives for improving 
financial education and ensuring that those who face financial problems are dealt 
with fairly by their retail bank are having a positive impact. However, this does 
indicate that higher income and higher educational attainment groups may have 
needs that are not currently being met.  The regulator may be interested to find out 
the reasons why they have low confidence in these areas of regulation. 
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The regression analysis revealed that age, income and education were significant 
factors when measuring confidence in retail banking regulation.  Older consumers, 
higher income and more highly educated consumers were less confident than their 
younger, lower income, lower educational attainment counterparts.  Banks now use 
big data to understand their consumers and are interested in where their segments, 
such as age, gender, income, education, channel usage, loyalty, life stage etc., 
overlap.  This research demonstrates that some of the banks’ potentially most 
profitable consumers are the least confident in them.  In today’s challenging and 
highly competitive market, addressing this could be a significant differentiator.   
The stability of the economy depends on confidence in the banking system.  Indeed, 
the root of government intervention stems from the need to ensure households and 
businesses are healthy and the threat of destabilising events is reduced.  The low 
levels of confidence that the banking system is stable and secure, and marginally 
higher levels of confidence that consumer money is protected should their bank fail 
should indicate to government that the schemes they have in place are perhaps not 
common knowledge for consumers and could be better promoted to raise 
awareness; particularly to avoid a future bank run. 
One of the most interesting findings in this research is that consumers who have a 
higher level of income and a higher level of educational attainment have lower levels 
of confidence in retail banking regulation.  Clearly, if these groups do not feel their 
interests are protected there is a potential loss of custom from the segment of 
consumers that are likely to be highly profitable.  Targeted marketing for these 
groups should be more focused on building trust and confidence in the institution 
and its products and services.  Focusing on the double bottom line, pursuing social 
objectives in addition to financial objectives, is one method that would improve the 
image of some of the larger institutions. 
Those with lower education levels and young consumers consistently recorded 
higher levels of confidence in each of the areas that regulation seeks to address.  
This research cannot answer why this is.  However, this could be due to naivety or 
the implicit trust that these groups tend to have towards others they may feel have 
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a greater understanding or experience.  The regulator should approach this with 
caution, as many of the past mis-selling and misconduct scandals of recent decades 
have occurred due to the belief that banks were working in the consumers best 
interests when clearly this wasn’t the case. 
Cultural and regulatory reforms have gone some way to address this; however, as 
proposed by Llewellyn (2014) a restructure of the financial system to increase the 
number of mutuals could reduce the imbalance of powerful shareholder value model 
institutions which dominate the UK retail banking market.  This would reduce the 
complex monopoly structure and the lack of personal responsibility for decisions 
which has been partially blamed for the Global Financial Crisis. 
The Government should also take appropriate steps to reduce the risk of regulatory 
capture by addressing the revolving door practice in the financial sector.  This would 
reduce the conflicts of interest and reduce another factor in public distrust; the belief 
that there is corruption or collusion at the top of these institutions.  These beliefs 
were reinforced by events such as price-fixing and market-rigging.  Complex 
products, such as protection and retirement products, may be avoided due to 
mistrust which increases both individual consumer detriment and overall society as 
the government has to support those who cannot support themselves during illness 
and/or old-age.  Therefore, increased transparency should be enforced by the 
government.  The introduction of a compulsory ethical code would go some way to 
improve this. 
Overall, consumers slightly agree that they have confidence in retail banking 
regulation.  Undoubtedly there is still a long way to go to improve the image of the 
industry and ensure that consumers are accessing appropriate products and 
receiving a service that is beneficial to their welfare. 
6.10 Contributions to Theory 
There are four main contributions to the theory and literature that this study makes: 
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i. The finding that those with a higher income and higher educational attainment 
have less confidence in retail banking regulation 
ii. The use of theorists, practitioners and end-users in the stages of survey design, 
from theoretical model to empirical testing of the consumer survey 
iii. The finding that the use of parametric tests for the analysis of Likert scale data is 
robust 
iv. The use of three stages of analysis to inform which considered, individual 
demographics in relation to levels of confidence; the direction of confidence in 
relation to these demographics; and the combined demographic factors that have 
the greatest impact on the levels of confidence.  Each of these stages of analysis 
would be of interest to different stakeholders as discussed above. 
6.11 Recommendations for Future Research 
Potentially, future research should be undertaken to encompass a wider 
participation in terms of location and examine the ‘why’ questions that this research 
uncovers.  
i. Why are those employed in the sector no more confident than the general 
public? 
ii. Why do the youngest consumers have the most confidence? 
iii. Why do those who have a higher level of educational attainment have less 
confidence in the system? 
iv. Why do those who earn a higher income have less confidence in the system? 
Additionally, there is likely to be a strong relationship between educational 
attainment and income level.  This has not been tested for in this study, but may be 
crucial to understanding the ‘whys’ for these demographic groups. 
Answering the above questions could improve the effectiveness of regulation, 
confidence in the financial system and the profitability of financial institutions.  Most 
importantly, it could reduce consumer detriment and increase confidence in 
managing day-to-day their retail banking affairs. 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE CONSENT FORM AND EMAIL COMMUNICATION 
(i) Example Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 305 
 
(ii) Example email to participate in the research design 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE SURVEY 
Claire McCafferty 
  
Consent 
Edinburgh Napier University requires that all individuals who participate in 
research studies give their formal consent to do so.  Please read the following and 
tick the box to confirm you understand and agree to participate in the study. 
1. I freely consent to be a participant in the research project on the topic of 
'Consumer confidence in Retail banking regulation' conducted by Claire McCafferty, 
a PhD student at Edinburgh Napier University. 
2. The main aim of this research is to measure consumer confidence in the different 
areas that regulation seeks to address and should take no longer than 20 minutes to 
complete. 
3. I understand that my answers are anonymous and confidential.  My name will not 
be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in 
anything published by the researcher. 
4. I also understand that if, at any time, during the survey I feel unable or unwilling 
to continue, I am free to leave.  That is, my participation in the study is completely 
voluntary, and I may withdraw from it without negative consequences.  However, 
after data has been collected it will not be possible for my data to be removed. 
5. Additionally, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I 
am free to decline.  A partial completion will indicate a wish to withdraw.  Partial 
completions will not be included in the research and will be void. 
6. I have read and understood the above and consent to participate in this study.  My 
approval is not a waiver of my legal rights.  Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to acquire a copy of the informed consent form for my records upon request. 
 
 
1. 
Please tick this box to confirm that you have read the consent information above 
and agree to participate in this study.  
I agree 
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Introduction 
My name is Claire McCafferty and I am a PhD student at Edinburgh Napier 
University. 
As part of my research I am collecting data on consumer confidence in retail 
banking regulation. 
For the purposes of this study, retail banking is defined as personal or individual 
accounts held at a high street or online bank.  The type of accounts this includes are: 
current accounts (with or without overdrafts), savings accounts, personal loans, 
credit cards and mortgages.   
It does not include investments, pensions or other specialised products. 
In total there are three pages of questions in this survey.  The first page has a total 
of eight demographic questions.  The second and third page have a combined total 
of ten questions which ask you to rate to what extent you agree with a particular 
statement.  The scale runs from strongly agree to strongly disagree.   
Please select the option that most reflects your individual view.  Whether you agree 
or disagree with a statement, and how strongly you feel about this, will depend on 
your personal experience and therefore there are no right or wrong answers. 
If you would like to be informed of the findings of this research, please contact me 
on the details on the last page of this survey. 
Please note this survey is only open to participants living in Scotland. 
Thank you for participating! 
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Demographic questions 
1
. 
Gender  
Male Female Prefer not to say Other 
 
2
. 
 
Age range  
18-
19 
20-
24 
25-
29 
30-
34 
35-
39 
40-
44 
45-
49 
50-
54 
55-
59 
60-
64 
65-
69 
70-
74 
75-
79 
80-
84 
85-
89 
90
+ 
 
3
. 
 
Do you currently have a UK bank account?  
Yes No 
 
4
. 
 
Do you currently live in Scotland?  
**This survey is only open to participants living in Scotland** 
Yes 
 
5
. 
 
Highest qualification held  
Secondary school College Undergraduate  Postgraduate 
 
6
. 
 
Employment status  
Working full-
time 
Working part-
time Student 
Not currently 
working 
 
7
. 
 
Income range  
<£13,500 
£13,501-
£27,600 
£27,601-
£43,000 
£43,001-
£150,000 £150,001+ 
 
8
. 
 
Do you currently work in the financial services sector?  
Yes No 
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Core questions 
1. 
I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and secure  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
2. 
 
 
I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is protected should 
my bank fail  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
3. 
 
 
I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with sufficient information to 
make informed decisions  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
4. 
 
 
I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
5. 
 
 
I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
 
 
I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
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7. 
 
 
 
 
 
I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
8. 
 
 
I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated against by my retail 
bank  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
9. 
 
 
In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Slightly 
agree  
Slightly 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
10. 
 
 
I have confidence that adequate protection is provided by:  
The retail banking regulator 
Consumer Protection laws 
Both of the above 
Neither of the above 
Don't know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between demographic variables and consumer confidence levels in the rationales 
for regulation: A quantitative study of Scottish retail banking consumers 
Claire Lynne McCafferty PhD April 2020 Page 311 
 
 
  
Thank you 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
If you wish to contact me you can do so at the following addresses: 
email: c.mccafferty@napier.ac.uk 
post: Room 3/45, Edinburgh Napier University Business School, Craiglockhart 
Campus, 219 Colinton Road, Edinburgh, EH14 1DJ 
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APPENDIX C: SHAPIRO-WILK TEST OF NORMALITY 
(i) Shapiro-Wilk: Age 
Age Group Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
H1: I have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure 
18-29 
.884 71 .000 
30-44 
.893 126 .000 
45-59 
.874 149 .000 
60+ .896 86 .000 
H2: I have confidence that the money in 
my retail bank account(s) is protected 
should my bank fail 
18-29 
.863 71 .000 
30-44 
.872 126 .000 
45-59 
.866 149 .000 
60+ .814 86 .000 
H3: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will provide me with sufficient information 
to make informed decisions 
18-29 
.811 71 .000 
30-44 
.895 126 .000 
45-59 
.897 149 .000 
60+ 
.809 86 .000 
H4: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will do the right thing 
18-29 
.831 71 .000 
30-44 
.925 126 .000 
45-59 
.883 149 .000 
60+ .848 86 .000 
H5: I have confidence that I am protected 
from retail bank misconduct 
18-29 
.866 71 .000 
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30-44 
.893 126 .000 
45-59 
.896 149 .000 
60+ .860 86 .000 
H6: I have confidence that I can trust the 
expertise of my retail bank 
18-29 
.780 71 .000 
30-44 
.916 126 .000 
45-59 
.894 149 .000 
60+ .905 86 .000 
H7: I have confidence that the price of 
retail banking products is fair 
18-29 
.876 71 .000 
30-44 
.929 126 .000 
45-59 
.915 149 .000 
60+ .908 86 .000 
H8: I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
18-29 
.853 71 .000 
30-44 
.871 126 .000 
45-59 
.865 149 .000 
60+ .784 86 .000 
H9: In general, I have confidence that as 
a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected 
18-29 
.859 71 .000 
30-44 
.824 126 .000 
45-59 
.865 149 .000 
60+ .839 86 .000 
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(ii) Shapiro-Wilk: Education 
Highest Qualification Held Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
 
 
 
H1: I have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure 
Secondary School 
.825 98 .000 
College 
.902 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.907 108 .000 
Postgraduate .906 112 .000 
 
 
 
H2: I have confidence that the money in 
my retail bank account(s) is protected 
should my bank fail 
Secondary School 
.761 98 .000 
College 
.879 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.893 108 .000 
Postgraduate .852 112 .000 
 
 
 
H3: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will provide me with sufficient information 
to make informed decisions 
Secondary School 
.773 98 .000 
College 
.882 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.877 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.904 112 .000 
 
 
 
H4: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will do the right thing 
Secondary School 
.784 98 .000 
College 
.910 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.898 108 .000 
 
 
Postgraduate 
 
 
 
.913 112 .000 
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H5: I have confidence that I am protected 
from retail bank misconduct 
Secondary School 
.775 98 .000 
College 
.899 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.911 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.873 112 
.000 
 
 
 
 
H6: I have confidence that I can trust the 
expertise of my retail bank 
Secondary School 
.823 98 .000 
College 
.890 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.902 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.928 112 
.000 
 
 
 
 
H7: I have confidence that the price of 
retail banking products is fair 
Secondary School 
.870 98 .000 
College 
.920 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.934 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.930 112 
.000 
 
 
 
 
H8: I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
Secondary School 
.794 98 .000 
College 
.835 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.875 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.876 112 
.000 
 
 
 
 
H9: In general, I have confidence that as 
a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected 
Secondary School 
.730 98 .000 
College 
.878 114 .000 
Undergraduate 
.866 108 .000 
Postgraduate 
.883 112 
.000 
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(iii) Shapiro-Wilk: Income 
Income range Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. 
 
 
H1: I have confidence the UK retail 
banking system is stable and secure 
<£13,500 
.820 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.900 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.917 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 .925 62 .001 
£150,001+ .640 6 .001 
 
 
H2:I have confidence that the money in 
my retail bank account(s) is protected 
should my bank fail 
<£13,500 
.822 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.906 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.838 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.852 62 .000 
£150,001+ 
 
.496 6 .000 
 
 
 
H3: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will provide me with sufficient information 
to make informed decisions 
<£13,500 
.809 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.862 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.897 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.917 62 .000 
£150,001+ 
.907 6 
 
.415 
 
 
 
<£13,500 
.848 128 .000 
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H4: I have confidence that my retail bank 
will do the right thing 
£13,501-£27,600 
.854 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.907 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.937 62 .003 
£150,001+ 
 
.908 6 .421 
 
 
H5: I have confidence that I am protected 
from retail bank misconduct 
<£13,500 
.863 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.859 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.879 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.927 62 .001 
£150,001+  
 
.775 6 .035 
 
 
H6: I have confidence that I can trust the 
expertise of my retail bank 
<£13,500 
.843 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.874 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.901 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.921 62 .001 
£150,001+ 
 
.805 6 .065 
 
 
H7: I have confidence that the price of 
retail banking products is fair 
<£13,500 
.888 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.921 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.925 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.926 62 .001 
£150,001+ 
 
.920 6 .505 
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H8: I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
<£13,500 
.783 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.863 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.851 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.916 62 .000 
£150,001+ 
 
.822 6 .091 
 
 
H9: In general, I have confidence that as 
a retail bank customer I am adequately 
protected 
<£13,500 
.817 128 .000 
£13,501-£27,600 
.866 122 .000 
£27,601-£43,000 
.832 114 .000 
£43,001-£150,000 
.907 62 .000 
£150,001+ 
 
.822 6 .091 
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APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(i) T-tests: Employed in the financial services sector 
T-Test Work in FS N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig (2-
tailed) 
H1: I have confidence the UK 
retail banking system is stable 
and secure 
Yes 18 4.83 .857  
-3.446 
 
430 
 
.001 
No 414 3.86 1.190 
H2 I have confidence that the 
money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should 
my bank fail 
Yes 18 5.17 .707  
 
-4.104 
 
 
430 
 
 
.001 No 414 4.45 1.112 
H3 I have confidence that my 
retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make 
informed decisions 
Yes 18 4.06 1.162  
 
0.455 
 
 
430 
 
 
.649 No 414 4.18 1.145 
H4: I have confidence that my 
retail bank will do the right thing 
Yes 18 3.83 1.339  
0.157 
 
430 
 
.876 
No 414 3.88 1.211 
H5: I have confidence that I am 
protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Yes 18 4.06 1.162  
.0.77 
 
430 
 
.939 
No 414 4.03 1,172 
H6: I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my retail 
bank 
Yes 18 3.83 1.505  
.354 
 
430 
 
.723 
No 414 3.93 1.174 
H7: I have confidence that the 
price of retail banking products 
is fair 
Yes 18 3.61 1.461  
-.128 
 
430 
 
.898 
No 414 3.57 1.244 
H8: I have confidence that I will 
not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank 
Yes 18 4.44 1.464  
-.047 
 
430 
 
.963 
No 414 4.43 1.050 
H9 In general, I have confidence 
that as a retail bank customer I 
am adequately protected 
Yes 18 4.44 1.097  
-.661 
 
430 
 
.509 No 414 4.28 1.045 
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(ii) Mann-Whitney U tests: Employed in the financial services sector 
 
Mann- Whitney U Work in FS N Median U z P 
H1: I have confidence the UK 
retail banking system is stable 
and secure 
Yes 18 5  
5410.5 
 
3.374 
 
.001 
No 414 4 
H2 I have confidence that the 
money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected should my 
bank fail 
Yes 18 5  
5186.0 
 
2.991 
 
.003 
No 414 5 
H3 I have confidence that my 
retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make 
informed decisions 
Yes 18 4  
3362.5 
 
-.738 
 
.461 
No 414 4 
H4: I have confidence that my 
retail bank will do the right thing 
Yes 18 4  
3581.0 
 
-.290 
 
.772 No 414 4 
H5: I have confidence that I am 
protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Yes 18 4  
3741.5 
 
.031 
 
.975 
No 414 4 
H6: I have confidence that I can 
trust the expertise of my retail 
bank 
Yes 18 4  
3649.5 
 
-.153 
 
.878 No 414 4 
H7: I have confidence that the 
price of retail banking products is 
fair 
Yes 18 4  
3751.0 
 
.050 
 
.960 No 414 4 
H8: I have confidence that I will 
not be unlawfully discriminated 
against by my retail bank 
Yes 18 5  
4114.0 
 
.802 
 
.422 
No 414 5 
H9 In general, I have confidence 
that as a retail bank customer I 
am adequately protected 
Yes 18 5  
4152.5 
 
.876 
 
.381 
No 414 4.5 
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(iii) T-tests: Gender 
T-Test Gende
r 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t df Sig (2-
tailed) 
H1: I have confidence the 
UK retail banking system is 
stable and secure 
Male 147 4.01 1.22  
1.34 
 
427 
 
.180 
Female 282 3.85 1.17 
H2 I have confidence that 
the money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected 
should my bank fail 
Male 147 4.55 1.16  
 
.928 
 
 
427 
 
 
.354 Female 282 4.45 1.07 
H3 I have confidence that 
my retail bank will provide 
me with sufficient 
information to make 
informed decisions 
Male 147 4.21 1.18  
 
.380 
 
 
427 
 
 
.704 
Female 282 4.17 1.12 
H4: I have confidence that 
my retail bank will do the 
right thing 
Male 147 3.97 1.27  
1.103 
 
427 
 
.271 
Female 282 3.84 1.18 
H5: I have confidence that I 
am protected from retail 
bank misconduct 
Male 
 
147 4.10 1.25  
.743 
 
427 
 
.458 
Female 282 4.01 1.12 
H6: I have confidence that I 
can trust the expertise of my 
retail bank 
Male 147 3.93 1.29  
-0.035 
 
427 
 
.972 
Female 282 3.94 1.13 
H7: I have confidence that 
the price of retail banking 
products is fair 
Male 147  3.66 1.36  
1.002 
 
427 
 
.317 
Female 282 3.53 1.20 
H8: I have confidence that I 
will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
Male 147 4.47 1.14  
 
.436 
 
 
427 
 
 
.663 Female 282 4.42 1.03 
H9 In general, I have 
confidence that as a retail 
bank customer I am 
adequately protected 
Male 147 4.41 1.05  
 
1.809 
 
 
427 
 
 
.071 
Female 282 4.22 1.04 
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(iv) Mann-Whitney U tests: Gender 
Mann- Whitney U Gender N Median U z p 
H1: I have confidence the UK 
retail banking system is 
stable and secure 
Male 147 4  
18981.5 
 
-1.488 
 
0.137 
Female 282 4 
H2: I have confidence that 
the money in my retail bank 
account(s) is protected 
should my bank fail 
Male 147 5  
 
19215.5 
 
 
-1.318 
 
 
0.185 Female 282 5 
H3: I have confidence that 
my retail bank will provide 
me with sufficient information 
to make informed decisions 
Male 147 5  
 
20002.5 
 
 
-.626 
 
 
.532 Female 282 4 
H4: I have confidence that 
my retail bank will do the 
right thing 
Male 147 4  
19104.5 
 
-1.382 
 
.167 
Female 282 4 
H5: I have confidence that I 
am protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Male 147 4  
19362.5 
 
-1.169 
 
.242 
Female 282 4 
H6: I have confidence that I 
can trust the expertise of my 
retail bank 
Male 147 4  
20337.5 
 
-.332 
 
.740 
Female 282 4 
H7: I have confidence that 
the price of retail banking 
products is fair 
Male 147 4  
19406 
 
-1.114 
 
.265 Female 282 4 
H8: I have confidence that I 
will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
Male 147 5  
19554 
 
-1.032 
 
.302 
Female 282 5 
H9: In general, I have 
confidence that as a retail 
bank customer I am 
adequately protected 
Male 147 5  
18467 
 
-1.976 
 
.048 
Female 282 5 
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(v) ANOVA and Tukey HSD test: Age 
ANOVA Age 
groups 
df1 df2 F Sig. Age groups Mean 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
H1  I have 
confidence the 
UK retail banking 
system is stable 
and secure 
 
18-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.218 
30-44 .337 
45-59 .329 
60+ .236 
 
30-44 
18-29 -.337 
45-59 -.008 
60+ -.101 
 
45-59 
18-29 -.329 
30-44 .008 
60+ -.093 
 
60+ 
18-29 -.236 
30-44 -.101 
45-59 .093 
 
 
 
H2: I have 
confidence that 
the money in my 
retail bank 
account(s) is 
protected should 
my bank fail 
 
18-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.129 
30-44 -.303 
45-59 -.367 
60+ -.326 
 
30-44 
18-29 .303 
45-59 -.064 
60+ -.023 
 
45-59 
18-29 .367 
30-44 .064 
60+ .041 
 
60+ 
18-29 .326 
30-44 .023 
45-59 -.041 
 
 
H3: I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank will 
provide me with 
sufficient 
information to 
make informed 
decisions 
 
18-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.702 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
30-44 .724* 
45-59 .582* 
60+ .443 
 
30-44 
18-29 -.724* 
45-59 -.142 
60+ -.280 
 
45-59 
18-29 -.582* 
30-44 .142 
60+ -.139 
 
60+ 
18-29 -.443 
30-44 .280 
45-59 .139 
 
 
 
 
H4:  I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank will 
do the right thing 
18-29  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
30-44 .941* 
45-59 .666* 
60+ .418 
30-44 18-29 -.941* 
45-59 -.275 
60+ -.523* 
45-59 18-29 -.666* 
30-44 .275 
60+ -.248 
60+ 18-29 -.418 
30-44 .523* 
45-59 .248 
 18-29     30-44 .504* 
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H5: I have 
confidence that I 
am protected 
from retail bank 
misconduct 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
3.721 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
45-59 .496* 
60+ .281 
30-44 18-29 -504* 
45-59 -.008 
60+ -.223 
45-59 18-29 -.496* 
30-44 .008 
60+ -.215 
60+ 18-29 -.281 
30-44 .223 
45-59 .215 
 
 
H6: I have 
confidence that I 
can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
18-29  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.955 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
30-44 .915* 
45-59 .827* 
60+ .617* 
30-44 18-29 .915* 
45-59 -.088 
60+ -.298 
45-59 18-29 -.827* 
30-44 .088 
60+ -.210 
60+ 18-29 -.617* 
30-44 .298 
45-59 .210 
 
 
 
H7:  I have 
confidence that 
the price of retail 
banking products 
is fair 
18-29  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.936 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
30-44 .931* 
45-59 .913* 
60+ .679* 
30-44 18-29 -.931* 
45-59 -.017 
60+ -.234* 
45-59 18-29 -.913* 
30-44 .017 
60+ -.234 
60+ 18-29 -.679* 
30-44 .257 
45-59 .234 
 
 
 
H8: I have 
confidence that I 
will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my 
retail bank 
18-29  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.354 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.71 
30-44 .360 
45-59 .300 
60+ .104 
30-44 18-29 -.360 
45-59 -.061 
60+ -.257 
45-59 18-29 -.300 
30-44 .061 
60+ -.196 
60+ 
 
 
 
 
18-29 -.104 
30-44 .257 
45-59 .196 
 
 
 
H9:  In general, I 
have confidence 
18-29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30-44 -.542* 
45-59 .357 
60+ .199 
30-44 18-29 -.542* 
45-59 -.185 
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that as a retail 
bank customer I 
am adequately 
protected 
 
3 
 
428 
 
4.67 
 
0.003 
60+ -.343 
45-59 18-29 -.357 
30-44 .185 
60+ -.159 
60+ 18-29 -.199 
30-44 .343 
45-59 .159 
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(vi) Kruskal-Wallis and pairwise comparison test: Age 
Kruskal-Wallis Age 
groups 
Md df N Sig (2-
sided) 
Age groups Adj. Sig 
H1:  I have 
confidence the UK 
retail banking 
system is stable 
and secure 
18-29  4  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.241 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
30-44 4 
45-59 4 
60+ 4 
H2: I have 
confidence that the 
money in my retail 
bank account(s) is 
protected should 
my bank fail 
18-29 5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.206 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
30-44 5 
45-59 5 
60+ 5 
H3: I have 
confidence that my 
retail bank will 
provide me with 
sufficient 
information to 
make informed 
decisions 
18-29 5  
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
30-44 4 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
45-59 4 18-29 .001 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 60+ 5 
 
 
H4:  I have 
confidence that my 
retail bank will do 
the right thing 
18-29 5  
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
30-44 4 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
60+ .008 
45-59 4 18-29 .000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 60+ 4 
 
 
H5: I have 
confidence that I 
am protected from 
retail bank 
misconduct 
18-29 5  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
.009 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
30-44 4 18-29 .038 
N/A N/A 
45-59 4 18-29 .012 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
60+ 4 
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H6: I have 
confidence that I 
can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
18-29 5  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
N/A N/A 
30-44 4 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
45-59 4 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
60+ 4 18-29 .002 
N/A N/A 
 
 
 
H7:  I have 
confidence that the 
price of retail 
banking products is 
fair 
18-29 5  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
30-44 3 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
45-59 3 18-29 .000 
N/A N/A 
60+ 4 18-29 .005 
N/A N/A 
H8: I have 
confidence that I 
will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my retail 
bank 
18-29 5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
  
 
 
 .096 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
30-44 5 
45-59 5 
60+ 5 
 
H9:  In general, I 
have confidence 
that as a retail 
bank customer I 
am adequately 
protected 
18-29 5   
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.008 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
30-44 4 18-29 .011 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
45-59 4 
60+ 5 
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(vii) ANOVA and Tukey HSD test: Education 
ANOVA Education df1 df2 F Sig. Education Mean 
Difference 
 
 
 
H1: I have 
confidence the 
UK retail 
banking system 
is stable and 
secure 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.689 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.046 
C .387 
UG .407 
PG .364 
College SS -.387 
UG .020 
PG -.023 
Undergraduate SS -.407 
C -.020 
PG -.023 
Postgraduate SS -.364 
C .023 
UG .043 
 
 
 
H2: I have 
confidence that 
the money in 
my retail bank 
account(s) is 
protected 
should my 
bank fail 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.744 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.157 
C .315 
UG .187 
PG .060 
College SS -.315 
UG -.218 
PG -.255 
Undergraduate SS -.187 
C .128 
PG -.127 
Postgraduate SS -.060 
C .255 
UG .127 
 
 
H3: I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will provide me 
with sufficient 
information to 
make informed 
decisions 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.017 
C .173 
UG .279 
PG .490* 
College SS -.173 
UG .107 
PG .317 
Undergraduate SS -.279 
C -.107 
PG .210 
Postgraduate SS -.490* 
C -.317 
UG -.210 
 
 
 
 
H4:  I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will do the right 
thing 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
C .401 
UG .463* 
PG .760* 
College SS -.401 
UG .061 
PG .359 
Undergraduate SS -.463* 
C -.061 
PG .298 
Postgraduate SS -.532 
C -.179 
UG -.289 
     C .353 
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H5: I have 
confidence that 
I am protected 
from retail bank 
misconduct 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
3.841 
 
 
 
 
 
.010 
UG .243 
PG .532* 
College SS -.353 
UG -.110 
PG .179 
Undergraduate SS -.243 
C .110 
PG .289 
Postgraduate SS .532* 
C -.179 
UG -.289 
 
 
H6: I have 
confidence that 
I can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.909 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.002 
C .096 
UG .332 
PG .559* 
College SS -.096 
UG .236 
PG .463* 
Undergraduate SS -.332 
C -.236 
PG .227 
Postgraduate SS -.559* 
C -.463* 
UG .227 
 
 
 
H7:  I have 
confidence that 
the price of 
retail banking 
products is fair 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.008 
C .284 
UG .398 
PG .577* 
College SS -.284 
UG .114 
PG .293 
Undergraduate SS -.398 
C -.114 
PG .179 
Postgraduate SS -.577* 
C -.293 
UG -.179 
 
 
 
H8: I have 
confidence that 
I will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my 
retail bank 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.381 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.248 
C .052 
UG .182 
PG .267 
College SS -.052 
UG .182 
PG .267 
Undergraduate SS -.182 
C -.129 
PG .085 
Postgraduate SS -.267 
C -.214 
UG -.085 
 
 
 
 
 
H9:  In general, 
I have 
Secondary 
School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C .308 
UG .266 
PG .536* 
College SS -.308 
UG -.042 
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confidence that 
as a retail bank 
customer I am 
adequately 
protected 
 
3 
 
428 
 
4.715 
 
.003 
PG .227 
Undergraduate SS -.266 
C .042 
PG .270 
Postgraduate SS -.536* 
C -.227 
UG -.270 
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(viii) Kruskal-Wallis and pairwise comparison test: Education 
Kruskal-Wallis Education Md df N Sig (2-
sided) 
Education Adj. Sig 
H1: I have 
confidence the 
UK retail 
banking system 
is stable and 
secure 
Secondary 
School 
4  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.040 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
College 4 
Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 4 
H2: I have 
confidence that 
the money in 
my retail bank 
account(s) is 
protected 
should my bank 
fail 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.135 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
College 4.5 
Undergraduate 5 
Postgraduate 5 
H3: I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will provide me 
with sufficient 
information to 
make informed 
decisions 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.005 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
College 4.5 
Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.003 
N/A N/A 
 
 
 
 
H4:  I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will do the right 
thing 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
College 4 Secondary 
School 
.033 
N/A N/A 
Undergraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.027 
N/A N/A 
Postgraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.000 
N/A N/A 
 
 
 
H5: I have 
confidence that 
I am protected 
from retail bank 
misconduct 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.002 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
College 4 Secondary 
School 
.049 
 
N/A 
 
N/A Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.001 
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N/A N/A 
 
 
H6: I have 
confidence that 
I can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
Secondary 
School 
5 3 432 .000  
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A College 4 
Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.000 
College .012 
N/A N/A 
 
 
H7:  I have 
confidence that 
the price of 
retail banking 
products is fair 
Secondary 
School 
4  
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.006 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A College 4 
Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 3 Secondary 
School 
.003 
N/A N/A 
H8: I have 
confidence that 
I will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my 
retail bank 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.257 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
College 5 
Undergraduate 5 
Postgraduate 5 
 
H9:  In general, 
I have 
confidence that 
as a retail bank 
customer I am 
adequately 
protected 
Secondary 
School 
5  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.002 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
College 4 
Undergraduate 4 
Postgraduate 4 Secondary 
School 
.001 
N/A N/A 
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(ix) ANOVA and Tukey HSD test: Income 
ANOVA Income df1 df2 F Sig. Income Mean 
Difference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1: I have 
confidence the UK 
retail banking 
system is stable 
and secure 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.557 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.185 
£13,501-£27,600 .283 
£27,601-£43,000 .323 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.199 
£150,001+ -.247 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.283 
£27,601-£43,000 .040 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.084 
£150,001+ -.530 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.323 
£13,501-£27,600 -.040 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.124 
£150,001+ -.570 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.199 
£13,501-£27,600 .084 
£27,601-£43,000 .124 
£150,001+ -.446 
 
 
£150,001+ 
 
<£13,500 .247 
£13,501-£27,600 .530 
£27,601-£43,000 .570 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.446 
 
 
 
 
 
H2: I have 
confidence that the 
money in my retail 
bank account(s) is 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.567 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001 
£13,501-£27,600 .201 
£27,601-£43,000 -.234 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.384 
£150,001+ -.760 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.201 
£27,601-£43,000 -.435* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.585* 
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protected should 
my bank fail 
£150,001+ -.962 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 .234 
£13,501-£27,600 .435* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.150 
£150,001+ -.526 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 .384 
£13,501-£27,600 .585* 
£27,601-£43,000 .150 
£150,001+ -.376 
£150,001+ 
 
<£13,500 .760 
£13,501-£27,600 .962 
£27,601-£43,000 .526 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.376 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H3: I have 
confidence that my 
retail bank will 
provide me with 
sufficient 
information to make 
informed decisions 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.787 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001 
£13,501-£27,600 .312 
£27,601-£43,000 .563* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.388 
£150,001+ 1.151 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.312 
£27,601-£43,000 .251 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.075 
£150,001+ .839 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.563* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.251 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.176 
£150,001+ .588 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.388 
£13,501-£27,600 -.075 
£27,601-£43,000 .176 
£150,001+ .763 
 
 
<£13,500 -1.151 
£13,501-£27,600 -.839 
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£150,001+ 
 
£27,601-£43,000 -.588 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.763 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H4: I have 
confidence that my 
retail bank will do 
the right thing 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
£13,501-£27,600 .342 
£27,601-£43,000 .457* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.679* 
£150,001+ 1.378* 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.342 
£27,601-£43,000 .114 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.337 
£150,001+ 1.036 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.457* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.114 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.222 
£150,001+ .921 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.679* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.337 
£27,601-£43,000 -.222 
£150,001+ .699 
£150,001+ 
 
<£13,500 -1.378* 
£13,501-£27,600 -1.036 
£27,601-£43,000 -.921 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.715 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.146 
£13,501-£27,600 .187 
£27,601-£43,000 .187 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.308 
£150,001+ 1.029 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.187 
£27,601-£43,000 -.001 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.121 
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H5: I have 
confidence that I 
am protected from 
retail bank 
misconduct 
£150,001+ .842 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.187 
£13,501-£27,600 .001 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.122 
£150,001+ .842 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.308 
£13,501-£27,600 -.121 
£27,601-£43,000 -.122 
£150,001+ .720 
 
£150,001+ 
<£13,500 -1.029 
£13,501-£27,600 -.842 
£27,601-£43,000 -.842 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.720 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H6: I have 
confidence that I 
can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.052 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001 
£13,501-£27,600 .203 
£27,601-£43,000 .448* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.598* 
£150,001+ 1.378* 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.203 
£27,601-£43,000 .245 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.395 
£150,001+ 1.175 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.448* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.245 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.150 
£150,001+ .930 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.598* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.395 
£27,601-£43,000 -.150 
£150,001+ .780 
 
 
<£13,500 -1.378* 
£13,501-£27,600 -1.175 
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£150,001+ 
 
£27,601-£43,000 -.930 
£43,001-
£150,000 
-.780 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H7: I have 
confidence that the 
price of retail 
banking products is 
fair 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
£13,501-£27,600 .542* 
£27,601-£43,000 .537* 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.742* 
£150,001+ .651 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.542* 
£27,601-£43,000 -.005 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.201 
£150,001+ .109 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.537* 
£13,501-£27,600 .005 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.205 
£150,001+ .114 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.742* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.201 
£27,601-£43,000 -.205 
£150,001+ -.091 
 
 
£150,001+ 
 
<£13,500 -.651 
£13,501-£27,600 -.109 
£27,601-£43,000 -.114 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.091 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H8: I have 
confidence that I 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.507 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.008 
£13,501-£27,600 .368* 
£27,601-£43,000 .249 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.558* 
£150,001+ .354 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.368* 
£27,601-£43,000 -.119 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.191 
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will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my retail 
bank 
£150,001+ -.014 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.249 
£13,501-£27,600 .119 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.310 
£150,001+ .105 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.558* 
£13,501-£27,600 -.191 
£27,601-£43,000 -.310 
£150,001+ -.204 
 
 
£150,001+ 
 
<£13,500 -.354 
£13,501-£27,600 .014 
£27,601-£43,000 -.105 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H9: In general, I 
have confidence 
that as a retail bank 
customer I am 
adequately 
protected 
 
 
<£13,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.285 
£13,501-£27,600 .160 
£27,601-£43,000 .150 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.357 
£150,001+ .089 
 
£13,501-
£27,600 
<£13,500 -.160 
£27,601-£43,000 -.010 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.198 
£150,001+ -.071 
 
£27,601-
£43,000 
<£13,500 -.150 
£13,501-£27,600 .010 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.207 
£150,001+ -.061 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
<£13,500 -.357 
£13,501-£27,600 -.198 
£27,601-£43,000 -.207 
£150,001+ -.269 
 
 
<£13,500 -.089 
£13,501-£27,600 .071 
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£150,001+ 
 
£27,601-£43,000 .061 
£43,001-
£150,000 
.269 
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(x) Kruskal-Wallis test and pairwise comparison test: Income  
Kruskal-Wallis 
 
Income Md df N Sig (2-
sided) 
Income Adj. Sig 
 
H1: I have 
confidence the 
UK retail 
banking system 
is stable and 
secure 
<£13,500 4  
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.125 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 4 
£27,601-£43,000 4 
£43,001-£150,000 4 
£150,001+ 4 
 
 
 
 
 
H2: I have 
confidence that 
the money in 
my retail bank 
account(s) is 
protected 
should my bank 
fail 
 
<£13,500 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001 
N/A N/A 
 
£13,501-£27,600 
4  
£27,601-
£43,000 
 
.029 
 
£43,001-
£150,000 
 
 
.009 
£27,601-£43,000 
 
 
5  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A £43,001-£150,000 
 
5 
£150,001+ 5 
 
 
 
 
<£13,500 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 4 
£27,601-£43,000 4 <£13,500 .000 
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H3: I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will provide me 
with sufficient 
information to 
make informed 
decisions 
 
 
4 432 .000 N/A N/A 
£43,001-£150,000 4 
£150,001+ 3.5 
 
 
 
 
 
H4: I have 
confidence that 
my retail bank 
will do the right 
thing 
<£13,500 5  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 4 
£27,601-£43,000 
 
 
4 <£13,500 .008 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
£43,001-£150,000 3.5 <£13,500 .001 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
£150,001+ 3 
 
 
H5: I have 
confidence that 
I am protected 
from retail bank 
misconduct 
<£13,500 
 
5  
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.044 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 
 
4 
£27,601-£43,000 
 
4 
£43,001-£150,000 
 
4 
£150,001+ 
 
3.5 
 <£13,500 5      
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H6: I have 
confidence that 
I can trust the 
expertise of my 
retail bank 
£13,501-£27,600 4  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.000 
N/A N/A 
£27,601-£43,000 4 <£13,500 0.15 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
£43,001-£150,000 3 <£13,500 .002 
 
N/A 
 
N/A £150,001+ 3 
 
 
H7: I have 
confidence that 
the price of 
retail banking 
products is fair 
<£13,500 4  
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
.000 
N/A N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 3 <£13,500 .001 
N/A N/A 
£27,601-£43,000 
 
3.5 <£13,500 .004 
N/A N/A 
£43,001-£150,000 3 <£13,500 .004 
 
N/A 
 
N/A £150,001+ 3.5 
 
 
 
H8: I have 
confidence that 
I will not be 
unlawfully 
discriminated 
against by my 
retail bank 
<£13,500 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.007 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 5 <£13,500 .037 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
£27,601-£43,000 
 
 
5 
£43,001-£150,000 
 
4 <£13,500 .009 
 
N/A 
 
N/A £150,001+ 4.5 
H9: In general, I 
have 
confidence that 
as a retail bank 
<£13,500 5  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
432 
 
 
 
.111 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
N/A 
£13,501-£27,600 4 
£27,601-£43,000 4 
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customer I am 
adequately 
protected 
£43,001-£150,000 4 
£150,001+ 4.5 
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APPENDIX E: CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
(i) Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: Age 
H6: I have confidence that I 
can trust the expertise of my 
retail bank 
Pearson Correlation -.120 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.12 
N 432 
H7: I have confidence that the 
price of retail banking products 
is fair 
Pearson Correlation .136 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 
N 432 
 
(ii) Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: Education 
H1: I have confidence the UK 
retail banking system is stable 
and secure 
Pearson Correlation -.098 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042 
N 432 
H3: I have confidence that my 
retail bank will provide me with 
sufficient information to make 
informed decisions 
Pearson Correlation -.152 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
N 432 
H4: I have confidence that my 
retail bank will do the right 
thing 
Pearson Correlation -.211 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H5: I have confidence that I 
am protected from retail bank 
misconduct 
Pearson Correlation -.138 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 
N 432 
H6: I have confidence that I 
can trust the expertise of my 
retail bank 
Pearson Correlation -.180 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H7: I have confidence that the 
price of retail banking products 
is fair 
Pearson Correlation -.161 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
N 432 
H8: I have confidence that I 
will not be unlawfully 
discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
Pearson Correlation -.097 
Sig. (2-tailed) .044 
N 432 
H9: In general, I have 
confidence that as a retail 
bank customer I am 
adequately protected 
Pearson Correlation -.164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
N 432 
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(ii) Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: Income 
H2: I have confidence that the money 
in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail 
Pearson Correlation .153 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
N 432 
H3: I have confidence that my retail 
bank will provide me with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
Pearson Correlation -.175 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H4: I have confidence that my retail 
bank will do the right thing 
Pearson Correlation -.208 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H5: I have confidence that I am 
protected from retail bank misconduct 
Pearson Correlation -.105 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 
N 432 
H6: I have confidence that I can trust 
the expertise of my retail bank 
Pearson Correlation -.206 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H7: I have confidence that the price of 
retail banking products is fair 
Pearson Correlation -.192 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 432 
H8: I have confidence that I will not be 
unlawfully discriminated against by my 
retail bank 
Pearson Correlation -.143 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 
N 432 
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APPENDIX F: STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
(i) H1: I have confidence the UK retail banking system is stable and secure 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Work In FS (No) -1.045 .000 .059 
Education (Secondary School) .397 .003 
Age (18- 29 ) .376 .013 
 
(ii) H2:  I have confidence that the money in my retail bank account(s) is 
protected should my bank fail 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Income (£13,501-£27,600) -.369 .002 .049 
Age (18-29 ) -.324 .022 
Work In FS (Yes) .598 .023 
 
(iii) H3: I have confidence that my retail bank will provide me with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .557 .000 .061 
Education (Secondary School) .313 .015 
Income (£27,601-£43,000) -.243 .050 
 
(iv) I have confidence that my retail bank will do the right thing 
 H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .723 .000 .084 
Education (Secondary School) .562 .000 
 
(v) I have confidence that I am protected from retail bank misconduct 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .461 .002 .040 
Education (Secondary School) .390 .003 
 
(vi) I have confidence that I can trust the expertise of my retail bank 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .801 .000 .103 
Education (Secondary School) .464 .001 
Education (College) .349 .008 
Income (£150,001+) -.975 .037 
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(vii) I have confidence that the price of retail banking products is fair 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .744 .000 .097 
Education (Secondary School) .378 .008 
Income (<£13,500) .294 .035 
 
(viii) I have confidence that I will not be unlawfully discriminated against by 
my retail bank 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Income (<£13,500) .362 .001 .024 
 
(ix) In general, I have confidence that as a retail bank customer I am 
adequately protected 
H1 B Sig. R square 
Age (18-29 ) .382 .001 .042 
Education (Secondary School) .398 .003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
